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Editor's Foreword 
The cold war is now said to be over. Confrontation has been 
replaced by cooperation. In another perspective: the dramatic 
and revolutionary events we have been witnessing in Europe 
are in a way elements in the closing of an era largely formed 
by the Second World War. But ethnical strife, re-emerging 
nationalism and unsolved geographical problems remind us that 
some problems will simply not go away. The challenges that 
e.g. Moldavia, the Baltic states, Karelia, the Kuriles, the 
Balkans and the Soviet Union and a unified Germany repre-
sent, mark in a way the rebirth of history, not the end of 
history. 
The Second World War was perceived as a moral and 
ideological conflict. In its announced war aims, each side 
committed itself to crusades: Germany and its allies against 
communism; Japan against colonialism; Britain, the United 
States, and the Soviet Union (after June 1941) against fascism 
and militarism. In early April 1940, however, the war was still 
not a world war and still not a total one. 
In early April 1940 the War was still two separate Wars: 
Germany versus the Western Allies in Europe; and Japan 
waging war against China in East Asia. The Soviet Union was 
de facto a neutral ally of Germany, and the United Stales on 
the sideline, but secretly trying to find ways to help the 
United Kingdom. 
In September 1939 Poland had been attacked and occupied by 
Germany and the Soviet Union, and Finland had to make 
peace in March 1940 after the Soviet attack on N ovembcr 30 
1939. The war at sea and in the air continued. The victorious 
Wehrmacht was deploying against France, and the next 
offensive in Europe was only a question of time ... To the 
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surprise of most people, the next attack came not in the west, 
but in the north, against the small neutral countries, Denmark 
and Norway ... 
A considerable amount of research exists on the campaign in 
Norway, and the Narvik campaign in particular. But as noted 
by Olav Riste in his introduction, much of that research had 
naturally centred on national perspectives. Moreover, earlier 
classified material has been declassified, e.g. intelligence 
material, and has been used by several participants in a fruitful 
way. In April and May 1940 for example, German radio 
intelligence was more successful in deciphering the British 
naval ciphers than British intelligence was with the German 
ciphers at that time. The result was that, as noted in Jiirgen 
Rohwer's contribution, 30 to 50 per cent of the intercepted 
signals were available after short delays. 
Some of the essays also speak volumes on the role played 
"not only by skill and planning and courage, but by sheer 
good luck," to borrow a phrase from Michael Howard. One 
could add chance as well. A case in point was the German 
torpedo failures. The battleship W arspite was attacked three 
times by German submarines. Three cruisers, many destroyers, 
and transport vessels were also attacked. The result: one 
·transport vessel sunk. "What might have happened", asks 
Jiirgen Rohwer, "if all the torpedoes had worked as expected?" 
For practical purposes and as a help to the readers, this 
collection has been divided into two parts. Part I, The Road 
to North Norway, deals with the events and deliberations that 
led to the Gennan attack, codenamed Operation Weserabung, 
and the Allied responses. 
Part II, called The Banle for Narvik, focuses more on the 
actual military campaign and operations that culminated in the 
allied recapture of Narvik - Hitler's first setback on land in 
the war. Bridging the two parts is the essay by T. Kingston 
Derry, who is the only British contributor. Otherwise each of 
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the five nations that fought in the campaign is represented by 
two or more historians. 
It must certainly be called rather unique in the history of 
Norway that such a small country, and Narvik in particular, 
figured for months among the high priority concerns of several 
great powers. But in what lies the importance of Operation 
Weserubung in military history today? Several answers may be 
suggested. First, there is the fact of the use of airdropped 
troops for the first time despite the fact that this was a vital 
surprise element in the planned offensive in the West. Another 
example is the high risk and severe losses which the German 
navy was prepared to accept in an operation that was "against 
every rule of naval warfare". Pessimistic admirals talked about 
more than 50 per cent naval losses. Operation Weserubung 
also stands out as the war's first joint operation of army, navy 
and air force planned and commanded by the OKW under 
Hitler's immediate influence. Despite its success, however, it 
was to remain only an episode in the history of the Wehr-
macht. The German armed services soon reverted to operating 
in separate compartments. 
Another aspect worth noting is that the two amphibious 
landings during the N arvik battle fostered increasing Allied 
interest in combined operations in terms of amphibious assaults 
on Axis-held tenitory in Europe, culminating in Normandy in 
June 1944. 
A particularly difficult problem that these essays could only 
touch upon was the impact of the Soviet Union on the prelude 
and perhaps also on the outcome of the Narvik campaign. Its 
attack on Finland on 30 November I 939 set in motion the 
chain of events that strongly increased the interest of Germany 
and the Western Allies in the Nordic countries. It is doubtful 
whether Germany could have attacked Narvik unless German 
tankers were ready in a Soviet harbour in the Kola peninsula 
in advance. Only one of the tankers, the fan Willem, reached 
Narvik on 8 April. In addition,the perceived danger from the 
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Soviet Union during the battle prevented the Norwegian 
authorities from transferring fresh units from East Finnmalk to 
the battle zone. If a front line battalion of infantry had been 
transferred, this could have made quite a difference to the 
Allied campaign. 
As it was, the Norwegian campaign ended in a clear German 
victory. In the long term, however, the strategic disadvantages 
clearly outweighed the advantages: the great losses of the 
German navy, and their probable impact on the subsequent 
cancellation of the invasion of the United Kingdom, were an 
immediate consequence. But even more important was the 
over-extension caused by the need to commit over 300,000 
troops to the defence of Norway against an Allied invasion 
that never came. Thus Germany's victory in June 1940 carried 
the seeds of its final downfall five years later. 
The essays collected in this volume are the result of an 
international seminar of historians held in Narvik 26-28 May 
1990, organised by the Norwegian Institute for Defence 
Studies. The theme, location, and timing of the seminar were 
not accidental. Fifty years earlier, on the very days the 
seminar was in session, Narvik was recaptured by Allied and 
Norwegian troops, soon to be lost again to the Germans for 
the second time. 
The editor would like to record his gratitude to the Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies, and in particular its adminis-
trative officer Colonel Sundstr~m and its principal secretary, 
Vigdis Bj~rklund, for the smooth arrangement of the seminar. 
This book has benefitted greatly from the English language 
expertise of Marion Burdess and Irene Kulblik and the latter's 
sub-editing, and Francois Rebattet has translated Philippe 
Masson's essay from French. 





As Dr Derry reminds us in his essay, the battle for Narvik has 
been called "the most completely researched operation of the 
war". Can the same be said for the political and strategic 
prelude to the war? And if so, what was the point of another 
conference on the subject? 
My answer to the first question is: "Yes, maybe". My answer 
to the second question is rather longer. It is a fact, which we 
historians still struggle to get around, that historical research 
is still primarily conducted along national lines. This is partly 
for linguistic reasons, and partly for practical reasons con-
nected with the accessibility of source material. But elements 
of national prejudice also play a part, especially when review-
ing controversial events close to our own time. A major value 
of a seminar such as the one held at Narvik lies therefore in 
bringing together historians from all the nations involved to 
confront them with different national interpretations of the 
events, and to seek - not necessarily a complete consensus, but 
at least a common understanding so that remaining differences 
of interpretation do not coincide with national borders. 
The second reason for holding such a seminar is the impor-
tance of making the results of our researches known to the 
public. It is a fact that many myths still persist in the minds 
of even the generally well-infonned public - myths often 
cemented by the media. Anyone who followed the Norwegian 
mass media during the first half of 1990 will have seen how 
old misconceptions keep returning to the surface at each 
anniversary of that fateful year 1940. By making the seminar 
open to the press and the public we were making another and 
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very determined effort to share with the widest possible 
audience our views, interpretations, and conclusions. 
What, then, is the current state of international historical 
research concerning what we have called "The Road to North 
Norway"? When asked the same question fifteen years ago, at 
a conference in Oslo on "The Great Powers and the Nordic 
Countries 1939-1940", my own answer was that while we 
were clearly on the way to a better multi-national understand-
ing of the period, some national prejudices still marred our 
discussions.' The Narvik seminar, I am happy to note, was 
remarkable for the absence of such national blinkers. 
I should like to substantiate this by concentrating my introduc-
tory remarks to some of the issues that have been hotly 
debated in the past - debates that still reverberate in the media 
during each anniversary. But I will take as my point of 
departure the title of the first session: "The Road to North 
Norway". How, and for which reasons or motives, did four 
foreign states become involved in a war in this distant and to 
them unknown part of Europe? 
There can be no doubt that the longest and most difficult road 
to North Norway was the one which the forces of Poland in 
exile had to follow. It was therefore a particular privilege, at 
the seminar, to have Professor Panecki 's survey of the political 
events that led to the re-constitution of a Polish Government 
in exile in Paris, and of the decisions of that government to 
carry on the struggle with forces that had escaped from the 
home territory as well as forces formed from Poles living 
abroad. The participation of Polish forces in the effort to evict 
the German invader from Norway was remarkably uncontro-
versial among the Polish authorities in exile. The reason, 
according to Professor Panecki, was simple: Poland's raison 
d' erat, and the strategic concepts that followed, demanded the 
continuation of the war until the final victory over Nazi 
Germany and the conclusion of a just peace. 
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Many of the historical controversies of the past have centred 
on the motives for the German invasion of Norway. For long -
indeed for too long - there were historians who tended to 
portray the German invasion as a defensive move to forestall 
an impending invasion by the Western powers. It was a 
particularly refreshing experience during the seminar to hear 
the distinguished German historian Professor Salewski lay to 
its final rest the simplistic idea of a "race for Norway" which 
continued until the Germans on 9 April "got there first". With 
his unrivalled expertise as a naval historian, Professor Salewski 
has given us a clear understanding of how the German Naval 
Command saw the occupation of Norway as necessary in 
terms of the role they wished to play in Hitler's war- Norway 
here meaning South Norway up to and including Trondheim. 
North Norway, according to Salewski, only entered the picture 
after the outbreak of the Winter War in Finland, as a conse-
quence of Allied plans to land in Narvik and secure the 
Swedish ore fields. Hence the necessity of occupying the 
whole of Norway. From then on, as he says in his paper, "the 
necessity of invading the whole of Norway was stronger than 
all operational and logistical risks". 
On the side of the Western Allies, the already fairly well 
established picture of confused planning, based on unrealistic 
assumptions, has been further strengthened by the contributions 
of Dr Kersaudy and Dr Derry. Although historians are not in 
the business of apportioning guilt or innocence among the 
actors, it is hard to escape the conclusion that the French 
provided most of the driving force behind the schemes for the 
opening of a front in Scandinavia. As we have seen, those 
schemes were without exception of "remarkable unreality": 
they disregarded not only the obstacle of Scandinavian 
neutrality, but also the operational hazards of the difficult 
terrain and communications as well as the lack of properly 
trained forces. Still, those schemes were pursued. And the 
reason, according to Dr Kersaudy, was that both Daladier and 
Reynaud "'were subjected to the same political and strategic 
imperatives: It was impossible to continue doing nothing, but 
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there must be no operations on the frontiers of France". In that 
perspective the British, increasingly sensitive to the same 
political imperative, and constrained in the end to accept the 
French strategic imperative, agreed to mine-laying in Norway 
as the softest option. This had been Wins ton Churchill's 
preferred alternative all along. And it did have the distinct 
advantage of being practical. Mine-laying also had the added 
advantage in British eyes of fitting into Britain's preference for 
war by economic blockade instead of by armed struggle. But 
its effect on the ore traffic would probably have been negli-
gible. 
The hesitations, throughout this wrangle, of the two most 
powerful figures in the British War Cabinet - Chamberlain and 
Halifax - cannot but strengthen doubt~ whether an Allied 
intervention on land in Norway would have occurred after 8 
April without a prior German attack. In fact most students of 
British decision-making in those days would put it more 
strongly, remembering what the Secretary of State for War 
said at the War Cabinet meeting which approved the so-called 
"Plan R.4" on 5 April: "If the Germans were going to react at 
all, they would probably do so very shortly after we laid our 
minefield. We should therefore probably soon know whether 
the forces to be held in readiness in the United Kingdom 
could be dispersed. "2 
One clear and important conclusion from the seminar was the 
crucial failure of intelligence to comprehend that an invasion 
of Norway was about to take place. Since both strategic and 
tactical surprise were essential preconditions for a successful 
German assault, a correct assessment of what was afoot might 
have changed the course of history. So why did intelligence 
fail? There are both long and short answers to that question. 
The long answer was eloquently presented to the seminar by 
Dr Derry. I shall have to limit myself to the short one: what 
it basically comes down to is what one British historian has 
called "strategic prejudice".' On the British side, the prejudice 
consisted of a firm conviction that British naval power made 
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a large-scale German invasion of Norway impossible. Hit-and-
TWl attacks, or even a temporary seizure of one or two points 
on the coast of South Norway, were the limits of Gennan 
capabilities in the area. The British would therefore in any 
case have what is now called "escalation control". According-
ly, the German naval movements during 5-8 April were 
interpreted in the light of what the British Admiralty expected 
might happen, which coincided with what the German Naval 
Command hoped the British would believe: namely that it was 
a prelude to a break-out into the Atlantic. 
On the Norwegian side this failure of intelligence was of 
course particularly crucial. For it is at least possible to imagine 
that better prepared Norwegian defences might have led to 
failure for the German assault. Even such a realistic judge as 
Norway's Commander in Chief during the campaign, General 
Ruge, wrote in June 1940 as follows: 
"If we had been reasonably prepared, our starting 
position during the first days would have been quite 
different from what it was. The Germans would have 
been stopped or thrown back into the sea. We would 
have gained time; the allies would have gained time; and 
they would have had a Norwegian army to work with 
instead of the small bands of freedom fighters which was 
all l could offer them.'~ 
So what failed on the Norwegian side? That the Gennans 
should achieve tactical surprise against the Norwegians is no 
wonder: no one should expect the rudimentary Norwegian 
apparatus for the collection and analysis of intelligence to 
comprehend what the flawed but still vastly superior British 
"secret services" did not understand. As far as strategic 
surprise was concerned, Norway's perception of the threat was 
similar to that of the British in its firm belief in the British 
naval deterrent against a Gennan invasion. But it contained a 
peculiar twist in tile Norwegian fear that serious British 
infringements of our neutrality might trigger off Gennan 
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reprisals, with further escalation up the vicious circle towards 
full Norwegian involvement in the war. 
In the more long-term perspective, so clearly brought out by 
Professor Skodvin, Norway's road to war raises a whole 
spectrum ofintemal political disputes connected with Norway's 
failure to rearm in time, and our inability to make our 
neutrality credible to or respected by the European great 
powers. But some of those issues may seem of more remote 
interest to an international audience. Some of the issues are 
also disputes that are bound to go on almost regardless of 
what we as historians have to say about them. Still, the 
proceedings of the Narvik seminar 1990 should help to bring 
the debate a major step forward. 
Notes 
1. See Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 2, 1977, No. 
1-2, for the proceedings of that conference. 
2. Public Record Office, London. Cab 65/12, W.M. (40) 
82nd Conclusions, Minute 6. 
3. Patrick Salmon, Scandinavia in British Strategy Sep-
tember 1939-April 1945 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Cambridge, July 1979) p. 263. 
4. Translated from 0. Riste (ed.), Otto Ruge: Felttoget 
(Oslo 1989) pp. 204-5. 
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Part I 
The Road to North Non.vay 

Chapter l 
Aspects of Neutrality: 
The Non.vegian Experience 
M. Skodvin 
I propose to discuss a few aspects of neutrality, as a general 
concept and as a practical guideline in Norwegian policy, in 
the period immediately preceding the German invasion. This 
must necessarily include a few more general remarks on 
policies and trends of thought, such as the awareness of 
possible danger and threat, some basic concepts of strategic 
thinking in Norway at the time: in short, a brief Norwegian 
approach to some of the themes that have been prominent in 
research and in general comment abroad. 
But first of all, allow me a reflection of a more general nature 
on the history of very small nations and how they relate to 
what is usually called "world history", in Norwegian verdens-
historie. 
The history of Norway is of course primarily international 
history in its regional or local version, conditioned by the 
distinctive characteristics and qualities of country and society, 
particularly its peculiarities. This is a truism, as long as we are 
dealing with the history of civilisation in general, such as 
influences and impulses in religion, art, literature and so forth, 
or with long-term trends in economic, political and, to a lesser 
extent, social history. 
When it comes to the history of war and warfare, however, 
Norwegians have in general been fortunate in remaining 
anonymous, sideline-sitters, watching European wars not even 
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from the grandstand, but from a small hilltop farther off, the 
"free hill", gratishaugen, that nature almost automatically 
provides for every Norwegian skijumping hill. When people, 
in this country, talked about "world war", most of us did not 
really include Norway in the world where such wars originated 
and were fought The events that we are here to commemorate 
have changed all that In a matter of months the grand 
strategy of four major European powers, involved in a 
European war, converged on Scandinavia, and Norway became 
their victim. Seen from abroad, this was one minor campaign 
amongst many, dramatic, technically interesting, and disastrous, 
especially in its consequences. Seen from here, it was more 
than chaotic. It inaugurated totally new bearings, and from 
some points of view, political as well as military, a thorough 
revaluation of what had been considered axiomatic, an 
Umwertung aller Werte. Just for once, may we remember that 
we are told never to say "never"? I submit the contention that 
never, in the history of events, has the world around us 
produced such shock waves in the direction of Norway. 
Where, and how, did they originate? That is where we in this 
country need to know very much more about the world hi 
general. How can these events be described, as seen from 
here? This is where, with a few outstanding exceptions, 
historians around the world have much to learn about Norway. 
Seen from abroad, the battle for Norway becomes the story of 
the Gennan, or the British, or the French campaign on 
Norwegian territory; the land itself appears mostly as a theatre 
of war, one among so many others. Numerous accounts 
describe why specific groups wanted to go there, how they 
went, how they perfonned, and how they left: in short, 
Norway is seen as an object in the history of the world. Our 
gallant Polish allies know more about that than we do. 
Here in Narvik you are on the other side of the hill. You are 
invited to sit here and see everything coming towards you. It 
should change your perspectives considerably. On a global 
scale, Robinson and Gallagher did the same thirty years ago, 
with Africa, placing themselves there to watch the new arrivals 
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and their consequences, instead of starting once again from 
London, from Paris, from Berlin, to discover what had always 
been there. Imagine a map where you are not misled by 
Mercator, or by the South-North orientation. If you look 
eastward from London in 1943, you do not see yourself as 
sitting on an island off the coast, but rather as a crew member 
on a fairly small boat, looking straight at a shark's jaws. If 
you imagine a similar tour d' horizon, the view from Norway 
in January 1940 was of aggression or plans for aggression 
from all sides, even from the arctic North; for you must not 
forget that when you looked down on Bodiil on your way here, 
you were only about halfway to Kirkenes, near what was then 
the Finnish border. 
On 6 January 1940 Norway received threatening notes from 
the Soviet Union and from Great Britain, the latter one 
explaining reasons for the decision to undertake belligerent 
operations in Norwegian territorial waters. In France, the 
Deu:xieme Bureau was examining plans for a landing in 
Petsamo, or for occupation of southern Norwegian ports, and 
of possible ways of getting to Oslo. Soon Kirkenes would be 
substituted for Petsamo, and even ports farther west in North 
Norway would be considered. In Gennany, Hitler himself was 
considering the Studie Nord. In another couple of days he was 
to forward plans for the consideration of the Wehnnacht. 
While Western Europe was talking of Sitzkrieg, Phoney War, 
drole de guerre, the war was being fought in Finland and on 
the oceans, in other words on all four sides of Norway, a 
country considerably bigger than Great Britain with Northern 
Ireland, but with a population of roughly three million 
inhabitants only, a population density of nine to a square 
kilometer, and, in tenns of military strength, a lamb among 
the wolves. How could so vulnerable a nation seek to protect 
itself against becoming involved in the war? 
Neutrality, it has been said, was an unwritten part of the 
Norwegian constitution. Once upon a time, neutrality had its 
doctrine, its rules of treatment, and it was confidently expected 
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to be respected as a protection for those who wanted to stay 
out of other peoples' wars. The concept was eroded, because 
the major powers did not respect it when it seemed to work 
against their own national interests. To what extent could it 
still, at the outbreak of the Second World War, be expected 
to offer some kind of protection? 
Norwegian neutrality policy came under heavy criticism from 
all belligerents. I submit that exaggerated criticisms were 
dictated by the same type of self-interest, to serve as pretexts 
for intervention, and to cloak real intentions. 
Which, then, were the main problems, and how were they 
handled by Norwegian authorities? Norwegian territorial waters 
are likely to provide the most representative test cases. 
The sea-lanes along the coast of Norway are among the 
longest inland waterways for international transit. The rights 
of passage in wartime are codified in the Haag conventions, 
notably nr. XIII (1907). On a number of occasions, they were 
violated by Gennany, and by the Allies, sometimes openly, 
and in other cases by deceit, subtlety and guile. The Gennan 
U 38 sank ore transports bound for Britain in Norwegian 
waters, December 1939. The British Cossack entered the 
Jf<}ssingfjord to attack the Gennan Altmark in February 1940. 
Several German ships, including the Altmark, tried to pose as 
merchant ships or as warships, according to what seemed most 
expedient at the moment, for instance by switching from 
merchant flag to the Reichsdienstflagge. Ships of the British 
navy were observed entering Norwegian territorial waters 
without claiming right of passage. In most of these cases, 
Norwegian authorities were able to proceed according to the 
rules, and arrive at a satisfactory solution. It may still surprise 
some of you to learn that on 19 March, in the House of 
Commons, Prime Minister Chamberlain stated, in a reply to 
Mr Dalton, that navy and air force had "kept a constant and 
continuous watch upon these waters in order to see whether in 
fact German warships were violating them. If we had been 
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able to establish a single case of the kind, we would not have 
hesitated ourselves to enter these territorial waters and to 
attack such a ship, but we have not, up to the present, been 
able to establish evidence that such violation has taken place, 
with the one exception, now some months ago, - I am leaving 
the A/tmark at the moment - when three vessels were, 
according to our information, destroyed in territorial waters ... 
I can honestly say that over a very long period we have been 
unable to establish any violation by German warships of 
Norwegian neutral waters which would justify us in going into 
these waters and, in turn, violating that neutrality." 
And now, the cause celebre, the Altmark: this famous Tross-
schiff also violated Norwegian neutrality by giving false 
information when inspected, and by using her radio to 
communicate with German personnel in Oslo, although it 
should be added that the message was intercepted, and that the 
captain offered his excuses. 
The British raid into Norwegian waters, however, had nothing 
to do with this. Its purpose was to liberate the British prison-
ers of war, since Norway had not done so. Was this a valid 
justification? In its note of 15 March, the Foreign Office 
stated: "If a belligerent warship, paying a legitimate visit of 
·not more than 24 hours to a neutral port, has prisoners on 
board, this does not in itself impose any obligation upon the 
neutral Government." The A/tmark did not even do that, she 
just passed through. The British argument ran as follows: The 
object of the passage was "to complete with impunity the 
belligerent operation which began with the capture of the 
British seamen". Hence, it could not be described as the 
"simple passage" of the Hague convention. To this, the 
Norwegian government very sensibly replied that "any warship 
belonging to a belligerent navy may have been engaged in a 
battle at one moment or another ... It is difficult to see how 
it could be admitted that it is compatible with neutrality that 
a warship pays visits to the ports of neutral states carrying on 
board prisoners of war, and at the same time consider it 
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inconsistent with the neutrality that the warship passes through 
the neutral territorial waters in order to return home ... " 
Finally, the crucial question: should the Norwegian escort have 
opened fire on the Cossack? The Norwegian view was, and 
had been for a long time, that a neutral power is under no 
obligation to use power against an overwhelmingly superior 
force. This was emphasised by the Norwegian delegation to 
the Hague more than 90 years ago, and included in the 
standing instructions of the Norwegian navy. The Norwegian 
government was gratified to receive, immediately, the full 
support of an outstanding American authority on international 
Jaw, Professor Philip C. Jessup: "Our sympathies for the Allied 
cause against the Nazis should not blind us to the just rights 
of a small neutral ... Especially since the famous dispute 
between England and the United States over the Alabama 
claims it has been agreed that the neutral's duty is relative and 
not absolute." In the language of the Hague convention the 
neutral has a duty to "use the means at its disposal to prevent 
violations of its neutrality. If the United States with its great 
navy failed to prevent a hostile act in its territorial waters it 
might be chargeable with a failure to observe its neutral 
duties, whereas a similar failure on the part of Nicaragua or 
Norway might involve no liability". In a layman's language, 
and more colloquially, the very strong Norwegian protests did 
not have to be signed with blood spent for no sensible 
military purpose at all. 
It is one of the ironies of history that the Altmark incident 
provided excellent propaganda material for the German 
invasion. In Germany it was interpreted as final proof that 
Allied escalation preceding the launching of the Scandinavian 
expedition had reached a point where German countermeasures 
could only be interpreted as mere self-defence, and also as a 
clear sign of Norwegian subservience. In Great Britain and 
even more in France, the opposite interpretation prevailed: 
Norwegians were so afraid of Germany that they let the 
Germans have a free run of their sea-lanes. In other words, 
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and in plain language: both sides had violated Norwegian 
neutrality, and both blamed Norway. The facts are that on the 
Gennan side preparations for an invasion had already reached 
a stage where further justification was welcome, and the 
Leitmotiv of having to forestall the British dominated in the 
megaphones of Gennan propaganda. The facts on the British 
side are that the incident almost led to the cancellation of the 
Scandinavian expedition, because Norwegian and Swedish 
acquiescence, a pennanent precondition, seemed more remote 
than ever before. The French government, less sensitive on this 
count, spoke for an immediate descent on the Norwegian 
coast Considered from the present, what does all this prove? 
It shows that established principles, ratified by all panies 
involved, were twisted to suit the self-interest of the offenders. 
What do we conclude from this, that Norwegian policymakers 
lived in a dream world, and had not discovered or been 
introduced to the facts of life in international politics? It has 
indeed been suggested, and we must ask the historian's usual 
question: "Is it consistent with the facts?" 
The strong man of Norwegian foreign policy was the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Professor Halvdan Koht, himself a his-
torian. He is a much abused and frequently misquoted man. 
For instance, he never said that if we behave strictly according 
to the rules we are safe, or anything similar. What he said, 
was: "If we are to be guided by international law to the letter, 
in every particular, we are invulnerable to criticism" - he did 
not say to aggression - and he added: "at least, nobody could 
be justified in complaining about us", and further: "this does 
not imply any particular confidence that pure law and justice 
would be respected" ("tru pil at den 'reine retten' vi/le bli 
respektert''). One of his early works was a biography of 
Bismarck. He was thoroughly conversant with European 
Realpolitik. In fact, I am not convinced that his opinion on 
that issue should be considered inferior to that of someone like 
Halifax. He was keenly aware of the dangers that threatened 
Norway from the West, and he repeatedly warned, in Starting 
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sessions behind closed doors, of similar danger from Germany. 
These records have been avaliable for many years (since 
1981). 
Koht, and the Nygaardsvold cabinet, had no naive confidence 
in a neutrality umbrella. Their main problem was political, in 
fact a problem of Rea/politik. It was obvious that in a worst-
case scenario, Norway could never play the role of a second 
Finland: even the Wehrmacht (350,000 men strong in Norway, 
more than the French army in peacetime) could not guarantee 
an efficient defence of the coastline as early as 1941. One of 
the implicit guarantees of Norwegian defence depended on the 
balance of power in Europe. The reasoning behind this 
guarantee was that in wartime, no major power could afford 
to let its adversary take possession of Norway. Norwegian 
forces must be able to hold until assistance arrived. In 1940, 
this held true. In South Norway, however, the assistance 
proved to be a case of too little and too late. In North 
Norway, there was time. The battle for Nortb Norway was 
lost, not in Narvik, but in Flanders. The underlying dilemma, 
however, was a political one. In case of Allied landings, could 
Norway accept assistance from Hitler's Germany? It was 
thought (or decided) not. Was German propaganda justified 
then in accusing Norway of having abandoned impartial 
neutrality, and taken the A!lied side? 
It was axiomatic to the Nygaardsvold cabinet, at an early 
stage, that if every possibility was lost, if Norway was being 
dragged into the war, there was no choice. Hitler could not be 
Norway's ally. It was equally agreed that the Allies - in 
practice the British - must never be allowed to take this for 
granted. In this, Norway was successful. One fundamental 
question is ever present in the hundreds and hundreds of 
documents now available in the PRO: what will Norway do? 
By persuasion, by pressure, by innuendo and by open chal-
lenges, the British tried to engender at least a fragile hope for 
some kind of accommodating attitude, without success. To 
Germany, this problem did not exist. Within the German 
22 
leadership, political solutions were never contemplated. 
Minister Briiuer's repeated suggestions from Oslo, that 
Germany should rely on Norwegian neutrality and support it 
by political means, were discarded. The idea of a strategic 
assault had been adopted as soon as serious planning began. 
In Hitler's mind there was no alternative. 
Was Norwegian neutrality policy based on illusions? Koht's 
concept was recently described as hopelessly behind its times, 
"a policy for the nineteen-twenties". It may well be so, in the 
sense that, in the age of Locamo, at the time when Briand and 
Stresemann came to Oslo to share the Nobel peace prize, one 
might hope that it should henceforth be possible for peaceful 
states to stay out of war, unless they were the victims of 
direct aggression. By the same criterion, one has to look far 
beyond the twenties for a similar model of major power 
strategy - for instance to the slogan of "my country, right or 
wrong". The differences between them are differences of 
degree, and they are considerable. The persuasion and pressure 
recipe of the UK is rather remote from the French war cry of 
attaque brusque, and the diplomatic approaches of the Allies 
are a far cry from the singleminded German concentration on 
a strategic assault without alternatives. Nevertheless the lesson 
of the neutrality period must be that there is no efficient 
policy capable of keeping a small country out of war, if both 
belligerent parties decide to descend upon it, leaving no 
alternative but complete submission; when the local D-day 
arrives, one has to face the music, as Norway had to do. 
Time has already put all of this far behind us. To younger 
generations it is to a rapidly increasing degree academic. We 
are not here to revive old quarrels, but to put them on file. 
This particular campaign and its origins is history, the pen has 
succeeded the sword. The vision of a less warlike future no 
longer strains our capacity of belief, as it used to. In this 
context, a policy of, say 1928, may well turn out to be a 
workable policy for the nineteen-nineties. 
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Chapter 2 
France: The Quest for 'External Theatres 
of Operations" 
F. Kersaudy 
In France, during the autumn of 1939, one preoccupation 
seemed to dominate all others in the debates between the high 
political and military authorities: that of avoiding a frontal 
attack against the Siegfried Line. Indeed, Generalissimo 
Gamelin and General Georges, two illustrious veterans of the 
First World War aged 68 and 65 respectively, both refused to 
initiate offensive operations against German territory. This was 
of course primarily because they had no material means of 
doing so; but it was also because they wished to spare their 
country the disastrous losses of the previous war - and 
themselves the risk of being blamed in the event of defeat. 
However, since for obvious political reasons it was impossible 
to do nothing at all, the Generalissimo and his staff resorted 
to a strategy that had worked wonders during the previous 
war; it had the added advantage of presenting few risks, while 
requiring only a small expenditure in human and material 
resources: the blockade of Germany, for which Britain, with 
its control of the sea, would assume the main responsibility. 
Of course, within the framework of that blockade, it might 
become necessary to undertake some military operations in the 
so-called "External Theatres of Operations". In fact, that was 
exactly where Norway entered the picture; in London, back in 
September 1939, Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the 
Admiralty, was already contemplating a mining operation in 
Norwegian territorial waters, in order to interrupt Germany's 
iron ore supplies. Churchill could not bring his Cabinet 
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colleagues to endorse this plan: on the other hand, it was 
greatly favoured by the French navy. But, at the Supreme 
Headquarters of the French armed forces in Vincennes, a 
somewhat more ambitious - and more meridional - strategy 
was being contemplated at the time. 
The French experts who had examined the German economy 
had reached precisely the same conclusions as their British 
colleagues: Scandinavian iron ore was vital to the German 
economy. Yet they had also discovered two other elements just 
as important for the German war effort: transportation, 
especially through the Danube waterway, and oil coming from 
Rumania and the Caucasus. Now at General Gamelin's 
headquarters, the strategists of 1939 - who were in most cases 
the same as those of 1918 - recalled the brilliant operations 
that had been conducted during the First World War in the 
Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle East. At the time, 
they had led by a chain reaction to the capitulation of 
Germany. The old dream of a decisive operation in the East 
was therefore extremely lively in the minds of the French 
planners during the autumn of 1939; they were contemplating 
the possibility of interrupting Germany's fluvial communica-
tions on the Danube, and sending an expeditionary force to 
Thrace, to Salonica or Istanbul in order to cut Germany's 
RQmanian oil supplies by opening a second front in the 
Balkans. (1) It was with these plans in mind that the French 
supreme Command had sent General Weygand, aged 72, to 
assume command of all French forces in the Near East. (2) As 
for German supplies of Russian oil, the possibility of a naval 
offensive in the Black Sea, as well as that of bombing and 
even land operations in the Caucasus, were also being 
contemplated. (3) 
Unfortunately for the French, such ambitious undertakings 
could only be carried out with British participation - and the 
British were more than reluctant. At the September session of 
the Supreme Council, when Prime Minister Daladier ac-
quainted his British counterpart Chamberlain with the plans 
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that were being devised by the French staffs, Undersecretary 
of State Cadogan noted that Chamberlain gently threw great 
buckets of water on all these schemes. (4) As a result, the 
French were forced, willy-nilly, to fall back on a Scandinavian 
theatre that was far less familiar to them. As General de 
Villelume was later to put it: "The only way to get out of the 
impasse in which we were stuck was to deprive Germany of 
its iron ore supplies. That was the crucial issue". (5) 
For Daladier, the issue was only crucial in so far as the 
country's morale was sinking fast, and the members of 
parliament were growing increasingly restive. His government 
was already being accused of showing insufficient energy in 
the prosecution of the war. An operation in Norwegian 
territorial waters of the kind advocated by Churchill would be 
ideally suited to shore up his government, while drawing 
warlike operations safely away fron the French front, and 
saddling the British ally with responsibility for the undertak-
ing. But Norway remained obstinately neutral and, in London 
at the beginning of October, Churchill himself had failed in 
his attempt to persuade the British Cabinet to override that 
neutrality. 
The Soviet attack on Finland at the beginning of December 
was to supply the necessary excuse. On 18 December, the 
General Secretary of the League of Nations sent all member 
countries a telegram urging them to supply all possible 
material and humanitarian aid to Finland. On the very next 
day, Daladier placed before the Supreme Council a plan for 
the assistance of Finland. It included the dispatch of a Franco-
British expeditionary force that would land at Narvik and then 
cross Norwegian and Swedish territory in order to reach 
Finland, thus implementing the League of Nations resolution. 
On their way to Finland, the troops would admittedly en-
counter the iron ore mines of Swedish Lappland - a fortunate 
coincidence, in so far as the Allies had long been seeking a 
way of interrupting the iron ore traffic bound for Germany. 
Daladier had indeed been much impressed by Fritz Thyssen 's 
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memorandum, insisting on the crucial importance of that iron 
ore for Gennany. "Now of course", Admiral Auphan later 
wrote, "it's a bit cynical to say so, but no one really hoped to 
stop the Soviet anny and save Finland. The idea was to use 
the pretext of such an operation to lay our hands on the 
Swedish iron ore, and thus deny it to Gennany." (6) 
But regardless of the pretext, both Norwegians and Swedes 
simply remained unwilling to let anyone cross their territory, 
as they reminded the British in several unambiguous diplo-
matic notes. Thereupon, both Daladier and Admiral Darlan 
found much attraction in a scheme originating from Finland, 
that provided for a landing to be carried out directly in 
Finland, at Petsamo. In spite of the rather forbidding nature of 
the terrain, of the immense difficulties involved in carrying out 
a landing at this latitude, of the serious drawbacks of a direct 
confrontation with the USSR, and ... of the considerable 
distance separating the north of Finland from the iron ore 
mines of Swedish Lappland, the French General Staff imme-
diately set to work devising plans for a landing at Petsamo. 
But that was not all; the French military officials, still 
hypnotised by the mirage of the orient, were also preparing 
plans for operations in the Balkans, Turkey and the Caucasus! 
For another two months, all these plans, involving the north 
as well as the south of the globe, were to be developed 
simultaneously, with truly astonishing disregard for the 
strategic and political realities of the moment. 
On 13 January 1940, Admiral Darlan received from Prime 
Mirtister Daladier an order to prepare plans for a naval action 
against Petsamo, Munnansk, Narvik and North Norway, to 
which was added on 16 January the Swedish port of Luleaa. 
In other words, Sweden, Norway, Finland and the USSR ... 
yet three days later, Darlan was also instructed by the Prime 
Minister to "prepare a preliminary plan for a possible interven-
tion aiming at the destruction of the Russian oil fields", 
specifically by means of "a direct intervention in the Cau-
casus". (7) Daladier and Darlan were by no means the only 
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French officials who had succumbed to the attraction of 
operations in outlying theatres; General Weygand, who insisted 
on "crushing the USSR in Finland" (8), was also willing, 
provided he received some reinforcements and 200 airplanes, 
to "storm the Caucasus" and "cut into Russia like a hot knife 
through butter". (9) Generalissimo Gamelin was also in favour 
of the Scandinavian expedition, but he also advocated "opera-
tions of war in the Balkans and the Caucasus". (10) 
All the above may explain why Captain Stehlin, reporting to 
the General Staff of the French air force at the beginning of 
February 1940, was told by the Air Chief of Staff, General 
Bergeret: "Only by striking at the Soviet Union will we be 
able to deprive Hitler's Germany of the resources it requires, 
while at the same time drawing war away from our borders. 
In Syria and Lebanon, General Weygand has assumed com-
mand of the armed forces that will head for Baku in order to 
snuff out the production of oil. From there, they will make for 
the north, and join up with the armies marching from Scandi-
navia and Finland towards Moscow." (10) 
This rather haphazard strategic planning was to be pursued for 
the whole of February and the better part of March, following 
- admittedly from a distance - the evolution of the Finno-
Soviet conflict. When the latter ended in mid-March, it also 
brought to an end all plans for a landing in Finland - and Mr 
Daladier's government as well ... But his successor Paul 
Reynaud remained beset by the very same political and 
strategic imperatives: no operations near the French borders, 
yet at the same time the utter impossibility of doing nothing 
at all, since that would doom the new government just as it 
had doomed the previous one. Since the same causes invari-
ably led to the same effects, Paul Reynaud was soon infected 
by the virus of operations in distant places: the Swedish ore 
mines, of course, but also the oil wells of the Caucasus, 
maritime traffic in the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea, the Danube 
... Palavers, studies and plans of all these possibilities were 
therefore pursued without interruption, and by the afternoon of· 
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8 April 1940 Paul Reynaud's War Cabinet was still examining 
... the military and economic consequences of opening an 
Eastern Front! 
British moderation 
It goes without saying that all such plans involving northern 
Europe or the Orient could be implemented only with British 
participation. Yet ever since September 1939, as we know, the 
British had refused to take them seriously, inasmuch as they 
all implied the very serious risk of a military confrontation 
with the USSR. This London absolutely refused to contem-
plate, as Neville Chamberlain discreetly but firmly hinted to 
his French counterpart during the Supreme Council sessions of 
19 December 1939 and 5 February 1940: a landing at Petsarno 
was ruled out, and exotic Oriental operations were likewise 
entirely out of the question. But during the session of 5 
February Chamberlain did express a willingness to contemplate 
the possibility of an operation involving the Swedish ore 
mines, since the French insisted. Daladier naturally took this 
up with alacrity, so that a common Franco-British plan was at 
last put in hand; according to that plan, the British were to 
supply two divisions and two reinforced brigades, and the 
French a brigade of mountain troops, a regiment of the 
Foreign Legion and a Polish brigade, for an operation to be 
launched in the third week of March. French military officials, 
while pursuing their plans for exotic Eastern forays, seriously 
set to work implementing the Scandinavian scheme - which 
the Finno-Soviet armistice abruptly brought to an end on 13 
March 1940. 
After that, endless talks were resumed between the British and 
French allies, with the new Premier Paul Reynaud in turn 
bringing strong pressure to bear on Chamberlain in favour of 
an offensive operation in any strategic theatre: Norway, 
Sweden, the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Causasus; against the 
neutrals, Germany, the Soviet Union, Italy, which one did not 
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matter provided parliament and public opinion were satisfied 
that war was being prosecuted vigorously enough ... "The 
idea", wrote Jacques Mordal, "was simply to do something -
even if it was something stupid". (I I) 
All this was to end in compromise at the Supreme Council 
session of 28 March. There, Chamberlain once again rejected 
any idea of an Eastern operation against the Soviets, and 
carefully refrained from comments on all other operational 
plans involving the Balkans. However, since it was clearly 
impossible to do nothing at all, he ended up agreeing to the 
seemingly most harmless operation: Churchill's plan for 
mining Norwegian territorial waters in order to stop the ore 
traffic to Germany. In exchange, the French would agree to 
launch magnetic mines designed to hamper German navigation 
in the Rhine (provided the French War Committee concurred). 
"Mr Chamberlain and the British", wrote Admiral Auphan, 
"were willing to run far greater risks than ourselves as far as 
Norway was concerned, provided we agreed to run greater 
risks concerning the Rhine Front. ( ... ) These two operations 
were entirely unrelated, and linking them made no sense. Yet 
that is exactly what was done at the Supreme Council." (12) 
As a result of this strange piece of bargaining, it was therefore 
agreed to set the Norwegian operation in motion between April 
4 and 5. But it will be noted that at no time did either 
Reynaud or Chamberlain mention the possibility of a German 
reaction, and the necessity of countering it. But in fact, even 
this soon became irrelevant since, the French War Committee 
having rejected the scheme for mining the Rhine, the British 
decided to retaliate by postponing the Norwegian operation. 
Churchill eventually persuaded them to relent, as a result of 
which the latter operation was finally scheduled to take place 
on 8 April. 
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Preparations 
The rather messy developments described above would 
naturally lead one to expect a certain confusion in the detailed 
preparations for the expedition. This was indeed the case: on 
4 January I 940, General Gamelin had ordered the constitution 
of a mixed brigade made up of mountain battalions, that was 
to operate in Finland under General Bethouart; it was to land 
at Petsamo. At the beginning of February a new order arrived: 
the landing was to take place at Narvik instead. On 16 March, 
after the Finno-Soviet armistice, the whole expeditionary corps 
was dissolved, the mountain brigade was sent back to its base 
in the Jura, all its equipment returned to the quartermaster's 
stores, and the whole transport fleet disbanded after vehement 
protests from the Admiralty. But on 28 March, while the 
politicians had not even considered the possibility of a German 
reaction to their mining operation in Norwegian waters, the 
military on both sides of the Channel abruptly took steps to 
meet just such an eventuality. The French, without even 
awaiting orders from the government or the Ministry of War, 
retrieved the February plans, strove to adapt them to the new 
conditions, and set out to collect at top speed the troops and 
ships that had been dispersed a fortnight before. On 5 April 
the mountain brigade, still in the Jura, received orders to 
prepare for embarkation. Again without awaiting orders from 
the Ministry of War, Admiral Darlan requisitioned three cargo 
ships and a passenger liner, the Vi/le tf Alger. That same day, 
General Bethouart received his first precise orders in almost a 
month: "G<~neral Audet instructed me to prepare a forward 
detachment, just as on I I March. This could naturally 
foreshadow a new departure. I asked the quartermasters at 
Lyon to give me back the equipment, but they refused". The 
next day, the French secret services having at last discovered 
the preparations being made in German ports, General 
Bethouart received more pressing orders: "We were alerted", 
he wrote, "I ordered all soldiers to return to base, I again 
asked the quartermasters to give me back my equipment, to 
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which they answered: 'Yes, but not tomorrow, since doing this 
on a Sunday would be too conspicuous'." (13) 
Hurdles 
In view of all the above, it may seem fortunate that the 
British had been entrusted with overall responsibility for the 
expedition and, if need be, were to land their troops first on 
Norwegian soil. This at least partially explains the rather 
disconcerting nonchalance shown by Generalissimo Gamelin in 
this whole affair. But in addition, the French troops about to 
embarlc for Norway suffered at the outset from four crippling 
handicaps. For one thing, there was a conspicuous lack of 
understanding between their civilian and military chiefs: Paul 
Reynaud and his Minister of War Daladier had long ceased to 
be on speaking terms, and the latter carefully refrained from 
sharing with Reynaud the military information to which he 
was privy. As for Reynaud, he would have liked to replace 
Generalissimo Gamelin, whom he deemed incompetent, yer the 
latter was supported by Daladier, who was threatening to 
resign if Gamelin were forcead to leave; now for compelling 
reasons of parliamentary arithmetic, Reynaud's government 
could not do without the support of Daladier's party ... 
Daladier in turn remonstrated severely with Gamelin, particu-
larly over the fact that troops earmarked for Norway had been 
issued with only one artillery group. (14) From his head-
quarters in Vincennes, Gamelin rejected all blame, and in turn 
accused Daladier of "interfering in the conduct of operations", 
whereas the government "had no right to be acquainted with 
the measures contemplated for the expedition, or the forces to 
be earmarked for it" - no doubt a somewhat restrictive 
conception of a government's role in wartime ... Besides, 
Gamelin, while jealously guarding his prerogatives, also 
appeared to take a somewhat restricted view of his responsi-
bilities in the Scandinavian affair, if General de Villelume is 
to be believed. The latter noted that Gamelin "was not 
interested in the matter. The French contingent was set up 
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without any central direction. The Third Section at Head-
quarters having tried to take a hand in it, the Staff at Vin-
cennes hauled it on the carpet". (16) To all this must he added 
that the Foreign Ministry was bitterly complaining that the 
military were leaving it in the dalk, and that the Admiralty 
was indignant at receiving no orders from Paris concerning the 
preparation of troop transports for Norway. Admiral Darlan 
had personally assumed responsibility for collecting ships in 
the ports, but he was in turn "increasingly mad at the General-
issimo". (17) 
The second handicap wa~ doubtless the fascination that the 
largely mythical "Eastern Front", located somewhere between 
the Balkans and the Caucasus, continued to exert on all French 
military officials, very much including General Gamelin. In 
fact, it explains to a large extent their lack of enthusiasm for 
the Scandinavian expedition. As a result, every single piece of 
equipment, every means of transportation, each artillery piece 
had to be literally wrestled from a highly reluctant General-
Staff that had earmarked them for more sunny climes - with 
unexpected consequences at times; thus the six antiaircraft 
guns obtained with great pains for the Scandinavian Expedition 
only came with instructions in Rumanian: they had been 
earmarked for the Balkans ... (18) 
The lack of information concerning the objective constituted 
the third great handicap. The British had abstained from 
sharing their own information - of which they had precious 
little anyway - and the French Foreign Ministry itself appar-
ently refused to share with the military whatever it had 
gathered. As a result, the military were compelled to base their 
operational plans on the crumbs of information they could 
collect from tourist guides. (19) Thus the French troops bound 
for Narvik had only the most elementary information about 
that port - which was to prove useless anyway, since the 
British immediately diverted them to Namsos instead. On the 
other hand, the artillery group that followed had been issued 
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maps of Berlin and its suburbs (20) - which was pemaps 
slightly premature. 
To top it all, me embarkation for Norway was to proceed in 
the most chaotic conditions; equipment was loaded aboard 
ships as it arrived - i.e. in the greatest disorder - as a result 
of which precious pieces of equipment and armament were to 
go astray on loading or during the trip. As for the departure 
from Brest, it was marked by the most frightening scenes of 
haste and confusion. 
Only during the second half of April, once the troops had 
landed in Norway, would the consequences of all this become 
apparent. But by then it was too late, for the French forces -
like the British forces in fact - had been gathered, equipped 
and embarked for a peacetime landing in a neutral country. 
Yet after 9 April, they were to carry out opposed landings in 
a country that was almost entirely occupied by the enemy. 
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Chapter 3 
Germany and North Norway: 
Strategy and Ideology 
M. Salewski 
The Gennan attack on Norway of 9 April 1940 was a typical 
national-socialist political crime, but it was the result of 
correct strategic thinking as well. Until the Moscow Peace 
between Russia and Finland of March 1940, you can speak in 
truth of that famous "race" between the Gennan and British 
admiralties, which Churchill as well as Waiter Hubatsch (in 
Gennany) and others have described in their early books on 
the Norwegian campaign. But after 12 March it has obviously 
been the initiative of Admiral Erich Raeder himself pressing 
very strongly on Hitler to initiate the assault. Raeder first of 
all was worried that the lasting danger imposed by the British 
on Norway would trouble and destroy the whole Gennan naval 
strategy. This strategy was based on the idea of cutting off the 
British lines of communications in the Atlantic Ocean. This 
idea, however, could never have been realised with nearly the 
whole Gennan fleet concentrated in the southern North Sea as 
a real "fleet in being", only expecting a British action against 
Norway, not knowing at all whether and when it would ever 
come. Raeder believed that it would be better to launch a 
preemptive strike against Norway than to fall back to a 
position of "wait and see". This is, in a very compressed fonn, 
the real reason of Weserubung and anyone who has to think 
in strategic tenns will accept the fact that the Seekriegsleitung 
was just thinking according to strategic needs. 
In spring 1939, this pure and proper strategic thinking led the 
professionals in the German Admiralty to the result that the 
occupation of Norway would be a brilliant idea, but neverthe-
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less nothing less than wishful thinking at the same time. All 
strategic and logistic studies had led to the result that Norway 
really would be a good base for German submarines, as well 
as for destroyers and cruisers, but that the German fleet was 
far too small and too weak to accomplish a successful naval 
assault on Norway. In any case it seemed to be better to deal 
with a strictly neutral Norway. Only thus did there seem to be 
a realistic chance of obtaining sufficient amounts of iron ore 
from Sweden via Narvik. If Norway remained neutral, the 
inner Norwegian shores could then be used by German 
shipping. 
Naturally the brains trust in the Seekriegsleitung knew all 
about "worst-case-thinking". The worst case would be gene-
rated by a British assault on Norway. It was very easy to 
imagine the consequences of British naval bases in Norway: 
the whole German navy would then be cut off from the high 
seas. This would have been even worse than in the First 
World War, when the German fleet had been barred in the 
German Bight, and when there had not been the slightest 
chance of brealdng through the northern barrier, as the passage 
via the English Channel had of course been bottled up by 
British forces. 
·The German naval records reflect these dilemmas on nearly 
every page concerning the northern war. Many of the most 
sldlful German naval officers were convinced that it was only 
a question of some weeks or months until Great Britain would 
try to realise the geographic advantages of Norway, and indeed 
we know now that the British Admiralty thought exactly in 
this direction. It would have been very strange if it had not, 
and that makes it simple for historians to understand the 
German and British sea strategy as far as Scandinavia is 
concerned. 
Nevertheless Hitler and the OKW knew very well that the 
Norwegian neutrality, from the political point of view, was as 
important as the neutrality of Belgium had been before the 
37 
First World War. Everybody remembered very well the 
political reactions of Great Britain in the first three days of 
August 1914. It was therefore not certain whether Britain 
would violate Norwegian or Danish neutrality in order to 
improve her strategic bases in the North Sea. That was exactly 
the reason why the Germans too were scrupulous. Only a 
precise analysis of the pros and cons could have answered the 
question whether it was better to respect Norwegian neutrality 
even if it were continuously endangered by the Western Allies 
or to risk a preventive action against any possible Allied 
military action in Norway or Norwegian waters. 
Certainly we have to ask ourselves what this perception of 
British strategy really meant. Without any doubt there were 
first of all the simple professional operational and strategic 
aspects. But if we remember the Hitlerian policy after the 
campaign against Poland and if we are willing to take into 
account the reasons for the "Phoney War" in the west, it 
seems less than pure speculation to say that Hitler was always 
hoping to postpone the great war with Britain. Hitler knew as 
well as any of his advisers that a German assault on Scandi-
navia would provoke exactly the same consequences as those 
provoked in 1914 by violating Belgian neutrality. An assault 
on Norway would have been the point of no return: Hitler was 
not yet willing to go so far. 
But Raeder was! During the formation of the German fleet, 
between 1935 and 1938 Raeder too hoped that the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement of 18 June, 1935 would lead to a 
final alliance between the two "Germanic" countries. Hitler 
himself had firmly pointed out that he did not wish any war 
with Italy, Japan or, most of all, with Great Britain. This 
directive was bluntly accepted by the German naval High 
Command because everybody knew very well that in the event 
of another Anglo-German war, things would be no better than 
in 1914-1918. 
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Gennan historians do not quite agree on the exact terminus ad 
quem when Hitler and Raeder were convinced that the conflict 
with England was unavoidable - but earlier or later, who can 
tell? I imagine that it would have been late autumn of 1937. 
Up to then no specific strategic planning against Britain took 
place. In the various war games Britain always played the role 
of a benevolent neutral. Certainly there had been officers, like 
Albrecht, who did not believe in this scenario, but the official 
line of strategy was maintained up to 1938. The political crisis 
of May 1938 provoked a climax: Raeder was sure now that 
England would be on the other side; the whole Z-P/an was 
nothing other than the reflection of this new political and 
strategic conviction. 
But it is of great historical interest that this famous plan was 
no answer at all to the actual British threat. It could have been 
realised only over a period of about ten years. In the mean-
time the Gennan navy would be weaker than it ought to be if 
all resources were focused on the British problem. It was 
exactly this point which led to the famous Donitz memoran-
dum of August 1939 being the last word of a long debate in 
the inner circles of the U-boat Commodores staff. Donitz was 
quite right when he pointed out that in the case of war with 
Britain there was no alternative but to enforce U-boat warfare 
by building as many U -boats as possible. Raeder was reluctant 
and Hitler too agreed with the hypertrophies of the "Z-Pian" 
which could only be realised in a decade. In short: political 
and strategic options as well as shipbuilding facilities differed 
enonnously. The question is: why? 
I think we have to clarify attitudes at different times. In my 
opinion there is no doubt that neither Hitler nor Raeder 
wanted to avoid the great war with Britain in the end, partly 
as a simple result of Nazi ideology and partly traditional naval 
revisionism: revenge for Scapa Flow! This great war in the 
Atlantic was anticipated for the years 1945-1950. In the 
meantime, however, it seemed better not to disturb Anglo-
Gennan relations by building submarines and discussing 
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geopolitical questions such as "Norway" or "Denmark". 
Gemzell has shown that an awareness of such questions really 
existed, and he emphatically pointed out that Weserabung was 
anticipated as early as in World War I, or at least in the late 
twenties, when the ideas of Alfred Wegener were infecting 
German sea strategy. All this is undoubtedly correct, but 
nevertheless irrelevant to the main problem: why did Raeder 
insist on Weserubung when he knew that the risks were almost 
too high - from both the political and strategic point of view? 
There are two main reasons. Firstly, Britain went to war with 
Germany, and Raeder, with a rather good knowledge of British 
history, was convinced that Britain would never again agree to 
an "Amiens". On the first day of war with Britain Donitz told 
his U-boat commanders that the war would last seven years, 
and he remembered the policy of Pitt versus Napoleon. Raeder 
and Donitz did not agree with Hitler's interpretation of British 
war-willingness; they were sure that after 3 September nothing 
but a clear victory or a clear defeat would bring Britain out 
of the war. 
The consequences were obvious! If Britain would fight 
regardless, it did not matter whether Germany violated the 
neutrality of any other state in Europe. From the very begin-
ning of war the SKL therefore put into effect the rather vague 
plans for Norway. You will find the steps to Weserabung in 
the war diaries of the Seekriegsleitung; it is not necessary to 
repeat the well-known facts. Without paying regard to any 
International Law, Weserubung was planned by the Gennan 
military. International law and problems of neutrality were set 
aside; it was the decision of the Fuhrer. 
I believe that it was indeed Hitler, who at first was reluctant 
because of International Law and the consequences of violating 
it. Certainly he did not make it a matter of conscience, but he 
always hoped that England at least would give in and "come", 
as it was put in the decades before World War I. Therefore he 
was relieved when he learnt from Schreiber and other sources 
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that the Allied Forces planned an action to help Finland via 
Norway. In this case a Gennan campaign against Norway was 
nothing but a justified reaction; it did not disturb the political 
hopes concerning Britain. We can see how Hitler, the OKW 
and Raeder played their parts together in preparing Weser-
ii.bung. 
To repeat: W eserii.bung planning since October 1939 was based 
on the assumption that Britain herself would take the first step. 
Therefore it seemed unnecessary to weigh the pros and cons: 
Gennany would be under heavy pressure and it would be 
impossible not to react to an Allied action on the northern 
stage. 
Everything changed when it became clear that the Allied help 
for Finland might never take place after the Moscow Peace. It 
does not matter whether the admiralty planned to invade 
Norway or not after this date - there are some obscure points 
in the official history after all, and I hope that they will 
become clear during this conference - the essential fact is, that 
Raeder and Hitler did not know anything about Allied plans 
concerning Scandinavia. There was no infonnation at all about 
this in Gennany: I do not know why; it may be that this was 
another triumph of the British secret service. 
The consequences are obvious: Raeder now changed his mind 
and finally convinced Hitler on 26 March that Weserubung 
had to be executed in the near future, that is to say, exactly 
before the bright northern midsummer nights would stop all 
tactical planning. Mid-April was the last opportunity, and 
Raeder successfully used it. 
But Weserubung proved not to be a simple realisation of 
Alfred Wegener's strategy. Studie Nord was finnly influenced 
by another basic idea which was generated by the Allied plans 
concerning support for Finland. Wegener had stressed the idea 
of involving only the southern and middle parts of Norway, 
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but the main problem now concerning the Seekriegsleitung was 
North Nmway and the Narvik region. 
Previously, North Norway had not been the main problem; in 
fact it had not been a problem at all. Nobody could imagine 
that it would be feasible to invade North Norway by sea, and 
if, contrary to all expectations, it had become necessary, it 
seemed impossible that the SLOCS (Sea Lanes of Communica-
tion, Ed.'s note) between Germany and Narvik ever could be 
safe. Only a sort of "tip and run" operation would have been 
a realistic option, and that was not considered sufficiently safe. 
That is why earlier German naval interest was not extended 
further north than up to Trondheirn. 
The overall strategic and political situation from the outbreak 
of the Winter War then cancelled all these reflections. Now it 
was obvious that North Norway was the centre of strategic 
interest for the Allies, because all military and logistic support 
for Finland had to be based on this part of the Scandinavian 
peninsula. To give up the invasion of North Norway would 
have meant the establishing of a new Allied-German front on 
the northern stage, and the geographic situation made it clear 
that in this case all advantages would be on the British side. 
It was therefore evident that only a complete occupation of 
Norway could avoid such a situation. 
It had to be avoided at all costs; the necessity of invading the 
whole of Norway was stronger than all operational and 
logistical risks. The SKL knew that Weserabung Nord was a 
very perilous operation, but knew that it had to be achieved. 
Therefore the whole operational planning concerning North 
Norway, was designated mandatory. In the SKL as well as in 
the OKW and in the headquarters of Hitler himself there were 
hopes that the Norwegians would not fight and that the 
invasion would be a "peaceful" one, but there were no 
illusions about the British reaction. It did not seem impossible 
that the whole British fleet, based on Scapa Flow, would come 
to grips with the German navy steering north; the danger of 
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another "Jutland" was imminent. This danger could only be 
avoided if the whole operation became a complete strategic 
surprise. 
It is not my job to tell the story of the operational and tactical 
outcome of Weserlibung on the northern stage. I have only to 
mention that the whole operation has to be seen as a political 
ideal, specifically that Weseriibung belongs to the general 
Gennan "grand design"; the invasion of Norway was not a 
strategic necessity for the aggressor but an ideological target. 
We know that Hitler would never have given independence 
back to Denmarlc and Norway; both countries were expected 
to fonn parts of the great "Gennanic Reich". Norway was 
intended to become the heart of this "Empire". There is also 
certain evidence that Hitler dreamed, as early as the spring of 
1940, of attacking the Soviet Union in order to realise the 
general "program", and this being accepted, it became obvious 
that the whole of Scandinavia together with Finland as a 
satellite would fonn the gigantic left flank of the German 
force which stood by to invade Russia. [What nearly happened 
during the Winter War: Allied support via North Norway to 
Finland could then have been turned into Allied support for 
Russia.] Considering the later PQ and QP convoy-routing in 
the Arctic Ocean, it is not difficult to imagine the strategic 
consequences of western bases in North Norway, Narvik 
included. Only by occupying the whole of Norway would it 
become possible to fight the Allied convoys in the Polar Sea 
with aircraft and destroyers. Norway in Allied hands would 
never have provoked the tragedy of PQ 17 and PQW 18. 
Fmally another interesting aspect has to be mentioned. It is 
related to the German-Russian negotiations after the well-
known Hitler-Stalin Pact of 23 August 1939. It was the 
Russians who put very strong pressure on the German naval 
officials to deliver a whole arsenal of naval equipment to 
Russia, including, it is well known, a large cruiser. Very soon 
Gennan naval omcers began to think of reciprocal compen-
sation. The idea of support bases in the Arctic was mooted 
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and found acceptable, the first being Archangelsk, and after 
that one in the Teriberka Bight, where indeed later Basis Nord 
was installed. Many years ago, I published the nearly unknown 
story of Basis Nord, and there you will find that this base was 
obviously only the beginning of a very ambitious strategic 
idea: logistically supported by Basis Nord, there were visions 
of a Gennan northern fleet, at least a strategic base for the 
home fleet which naturally was directed against the British 
fleet. Basis Nord was perhaps the only real strategic alternative 
to Weserabung, but it could only have worked if the Gennan-
Russian relations had remained friendly, because only Russian 
logistical support, for example by pennitting the use of the 
Arctic Canal, could ensure the continued operation of a 
Gennan naval base in the Arctic Sea. This episode indicates 
that even the so-called strategic necessities, which led to the 
invasion of Norway, were only consequences of the general 
war plan of the Nazis. It was perhaps the shadow of Russia 
which darkened the northern stage. 
In the end, it was all in vain. In fact, North Norway proved 
to be an extremely sore point in Gennan thinking. After the 
Gennan invasion of the Soviet Union, Norway became one of 
the greatest problems for Hitler. He was a! ways afraid of a 
British invasion in Norway and therefore he always stressed 
the necessity of strengthening the Norwegian bases. Finally, at 
the beginning of 1943, it was this problem which led to the 
fmal clash between Hitler and Raeder, which resulted in 
Raeder's dismissal. The last great Gennan battleship, the 
Tirpitz, was also destined to be lost in Norway. The almost 
incredible operational "luck" of 9 April, 1940, was later paid 
for with a lot of severe inconvenience, trouble and loss of life. 




Polish Destiny: From Westerplatte to Narvik 
T. Panecki 
On 1 September 1939 at 04.45 hours the Gennan baltleship 
Schleswig Holstein attacked the Polish Military Transit Depot 
on Westerplatte. For seven days and nights 180 soldiers 
successfully rebuffed attacks from the sea, land and air, 
delivered by superior Gennan forces. It was only when they 
had run short of ammunition, provisions and medicines that 
the Polish defenders decided to surrender. Westerplane was 
called "small Verdun" by the Gennans. 
Salvos from the Gennan battleship, which had gone to Danzig 
on a "courtesy visit", announced to the world that the Second 
World War had started. At the same time Gennan troops 
launched an attack along the whole 1,600 km of the Polish 
border. The Luftwaffe bombarded Polish villages and towns. 
The Gennan aggression was to cause much suffering and 
disaster in Poland; the nation was faced with the danger of 
extennination. 
When invaded, Poland opposed the aggressor by force of 
anns, disrupting Hitler's series of "peaceful" invasions. Poland 
was the first country in Europe to say "no" to the Gennan 
policy of blackmail and intimidation although the struggle was 
doomed to defeat from the start due to disproportion of forces. 
The strategical position of Poland, deeply outflanked from the 
north and south, made it easy for the Germans to carry out 
Fall Weiss. The plan provided for employment of two thirds 
of Gennan ground forces, including all their annoured and 
motorised divisions and all their bombers, against the Polish 
front The enemy had at its disposal crushing military superi-
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ority. The Gennan anny with strong industrial backup was at 
that time one of the most modem annies in the world. About 
1,500,000 men equipped with 2, 700 tanks, 2,000 planes and 
6,000 guns were reserved by the Third Reich for a direct 
attack against Poland. The Polish anny, amounting to approxi-
mately 1,000,000 soldiers not completely mobilised, lacked 
modern equipment and weapons, though it did not yield to the 
Wehnnacht in combat training. The country's inferior eco-
nomic and educational situation, its almost complete lack of 
industry, and its only slowly developing heavy industry caused 
all sorts of difficulties in supplying the anny with proper 
technology. The Polish anny had under its command only 300 
light and medium tanks and 500 reconnaissance whippet tanks. 
Artillery consisted of 4,000 guns and the air force had only 
400 planes, mostly outdated, ready to fight. The navy was 
equipped with 4 destroyers, 5 submarines, and 6 trawlers. 
Already after only a few days of war, there was no doubt that, 
in spite of stubborn and very often heroic resistance by the 
Poles, Gennan victory was only a matter of time. Gennany 
was fighting the war against the whole Polish people: the 
Gennans murdered civilians, shot hostages, and made terrorist 
raids on unprotected cities. From the first hours of the war the 
capital of Poland, Warsaw, was constantly being razed from 
the air. Poland became the first target of Gennan fury, the 
Polish nation was the first to learn and understand what a total 
war, directed at a whole race with reprieve for none, meant. 
Entering into an unequal conflict with Gennany on I Septem-
ber 1939, Poland expected her Allies, France and Great 
Britain, to fulfil their obligations. So, when these two powers 
declared war on the Third Rcich, Poland responded with great 
enthusiasm. Fighting against a much stronger enemy, she now 
felt that she was no longer alone, with such strong allies. 
Poles were expecting an offensive in the West any day. The 
French anny and the British air force as well as the Royal 
Navy raised high hopes. Polish-British military cooperation in 
the event of war had already begun on 30 August when the 
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three Polish destroyers Blyskawica (Lightning), Burza (Thun-
derstorm) and Grom (Thunder) left Gdynia and headed for 
harbour in the Scottish port of Rosyth. When hostilities broke 
out they were joined by the submarine Wilk (Wolf) and a little 
later by the Orzel (Eagle), which escaped from the port of 
Tallinn in Estonia where she had been interned, and after a 
daring escape, during which she sailed without any navigation 
instruments, she succeeded in baffling her German pursuers. 
Three other vessels the Rys (Lynx), Sep (Vulture) and Zbik 
(Wildcat) entered Swedish ports and were interned there. 
According to the Polish-French alliance signed in 1921 and 
new terms approved in May 1939 during staff talks, the 
French army was to undertake limited offensive actions three 
days after mobilisation, and 15 days later a general offensive 
on the western front was to be launched. In view of the above 
agreements the Polish Commander in Chief, Marshal Edward 
Rydz-Smigly, conducted rearguard actions while awaiting a 
decisive blow from his western Allies. The Allies, however, 
disappointed him. Indeed, on 6 September French units 
undertook some limited offensive actions but during the 
meeting of the Supreme Allied Council in Abbeville on 12 
September, because Poland's position was regarded as catastro-
phic, it was agreed to renounce an offensive on the western 
front. However, Poland was not informed of this decision. At 
that very moment la driJle de guerre (the Phoney War) on the 
western front began. 
The Polish authorities had assumed in their military calcula-
tions that the Soviet Union, with whom Poland signed a pact 
of non-aggression in 1932, would stay neutral. Though the 
Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 23 August 1939 spelled obvious 
German-Soviet rapprochement and made Poland's position 
worse, Polish leaders depended on the Soviets not to interfere 
in a conflict with Germany. 
Meanwhile important decisions, which would appear pregnant 
with consequence for further Polish resistance, were taken in 
47 
Moscow. On 17 September at 03.00 hours Molotov's deputy, 
Wladimir Patiomkin, met the Polish ambassador, Waclaw 
Grzybowski, and read out his government's memorandum to 
him. It was submitted that, since the Polish state had been 
overthrown and the Polish government as well as the country's 
capital ceased to exist, it had become necessary to take the 
Ukrainians and Byelorussians under the Soviet protection. In 
that situation the Soviet government had ordered its forces to 
cross the Polish-Russian border. The ambassador did not 
accept the memorandum stressing the fallacy of the asserted 
facts. Nevenheless, at 04.00 hours the first Russian divisions 
entered Poland. 
In view of the fact that the plans for the war with Germany 
had not anticipated Russian intervention, Polish border troops 
did not know how to cope with the unforeseen events. Some 
of them resisted the invader; others surrendered without 
fighting. Nobody knew why the Red Anny units had appeared 
on the Polish soil; some people even supposed the Soviets 
would come to Poland's assistance, though the Ribbentrop-
Molotov Pact was clearly at variance with this view. It was 
only after the Russian troops had advanced funher that the 
situation became clear. The Russians were apparently moving 
forward according to a definite plan which. it was later found, 
had been based on a secret protocol enclosed with the pact of 
23 August. 
The information on the Russian memorandum and the Red 
Army's invasion of Polish territory struck a blow at the Polish 
government, who, fleeing the country with the diplomatic 
corps for fear of an attack by Gennan forces, was then 
approaching the Polish-Rumanian border. Beforehand, the 
Polish govement had made contact with the Rumanian 
authorities about the transit of Poles through their territory and 
was granted an unofficial and quick transit of the President 
and the Cabinet to the port of Constanca on the Black Sea. It 
has to be admitted that Rumania was in a very difficult 
situation, pressed on both sides by the Russians and Germans. 
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Germany was interested in Rumanian oil, while Russia coveted 
Bessarabia which had belonged to her in the Czar's time. 
Under the terms of the treaty with Poland signed in 1921 
Rumania should have gone to war after 17 September when 
the Red Army attacked Poland, but in the event that was out 
of the question. Polish authorities expected only some facili-
tation for their speedy passage to France. On the evening of 
17 September, with Russian troops advancing rapidly, the 
President, the Cabinet, the Commander in Chief and some 
Polish units found shelter in Rumania. 
Despite the Russian invasion and the significant numerical 
superiority of the German forces, the 11ghting in Poland was 
still going on: Hel'pa, Modlin and Lvov were defending their 
positions; Warsaw, though brutally bombed by the Luftwaffe, 
was fighting fiercely; and besieged Polish forces continued to 
carry out their defensive action. Warsaw capitulated on 28 
September and the last Polish troops ceased fighting on 5 
October in the Kock area. The Polish-German campaign ended 
in defeat, but neither the Polish government nor the Supreme 
Command of the Army surrendered. 
Polish losses during the 35 days of fighting with Germany 
amounted to 70,000 killed and 130,000 wounded. It still 
remains uncertain how many Polish soldiers died in battles 
with the Red Anny units. 400,000 soldiers were taken prisoner 
by the Germans and over 200,000 by the Russians. Some 
85,000 men were interned in Rumania, Hungary, Lithuania and 
Latvia. 
The September campaign in Poland was the Wehrmacht's most 
costly victory and, as it temporarily halted German expansion, 
Poland's allies were given a chance to advance their defence 
preparation. According to Polish information Gennany lost 
45,000 killed and wounded in the Polish campaign and at the 
same time German losses on the western front amounted to 
1,600 soldiers. The war effort in Poland considerably lowered 
the combat capability of the German anny: nearly 1,000 tanks 
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and armoured vehicles, 300 planes and about 11,000 mech-
anised vehicles were destroyed. 
Russian losses were estimated at 737 killed and 1,862 wound-
ed. 
On 28 September 1939, on the very day when the Polish 
troops ceased fighting in Warsaw, the Third Reich and the 
Soviet Union signed the "Treaty on Borders and Friendship", 
which formally sanctioned Poland's partition. Ribbentrop and 
Molotov put their signatures to the treaty in Moscow. A secret 
protocol to the treaty decided the border line of the Soviet and 
German interest areas to be on the rivers Bug and San. The 
Polish state, whose territory in 1939 was 384,000 square 
kilometres, with 35 million inhabitants, was divided as follows: 
the Third Reich occupied a territory of 188,000 square 
kilometres with a population of 22 million, out of which 
92,000 square kilometres with 10 million Poles was annexed 
to the Reich. The remaining area became a German province, 
an artificial entity under complete German supervision, treated 
as a land of slaves, whose intelligentsia were persecuted right 
from the start for any manifestation of their own Polish 
culture. The Soviet Union occupied 196,000 square kilometres 
of Polish territory with 13 million inhabitants, 5 millions of 
whom were Poles. As a consequence of the NKWD controlled 
so-called referendum, the territory was formally annexed into 
the USSR in early November. Contrary to HiUer's original 
intention which was to consider the possibility of forming a 
truncated Polish state, Stalin vehemenUy opposed such a 
project finding the idea of an independent Polish state 
unacceptable. On 31 October, at the meeting of the Supreme 
Council of the USSR, Molotov repeated the Soviet stance on 
Poland and confirmed the fate of the annexed land, saying: 
"One swift attack, first by Germany, then by the Red Army, 
and nothing remained of the grotesque Versaille creation". 
The occupied lands became the scene of German terror and 
extermination as well as of Stalin's repressions which resulted 
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in about 2 million Polish citizens being deported deep into 
Russian tenitory. But the nation's strong will to fight that 
emerged on 1 September could not have been crushed by all 
the Gestapo and NKWD atrocities. The invaders' policies not 
only did not stop Poland's aspirations to independence; on the 
contrary, they intensified them. Any attempts to collaborate 
with the enemy were met with ruthless public condemnation. 
Hitler's Germany failed to organise any Polish infrastructure 
that would fight with or beside the fascist bloc. Within 
occupied Poland there never was collaboration. 
Polish society responded to terrorism and repression with 
sabotage, defensive activity and other forms of resistance. 
Organisations for civilian and military cooperation were 
conceived, expanded widely and became specialised. Even 
during the defence of Warsaw, as early as 27 September, there 
was founded a military organisation in the capital called the 
Service for Poland's Victory, whose aims were underground 
activities against the Germans. 
The state's authorities, established in France, were the soul and 
mouthpiece of the Polish nation's aspirations to independence. 
Since the legal President of Poland, his government and the 
Commander in Chief were interned in Rumania, they were no 
longer able to perform their constitutional duties, but the war 
was being continued in spite of Poland's defeat. In that 
situation, for the sake of continuity of the state of Poland, a 
new political power represented by General Wladyslaw 
Sikorski appeared, ready for a constiutional takeover. General 
W. Sikorski - Prime Minister, the Chief of General Staff and 
the Minister of Military Affairs in the prewar period - was one 
of Josef Pilsudski's opponents. In September 1939 Sikorski, 
without being assigned to a particular service, left Poland for 
Rumania from whence, accompanied by the French ambassador 
to Poland, Leon Noel, he went to Paris and contacted the 
French authorities there. As a fervent advocate of the alliance 
with France, General Sikorski was instantly accepted in French 
political circles as a candidate for the position of Prime 
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Minister of the Polish Government in Exile. Wladyslaw 
Raczkiewicz, who charged General Sikorski on 30 September 
with the task of forming a new government, was nominated 
for the Presidency of the Polish Republic on 27 September. 
Under the Act of 7 November the President appointed General 
Sikorski the Commander in Chief of the Polish armed forces 
as well. 
In December 1939 the National Council, a substitute Polish 
parliament in exile, was appointed. It represented the main 
Polish political parties and minority groups. 
The existence of the Polish Government in Exile was of great 
importance. Firstly, their activities were a vivid testimony to 
the Polish presence, which denied Hitler's and Stalin's 
intention of obliterating Poland from a political map of 
Europe. Secondly, the Polish government in France symbolised 
a continued Polish participation in the armed effort of the anti-
Hitlerite coalition. Thirdly, all the Allied and most of the 
neutral countries recognised the government, which was then 
a significant factor in determining the legal and international 
status of Poland. Finally, General Sikorski 's government was 
fully supported by the people of the occupied country, for 
whom Sikorski 's policy meant hope for prompt liberation. 
Paris, where the French authorities put the Hotel Regina at the 
government's disposal, became the government's temporary 
headquarters, and this was changed to Angers on 22 Novem-
ber. 
One of the government's main worries, and especially one of 
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief, General W. Sikor-
ski 's was the question of regular units of the Polish army in 
exile, that would continue the war with Germany on the side 
of France and Great Britain, on the understanding that Poland 
would regain her independence. 
Strategic concepts of the commander in chief of the Polish 
anny in France were based on the declaration of 13 December 
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1939 in which the government considered its main task to be 
a maximum "participation of Poland and her army in the war" 
to free the country from "the hostile occupation, and to 
guarantee Poland both direct and broad access to the sea as 
well as borders providing lasting security". The President, 
Prime Minister and Commander in Chief, and also other 
prominent officials in exile, spoke of the participation of 
Poland and her army in the war in all their declarations and 
public statements. Thus the Polish army recreated abroad "was 
to be an instrument for achieving the planned political aims". 
Consequently great care was taken of the army and the 
government in France was called the Government of Unity and 
National Defence. In order to pursue these objectives General 
Sikorski held in his own hands most of the important execu-
tive, civil and military functions. 
The largest part of the government's budget was spent on 
army expenditure. 
Poland's raison d' etre, and the Commander in Chief's strategic 
concepts resulting from it, required continued fighting until 
final victory over Germany and a just peace were won. As for 
the Soviet Union, the Polish Government in Exile was of the 
opinion that, although Poland and the USSR were not at war 
from the formal point of view, Stalin's brutal policy in the 
eastern areas of the Polish Republic made the country Poland's 
second enemy. 
Poles were right to expect that sooner or later western powers 
would clash with the Third Reich. The Polish armed forces 
could not be absent from that decisive encounter and fighting 
arm in arm with the Allied Armies would be their contribution 
towards Germany's defeat. The Polish military leaders con-
sidered the western front to be the main theatre of military 
operations where most land, air and naval forces should be 
concentrated. Thus the Polish army was expected to return to 
Poland from the West. Troops fanned in Syria were to 
approach the country as an auxiliary force fron the Middle 
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East, through the Balkans and the Carpathian Mountains. 
In order to recreate the Polish armed forces in France, Poland 
needed to renew her political and military alliances with the 
western powers. The army was to be organised in France and 
the forces in the Middle East countries subordinated to it, as 
well as those in Great Britain, where some Polish warships 
and the whole Polish merchant fleet had found harbour, and 
where it was hoped that the Polish air force would be 
recreated with the help of the RAF. 
The Polish Government in Exile was an ally of the western 
countries because it functioned under international treaties 
signed by Poland before and after 1939. The alliance with 
France signed in 1921, the guarantee treaty of 1925 and the 
treaty of 4 September 1939 constituted the basis of its policy. 
The alliance with France was strengthened by the one with 
Great Britain concluded on 25 August 1939. The bilateral 
alliance with Rumania was the only one which ceased to exist, 
because on 6 September 1939 Rumania declared herself a 
neutral country. 
The military agreement of 9 September 1939 appeared to be 
a further step to strengthen the links between Poland and 
France. It concerned a Polish division to be formed in France, 
and was signed in Paris by the French Prime Minister and 
Minister of National Defence, Edward Daladier, and Poland's 
ambassador Julius Lukasiewicz. As early as 12 September the 
Poles were offered by the French authorities a military camp 
in Coetquidan in Brittany with whatever facilities were 
necessary for a new division. The camp was known to Poles 
since the First World War as General J. Haller had formed 
units of the Polish army there, then. 
However, more extensive plans for Polish army organisation 
required new formal documents, and so, after negotiations on 
4 January 1940 General W. Sikorsld signed a new military 
agreement with Prime Minister Edward Daladier. The agree-
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ment said that the Polish army would be under the orders of 
the government of the Polish Republic but during combat 
operations it would come under the French Commander in 
Chiefs control. It stated precisely the terms of recruitment for 
the army from among the half million Poles living in France 
and clarified the question of supplies, armament, training and 
fmancing. All expenditure for the Polish units in France was 
to be paid by the French Ministry of Finance as a loan to 
Poland. 
The Polish side prepared to form two corps: one, organised in 
France and composed of the 1st and 2nd divisions which 
would be ready for combat on I April 1940; the other, 
composed of three infantry divisions organised in Canada and 
one in France. The 2nd Corps was expected to be ready for 
departure on I August 1940. There were also plans to organise 
one large armoured unit in France but its combat readiness 
would depend on evacuating Polish soldiers of General 
Maczek's lOth motorised cavalry brigade interned in Hungary 
and on training new specialists in France. 
On the same day an air agreement was signed with France. 
The Polish air force was to follow the French organisational 
structure and consist of two fighter wings, two support 
squadrons and some regular units. 
Since the Polish-British agreement of 25 August 1939 was 
mainly of a political nature, on 18 November there was 
another agreement signed concerning the navy and defining the 
status of Polish warships within the British fleet. 
The question of the air force formation became more compli-
cated because General Sikorski planned to organise the Polish 
air force in France, but there was strong opposition to the idea 
among senior Polish air force officers who argued that it 
would be better to base it with the Royal Air Force. A 
compromise was found at the French-Polish-British conference 
held in the French air force's Staff Headquarters during which 
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they decided that half of the Polish air personnel evacuated to 
France was to be sent to the British Isles. An adequate Polish-
British agreement was not signed until 11 June. That provided 
for two Polish bomber wings to be formed, Polish airmen to 
be formal volunteers under the protection of the Royal Air 
Force King's Regulations, officer promotions to be accepted 
by the Polish Commander in Chief, and Polish airmen to take 
both English and Polish oaths. It was agreed that temporarily 
the British would cover all expenditure as a loan to Poland. 
At the same time Polish soldiers, who had escaped abroad 
after the September campaign, were being evacuated to France. 
This source of recruitment, corn pared with the Polish colony, 
was a most valuable one; soldiers were well trained with some 
front-line combat experience. Most of them, about 40,000, 
including 5,500 officers, a modern motorised cavalry brigade, 
ahnost complete, as well as valuable air personnel of about 
900 men had been interned in Hungary. About 30,000 men 
together with High Command and staff officers had found 
shelter in Rumania. Almost one third of them were air 
personnel {9,276 men, including 1,491 officers). 13,800 Polish 
soldiers had been in Lithuania and 1,315 in Latvia. There were 
altogether about 85,000 men, who, after evacuation to France 
and Great Britain, could immediately enter into regiments, 
wings and batteries. 
The evacuation was complicated by the fact that Polish 
soldiers were kept interned and in order to flee the camps they 
had to be provided with civilian clothes, documents and 
money. Polish diplomatic agencies as well as French and 
British embassies were involved in the process. Soldiers came 
to France by rail through Jugoslavia and Italy, or by sea to 
Marseilles, from the Middle East, Sweden and Norway. It has 
been estimated that by 15 June 1940 about 22,000 people 
were evacuated from Rumania, 21,000 from Hungary but only 
500 men from the Baltic countries (because of pressure from 
the Russians). 
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Poles who had settled in different countries all over the world 
were a large reservoir of potential volunteers for the Polish 
army in France. The problem seemed simplest in France where 
local authorities agreed to recruitment being carried out among 
the Polish colony numbering almost half a million people. 
Altogether, 44,000 Poles from France reinforced the ranks of 
the Polish army. A very small Polish colony in Britain gave 
900 soldiers. Unfortunately, recruitment from among an 
estimated 5 million Polish emigrants in the United States 
ended in failure. Service in the Polish army appeared to 
Americans of Polish origin to be no better than joining the US 
army. 
The last and largest human reservoir was Occupied Poland, 
where the underground forces were already organised; the 
underground, however, did not seem as attractive to many 
young Poles as open engagement in Polish uniforms, so they 
chose to go to France. 
Taking into account the above sources of possible recruitment 
it seemed reasonable to expect to organise in France an army 
of about 185,000 soldiers. Unfortunately the optimistic 
calculations did not prove a realistic gauge and consequently 
the Polish army in France numbered only 82,000 soldiers by 
1940. 
It was also found necessary to alter the existing plans as 
regards the Soviet attack against Finland on 30 November. The 
League of Nations, by excluding the Soviet Union from its 
ranks on 14 November, was appealing to world opinion with 
an urgent request for help for the invaded Finns. At that 
moment a project was launched to dispatch expeditionary corps 
of French and British contingents to the Finno-Russian front. 
The Polish govenunent in France supported the initiative and 
embarked quickly upon preparation of the Polish Podhale 
(Highland) Brigade which numbered about 5,000 men and was 
commanded by Brigadier-General Z. Bohusz-Szyszko. 
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The whole expeditionary corps was intended to number 50,000 
soldiers. If the corps had been sent and entered into combat 
with the Red Anny, a completely new situation would have 
been created: the Western Allies, already at war with Ger-
many, would have found themselves in open conflict with the 
Soviet Union too, a situation which they had been trying to 
avoid since September 1939. 
As the hostilities with Finland ceased on 12 March 1940, the 
corps was not dispatched and the Polish Highland Brigade 
remained in France. 
By May 1940 the following units of the Polish army were 
organised as well as the Polish Highland Brigade: 
1. 1st Grenadier Division commanded by Gen. Bronislaw 
Duch (16,000 men strong) 
2. 2nd Infantry (Riflemen) Division commanded by Gen. 
Bronislaw Prugar-Ketling (16,000 men strong) 
3. lOth Armoured Cavalry Brigade commanded by Gen. 
Stanislaw Maczek (about 5,000 men strong - 2,000 of 
them ready to fight) 
4. 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Col. Tadeusz 
Zieleniewski (about 3,000 men strong and under organisa-
tion, without weapons and uniforms) 
5. 4th Infantry Division commanded by Gen. Rudolf Dreszer 
(about 3,000 men strong during the initial stage of 
organisation). 
The Polish air component in France, with the personnel from 
Hungary and Rumania as its core, numbered 6,863 men and 
officers in May 1940 and the air force consisted of 4 fighter 
squadrons and 5 fighter flights under Gen. Josef Zajac's 
command. The observation and bomber aviation had not been 
trained yet and was not ready for combat. Altogether, the 
Poles had 86 planes at their disposal. 
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Outside France, in Syria, there was only one Polish unit, the 
Independent Carpathian Riflemen Brigade commanded by 
Colonel Stanislaw Kopanski. By May 1940 its organisation 
had not been completed with the eventual military personnel 
of about 4,000 soldiers. 
The only part of the Polish armed forces which was taking 
part in combat operations from its first moments in exile was 
the Polish navy consisting of three destroyers (the Lightning, 
Storm and Thunder) as well as two submarines (the Eagle and 
Wolf). Already by 6 September the Polish destroyers had taken 
part in their first combat patrol. Also the submarines were 
carrying out some patrol missions. On every Polish ship there 
was one British liaison officer with whom cipher and radio-
telegraph operators and signalmen worked, who were opera-
tionally subject to British command but kept their Polish 
uniforms, ensign flags and regulations. 
Such was the picture of the Polish armed forces reconstituted 
in France and Britain after the lost September campaign of 
1939. The Polish army, subject to Polish political authorities 
in exile and commanded by General W. Sikorski, Commander 
in Chief, was reminding the world of Poland's existence and 
giving evidence of the fact that the Polish nation had never 
·accepted the loss of independence and the annexation of its 
motherland by the Third Reich and Stalin's Russia. The Polish 
army was a significant force in the fight for independence. 
The very thought sounded resonantly in General Sikorski 's 
address to the Polish Highland Brigade during the passing out 
parade on 10 April 1940: "Using your bayonets you will not 
only release the nation from the yokes of cruel bondage; you 
will not only enlarge your country's territory and secure 
lasting peace for it; you will also give to your countrymen a 
concept of a new Poland". 
The first Polish unit, reconstituted abroad, to fight against 
Germany was the Polish Highland Brigade. It was called up 
on 9 February 1940 as an emergency measure on account of -
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as it has already been mentioned - its planned participation 
in the expeditionary corps' activities on the Finnish front. The 
brigade was composed of battalions detached from the 1st and 
2nd divisions. Its name referred to the traditional alpine 
regiments of the Polish prewar army, and when the brigade's 
future battleground is taken account of the aspect of mountain 
fighting ability naturally assumes importance. As for its 
organisational structure it reflected that of a French alpine 
riflemen's brigade (Chasseurs A! pins) and consisted of- apart 
from headquarters, command and transport units - two demi-
brigades of two rifleman battalions each. Attached to the 
brigade there was a 13-man French liaison mission with 
Colonel Molle in command. 
The brigade's fonnation area was initially the region of Plelan-
le-Grand, later the Coetquidan camp and from 20 February, 
Malestroit, Rochefort-en-Terre, and Ploemel. By March the 
plans to use the brigade in Finland no longer had to be 
considered and they decided to direct the brigade to the front-
line region of Grenoble. 
When the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway the Allied 
countries again took into consideration the concept of the 
expeditionary corps being used in Scandinavia. 
The Polish brigade was to be included. Combat training was 
greatly intensified with this in mind and on 14 April a 
movement alert was sounded, after which on 15-16 April the 
units of the brigade were transported (by road and rail) to the 
region around Brest, where soldiers boarded troopships. On 24 
April the convoy with the Polish brigade on board, supported 
by an auxiliary cruiser the Colombie and some destroyers, left 
Brest and headed for Norway. 
The brigade's inner circle were career officers of the Polish 
prewar army. They all (except one person) were graduates of 
military colleges, well experienced in staff and command 
work. Brigadier-General Zygmunt Bohusz-Szyszko (aged 47), 
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the commander of the brigade, had been commanding an 
infantry division in the September campaign of 1939. 
A significant proportion of the group were Polish emigrants in 
France, 70 per cent of the privates were recruited from the 
same source. The average age of the soldiers was between 25 
and 30 years, which seemed to be good for a unit whose 
assignment was to fight in such peculiar conditions. 
It was a very long and difficult road that Poles had to travel 
from September 1939 to April 1940. The lost campaign did 
not crush their morale. In the course of six months they were 
again ready to continue the struggle against Germany; this 
time far from Poland, in the Norwegian fjords, Poles fought 
nonstop for 2,078 days until the very end of the Second 
World War in Europe. 
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Chapter 5 
British Plans and Operations 
T.K. Derry 
Some aspects of this tangle of long-past events call up vivid 
memories for one who was at the time a very amateurish 
editor of the news bulletins in Norwegian, which were being 
hurriedly improvised by the BBC. Moreover, it was only nine 
years after these events that I visited Narvik as an official 
historian of the British part in the campaign, and here as 
elsewhere the Norwegian authorities gave me every facility for 
my studies. I was privileged to survey the lower slopes of 
Taraldsvikfjell in the company of Major Hyldmo, who had led 
the Norwegian battalion in the victorious landing operation. On 
the Seventeenth of May I was present when the simultaneous 
advance by the Polish troops on the far side of the Beisfjord 
(then still unbridged) was commemorated by visiting Com-
munist generals at a ceremony in the old churchyard. I stood 
in the window of a lonely farmhouse, while its owners 
described the scene when the survivors of HMS Hardy 
struggled ashore, carrying their dying captain. I saw the hulks 
of German destroyers, beached in the innermost recesses of the 
Rombaksfjord. 
Yet perhaps the most imponant of the many impressions 
received was not that of the fighting itself, but that of the 
conditions men had fought in. All the way from Tromsfl the 
snow lay deep in that mid-May of 1949, so that even a 
military driver had difficulty in negotiating the way down to 
Narvik from Bardufoss through the mountains where the 














In 1958 the eminent Gennan historian, Walther Hubatsch, 
assured a select audience at London University (including 
Field-Marshal Auchinleck) that the scholars of four nations had 
"made it clear from their works that the achievements of the 
Gennan units employed have been remarkable, and they have 
been generously recognized by their fanner opponents". (1) 
Such recognition has been accorded most readily to General 
Dietl's long holding-operation around Narvik. The part played 
by Norwegian and Allied forces of all anns has likewise 
received more attention than the dimensions of the campaign 
might seem to warrant, so that by 1974 a leading American 
naval historian could describe it as "perhaps the most com-
pletely researched operation of the war". (2) Distinguished 
additions to this literature have also been made for the present 
jubilee. (3) Nevertheless, as a long silent and obviously 
outmoded practitioner of this little branch of historiography, I 
should like tentatively to suggest certain respects in which the 
struggle for Narvik is not even now to be regarded entirely as 
a chose jugee. 
In the first place, "The Road to North Norway" is a topic 
which still lends itself to conjecture, notwithstanding the 
signposts for the route set up by national historians. In 
September 1939 Churchill was already eager to lay mines in 
the Leads and Daladier desirous of "successful naval action in 
the Baltic", (4) which would undoubtedly have had reper-
cussions farther north; in October Grand-Admiral Racder 
expressed to the Fiihrer his hopes of "acquiring naval bases 
on the Norwegian coast with the help of Russian pressure", (5) 
while the Swedish banker Jacob Wallenberg was advising his 
government to tread warily in the matter of iron ore exports 
because Gennany had "a crushing military superiority over the 
Western Powers". (6) Then came the Winter War, with the 
spectacular initial victories of the Finns suggesting to excitable 
Conservative minds what the commander-designate for a 
proposed British naval incursion into Baltic waters called "a 
wonderful chance - and perhaps the last - of mobilising the 
anti-Bolshevik forces of the world". (7) Though Chamberlain 
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and Churchill remained reluctant to engage in open hostilities 
against Soviet Russia, both civil and military leaders in France 
were not: Daladier even wrote personally to the aged and 
notoriously pro-German King Gustav V of Sweden, outlining 
a general plan of attack, both in the north and at Baku. (8) 
Because the Finnish War came to an end before the Allied 
force (which was to occupy the iron mines and their railway 
on its way to rescue the Finns) had actually set sail, we can 
only conjecture the degree of resistance which would have 
been encountered all across Sweden and at the starting-point 
in Norway. (9) We may conclude from what was to happen 
in April that, in March too, the Germans would have coordi-
nated their forces to good effect. As for the Russians, later 
events suggest that their reaction would have been very 
formidable, so that either the map of Europe or at least the 
pattern of aJ!iances would have been transformed. Only the 
eventual opening of the Kremlin archives may be expected to 
shed light on this. The same is true of a second, more 
localised problem, which leads on to the present writer's 
appointed topic, namely "The Battle for Narvik". Did Stalin at 
any stage contemplate a carve-up of land in Scandinavia, such 
as he had achieved with Hitler in Poland? Certainly the 
Norwegian authorities in the North were sufficiently anxious 
about this possibility to retain one of their six infantry 
battalions and some smaller units in East Finnmark throughout 
the two months of the campaign, while rejecting the proposal 
of the Allies to post the Polish troops there as provocative. 
(10) 
At the very outset, were there other reasons, more cogent than 
the weather conditions in the misty and stormy North Sea and 
the element of chance - both of which favoured the enemy -
that help to explain the failure of the British Navy to intercept 
the ten heavily laden German destroyers on their long journey 
to Narvik? 
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There had certainly been plenty of warnings of impending 
maritime activities. On April 3rd, the day when the first 
supply ships set out for Narvik, the British War Cabinet was 
already discussing reports that a strong force had been 
assembled at Rostock, "with the avowed intention of taking 
action in Scandinavia, if necessary". (11) Troop embarlcations 
had also been reported from other Baltic ports, and there were 
repeated indications of something stining in North Sea ports 
as well. Then, at 8.48 a.m. on April 7th, some part of the 
force which had sailed only six hours earlier for Narvik and 
Trondheim (the heavy cruiser Hipper and 14 destroyers, 
escorted by the Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) was sighted from 
the air, and the RAF responded with two unsuccessful attacks. 
A second sighting disclosed only three destroyers apparently 
sailing south, but a third sighting at 1.25 p.m. reported what 
might be a battle cruiser, with two cruisers and ten destroyers, 
steering NNW and only 70 miles south of The Naze (Lindes-
nes). 
Earlier that afternoon the Commander in Chief of the Home 
Fleet (Sir Charles Forbes) received a report, which had 
reached the Admiralty the previous day, of Hitler's "definite 
orders to send one division in ten ships moving unostenta-
tiously at night to land at Narvik on April 8". (12) The 
·Admiralty had, however, commented negatively: "All these 
reports are of doubtful value and may well be only a further 
move in the war of nerves". (13) Even more unfortunate than 
this misleading evaluation was the fact that news of the RAF's 
third sighting of an enemy force (referred to above) was 
delayed for four hours, apparently by some mishap in radio 
transmission. 
In the belief that what impended was an attempted break-out 
by the enemy's capital ships into the Atlantic trade routes, the 
Home F1eet left Scapa F1ow at 8.15 p.m. in belated pursuit 
and held on into the north for 24 hours, though Admiral 
Forbes was increasingly disposed to believe that the Gennans 
were making for Norway. (14) Yet on the night of the 8th-
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9th, after turning back south, he kept his three battleships 
some 80 miles away from the Norwegian coast, whilst 
Admiralty orders prevented him from sending his cruisers to 
sweep northwards from closer inshore. 
Meanwhile, at 4.30 a.m. on the 8th the minefield intended to 
interrupt the ore traffic to Germany had been duly laid at 
Hovden in the Vestfjord, just north of Bod{<l, and this was 
being watched over by eight destroyers (including four partly 
disarmed for the minelaying) and by the banle cruiser Renown 
from farther out at sea. But the destroyer Glowworm, separated 
by accident from the Renown, was found and sunk at about 8 
a.m. by the Hipper (though not before she had bravely 
rammed the heavy cruiser). This caused the Renown to turn 
back south for a time, and the Admiralty ordered the destroy-
ers from the Vestfjord to follow her. The search for the enemy 
out at sea was further encouraged, when a flying-boat search-
ing ahead of the Home Fleet in the early afternoon sighted the 
Hipper and accompanying destroyers, which (as luck would 
have it) were steering west while waiting to enter the Trond-
heimsfjord next day. It was nearly 7 p.m. before a fruitless 
search by Admiral Whitworth in the Renown was ended by 
orders "to concentrate on preventing any German force from 
proceeding to Narvik". (15) But the heavy weather rendered 
his destroyers almost unmanageable, so he steered farther into 
the north until the weather should moderate. Although the 
sequel was a running fight at early dawn against the Scharn-
horst and Gneisenau, in which the latter was severely dam-
aged, by the evening of the 12th both German ships had made 
their way back to base after creating precisely the diversion 
intended. 
How did it come about that the struggle for Narvik began, not 
with an interception, in which the odds might have been 
heavily in favour of t11e interceptors, but with a coup against 
a small neutral port, where many practical and all the psycho-
logical advantages were on the side of the invader? 
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The fatally slow tempo of the British response to the German 
naval challenge of April 7th-9th owed something to the 
preceding seven months of "phoney war", during which there 
had been so many false alarms, mainly on the western front 
but also concerning Scandinavia. A second factor was un-
doubtedly the weakness of the Intelligence organisation, 
making a slow recovery from peacetime economies. Until the 
summer of 1939 the Joint Intelligence Committee was regarded 
as "a peripheral body"; (16) it remained ineffective until 
Churchill became Prime Minister, while the Government Code 
and Cypher School had not yet mastered "Enigma". One 
variety, which the Germans used for air and some other 
operations in Norway, was indeed being read from April 15th 
until it was discontinued about a month later, but its special 
significance was not made clear to commanders in the field. 
Moreover, the circulation of Intelligence was often unaccoun-
tably slow, as when the vital information that German troops 
rescued from the Rio de Janeiro admitted that they were 
bound for Bergen, though known in the Admiralty early on 
the afternoon of April 8th, did not reach Admiral Forbes until 
11.00 p.m. A want of alertness also contributed to the ease 
with which the Germans all through the Norwegian campaign 
continued to read fully 30 per cent of intercepts on the main 
British naval cypher. 
It is arguable, however, that the biggest adverse influence was 
the self-assurance of the Royal Navy. Had not the British 
naval blockade been a - perhaps even the - determining factor 
in the First World War? Therefore in April 1940 the navy's 
primary concern was to enforce the blockade of the seaways 
by preventing any break -out into the Atlantic - just as the 
minelaying in the Vestfjord was to stop a break-in via the 
Leads. As for Norway, had not its west and even its north 
coast been a British interest since the days of Palmerston, and 
did not Norwegian politicians take the British navy for granted 
as their strongest defence? Such self-assurance encouraged the 
belief that, though the Germans might be confidently expected 
to react to our mine-laying, they certainly would not act first 
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on a coastline where Britannia so clearly "ruled the waves". 
But they did. 
The naval battles fought off Narvik on April lOth and 13th 
made sure that at any rate one of the six groups of enemy 
ships which had successfully penetrated into Norwegian waters 
should pay the full price of their audacity. Captain Warburton-
Lee's attack at dawn on the lOth developed into a drawn 
battle against heavy odds. Each side lost two destroyers, 
including the flotilla-leader with its captain, but the much 
smaller British warships (17) also disposed of six out of ten 
German merchantmen lying in the harbour and an ammunition 
ship encountered as they withdrew. They were then under 
heavy fire, so a landing (for which they had a party in 
readiness) was obviously impracticable. On the 13th the 
Warspite with its IS-inch guns and nine attendant destroyers 
completely eliminated the remaining German warships, but 
Admiral Whitworth decided that the 200 men he could muster 
were too few and too tired to land and hold even the water-
front. However, he reported later that evening and again the 
next morning that a larger force could now take Narvik "by 
direct assault without fear of meeting serious opposition on 
landing". (18) 
Why were there no troops ready in the right place at the right 
time to take advantage of the re-assertion of British sea-
power? The failure is all the more surprising because the 
mine-laying project had included "Plan R 4", under which a 
force had been organised to sail for Norwegian ports as soon 
as the expected German reaction to the mines made British 
help acceptable. But on the evening of April 7th, when the 
Home Fleet had sailed to stop a presumed break-out into the 
Atlantic, it was decided at the Admiralty (19) that four 
battalions already embarked in cruisers at Rosyth should be 
hurried ashore without their equipment and that two battalions 
embarked in transports in the Clyde should be deprived of 
their escorting cruiser and destroyers. The object was to make 
every possible ship available to the Home Fleet, whose 
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commander was not consulted and who found the change of 
plan disconcerting; equally disconcerted was the Prime 
Minister, when he elicited the information from an embar-
rassed First Lord at the War Cabinet meeting next morning. 
On the day following, when the Chiefs of Staff met at 6.30 
a.m. to consider the news of the German invasion of Norway, 
it was expected that the 1st Scots Guards, one of the two 
battalions in the Oyde, would "leave at once for Narvik": (20) 
yet the C.I.G.S., Sir Edmund lronside, recorded in his diary at 
midnight, "The whole day gone and nothing but talk." (21) It 
was not until 1 p.m. on April 12th that the first two com-
panies of Guardsmen sailed in a cruiser from Scapa Flow, 
escorting the military commander of the expedition to recover 
Narvik with part of his headquarters, while its naval com-
mander set sail at about the same time in another cruiser from 
Rosyth. Whitworth's report of the opportunity for immediate 
action led the naval commander to appoint a rendezvous for 
both cruisers at Skjelfjord with a view to an attack at Narvik 
next morning, but owing to difficulties in wireless transmission 
no message reached the General until he had already landed 
his two companies to support the Norwegians on the mainland 
farther north. The two men met for the first time on the 
morning of April 15th at Harstad, to which transports also 
brought the rest of the expedition. Thus the effects of some 
initial delay were compounded by the failure of the com-
manders to coordinate their plans for an improvised operation 
on their way to the intended scene of action. 
Unfortunately the sanguine tone of Admiral Whitworth's report 
had a further untoward effect on the Narvik expedition. If 
Narvik was likely at any moment to fall into our hands, was 
it not time to pay closer attention to the possibility of also 
recovering Trondheim, in which the Norwegian authorities 
showed more interest? It was therefore decided in London to 
divert three battalions (out of 5 1/2) from the Harstad convoy 
while it was still at sea. This modification of the objective did 
not lead to the recovery of Trondhcim, but it inevitably had 
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an adverse effect on the military commander's intended 
dispositions. 
It is generally agreed that Churchill bears the main respon-
sibility for the mistakes and misjudgements indicated above. 
As First Lord, he was spending much time in the Operational 
Intelligence Centre of the Admiralty, and the First Sea Lord, 
Sir Dudley Pound, was inclined to defer to his proposals for 
action. In strategic questions Churchill also tended to dominate 
his ministerial colleagues in committee and Cabinet, since Lord 
Hankey alone had comparable experience in military matters 
from the First World War. But should not the blame be shared 
by the Chiefs of Staff? 
Instituted in 1923 as a collective command for the armed 
forces, this was a trinity whose members still gave less 
thought to the unity of defence than to the separate interests 
of the three Services, which they also severally represented. 
Consequently, the Chiefs of Staff as a joint organisation 
exercised very little control over the present campaign, which 
was after all the first of any size since their meetings had 
started. It is instructive to compare the effectiveness of the 
stand they made against Churchill from 1942 onwards over 
Operation Jupiter, when he tried so persistently to find a 
special role for North Norway in the strategy of a world at 
war. (22) 
In the third place, it still occasions surprise to find that, 
counting from the arrival of the transports at Harstad on April 
15th, it took six weeks to recover Narvik from a numerically 
inferior and comparatively ill-supplied enemy. How far was 
this due to the notorious personal incompatibility between the 
naval and military commanders, compounded by the incom-
patible aims with which they had been commissioned? (23) 
Lord Cork's instructions from Churchill and Pound were oral 
and evidently highly aggressive; Mackesy's, signed by General 
Ironside as C.I.G.S., "required boldness", (24) but made it his 
first duty to establish a base from which to plan his further 
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operations. The 12th Earl of Cork and Orrery, alias "Ginger" 
Boyle, was an Admiral of the Fleet, called from retirement by 
Churchill to mastermind his reluctantly abandoned incursion 
into Baltic waters; (25) Mackesy, who was ten years younger, 
was a major-general of two years' standing. According to his 
own son, the latter "was not a conciliatory man, and he did 
not gladly accommodate himself to those in high places with 
whom he disagreed" (26) - a category covering both Cork and 
Churchill himself, whose intervention in Plan R 4 had 
produced inter alia this unwelcome substitute for an old 
friend, Admiral E.E.R. Evans "of the Broke". 
When Mackesy, at their first meeting in the Admiral's cruiser 
off Harstad, refused point-blank to be redirected straight to 
Narvik, there was a complete impasse, duly reported to 
Churchill by private cypher. (27) At the end of a week Cork 
was placed in supreme command. But it was still impracticable 
for him to overrule the General (albeit that Churchill suggested 
the possibility of placing him under arrest), (28) since 
Mackesy was supported by the naval chief of staff, Captain 
Maund, as well as the senior army officers other than his own 
chief staff officer, the future Lt.-General Sir Arthur Dowler. In 
retrospect, however, even he felt that, though Mackesy should 
have been more of a bridge-builder, "Others might have helped 
to build the bridge." (29) 
By April 24th agreement had been reached on trying the effect 
of a heavy bombardment of Narvik by the Warspite, with 
three cruisers and eight accompanying destroyers, troops being 
held in readiness to go ashore if the enemy showed signs of 
surrendering. It was aimed at military objectives only and was 
under Lord Cmk's personal direction, but the deep snow hid 
its effects and after three hours the enemy still made no sign. 
Meanwhile the British brigade remained largely snow-bound 
in positions along the route from Harstad towards Narvik 
beside the fjord, only the advance party of Scots Guards 
having been moved inland to Forsbakken, where their presence 
was intended to help a Norwegian advance against the enemy 
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in Gratangen. (30) In the last days of the month, however, the 
South Wales Borderers were conveyed in two stages to 
Haakvik on the south side of the Ofotfjord, from where they 
advanced nearly to Ankenes in spite of a vigorous enemy 
counterattack. A company of Irish Guards was also brought 
across in reserve, but the position was eventually transferred 
to the newly arrived Chasseurs Alpins, who were best able to 
cope with the German ski patrols in the mountains along the 
Beisfjord. 
The arrival on the scene of five French battalions, followed by 
four Polish, then prompted Lord Cork to renew his demand 
for a direct assault on Narvik, which Mackesy still vehemently 
opposed: even if a foothold were gained, machine-gun fire 
across the broken terrain would make further advance impos-
sible. The senior military officers supported the General, so the 
Admiral proposed an initial landing at the village of Bjerkvik 
instead. Mackesy consented, but handed over the operation to 
French troops under General de Brigade Bethouart, whose 
Chausseurs Alpins were finding the advance on B jerkvik by 
a mountain road too difficult in loose, deep snow. 
The first opposed landing of the Second World War was 
therefore undertaken by French Foreign Legionaries with the 
help of two light tanks, the British providing the ships for 
bombardment and the newly arrived landing craft, which put 
ashore the first flights of Legionaries and the tanks. The naval 
guns, in setting fire to houses which might harbour German 
machine-gunners, caused a horrifyingly high number of civilian 
casualties. (31) Otherwise the operation was outstandingly 
successful, as Lt.-General Auchinleck (Mackesy's intended 
successor) reported, though he observed that a raid by German 
bombers, for which the weather was unfavourable, might well 
have turned it into a failure. 
The 0yjord peninsula opposite Narvik was quickly overrun, 
and Auchinleck (who replaced Mackesy on the evening of 
May 13th) entrusted Bethouart with the operations for its 
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capture, one Norwegian battalion and a field battery being also 
provided by General Aeischer. Nevertheless there was a 
further delay of neatly a fortnight, mainly because the landing 
craft were needed to bring ashore A.A. guns and other heavy 
equipment intended for Bardufoss airfield, which had been 
cleared of snow by Norwegian labour under an agreement 
negotiated with General Aeischer after a reproachful interview. 
(32) Fighter aircraft were then flown in from carriers, such a~ 
had previously provided temporary and less fully effective help 
from their own complement. 
The guns of three cruisers and five destroyers were available 
to support the landings, which began on a small beach at 
Orneset just after midnight on May 28th; but there was also 
effective bombardment from French and Norwegian batteries 
at 0yjord, almost directly opposite. Two battalions of Legion-
naires and one of Norwegian troops made the attack against 
an enemy who manoeuvred skilfully on the heights above 
them. A critical moment came in the early morning, when sea 
fog at Bardufoss gave German bombers their chance to replace 
the RAF fighters and compel every warship to take evasive 
action, (33) so that the Germans were starting to fire down on 
to the beach before relief came from a single destroyer. The 
Polish battalions, which had attacked simultaneously against 
Ankenes, likewise suffered for a time from the withdrawal of 
naval support. The Germans counterattacked successfully on 
the heights behind Ankenes, so the day ended before that area 
was completely cleared, with the enemy incurring heavy losses 
as they withdrew eventually across, or round the head of, the 
Beisfjord. On the north side of Narvik the Germans had been 
able to retire along the line of the railway some hours before 
the Norwegian and French troops made their formal entry at 
5 p.m. 
The stubborn resistance encountered on May 28th suggests that 
the only surviving member of Dietl's staff (34) may have been 
justified in claiming retrospectively that an organised and well-
armed defence had been in place since the second day after 
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their arrival. There were also the problems of the snow, which 
even the Chausseurs Alpins found daunting, and of the terrain: 
exploring the Narvik promontory after its capture, Captain 
Maund found that "All beaches were well covered by ma-
chine-gun posts that could not have been neutralised by fire 
from the sea". (35) So from the evidence available it seems 
that General Mackesy was most probably right in refusing to 
risk what might have been a very costly failure in a situation 
where prestige rather than any truly vital interest was at stake. 
Nevertheless, there may have been some justification for 
General Ruge's view that Mackesy was "hesitant and timo-
rous": (36) he was certainly handicapped towards the end by 
ill-health, to which the strain of endless controversy with a 
fiery opponent may perhaps have contributed. At least three 
entries in the private diary of the C.I.G.S. suggest dissatisfac-
tion with Mackesy; (37) and Auchinleck, who had thought 
well of him when they met at the Staff College at Quetta, 
(38) now quickly found it necessary to exercise his secret 
power of supersession. The possibility that Mackesy never 
fully grasped the realities of a novel situation is suggested by 
the fact that he was apparently much slower than either 
Bethouart or Auchinleck to establish cordial relations with 
Fleischer, the Norwegian general whose troops bore the brunt 
of the fighting on the north side of N arvik. When much help 
might have been acquired from their expertise, General 
Mackesy was content to inform the War Office on April I 7th: 
"Norwegian troops are almost entirely untrained and I have, I 
am afraid, not much confidence in them." (39) 
Finally, some reassessment may still be needed of the part 
played by British troops in the Battle for Narvik. Except for 
the Norwegian 6th Brigade they were the first in the field, yet 
they had no role in the two opposed landings, except for the 
single battery of Royal Artillery (25-pounders) which operated 
under French control in the Polish advance into Ankenes. 
Instead, the 24th (Guards) Brigade was moved piecemeal into 
the south, when the evacuation of the Allied forces from 
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Namsos on the night of May 2nd-3rd left open the road route 
from Grong to Bod0 (which was wrongly supposed to be 
impassable at that season) for a German advance. The brigade 
then worked in close cooperation with five Independent 
Companies; newly formed from Territorial volunteers with 
some Regular officers (including eight with Indian Army 
experience), each of these was intended to function as a self-
supporting guerrilla unit, 290 men strong. There were also a 
weak Norwegian battalion and other small Norwegian units in 
this southern area, the defence of which was added on May 
7th to Lord Cork's overall responsibilities. 
On the lOth, pan of an Independent Company and two 
Norwegian companies successfully ambushed the enemy 
vanguard a few miles south of Mosj0en, the first settlement of 
any size on the route north. But on the same day 300 
Germans were landed at Hemnesberget, far in their rear, from 
a coastal steamer seized in Trondheim, the British navy having 
arrived on the scene an hour and a half too late. (40) The 
consequence was a serious loss of ground and the decision to 
move all the British troops south, so as to hold on if possible 
to Mo i Rana (another small port then comparable to Mosj0en) 
and in any case to Bod0, the loss of which would place fue 
operations against Narvik in jeopardy. 
Nevertheless, the Scots Guards and the Independent Com-
panies, together with some Norwegian troops (providing ski 
detachments), suffered a series of defeats - at Stien in front of 
Mo; in furee delaying-actions on the south side of the Saltfjell; 
and again on the north side, after crossing 23 miles of arctic 
plateau unscathed between high banks of snow. The newly 
arrived Irish Guards, two Independent Companies, and a 
Norwegian machine-gun company and ski patrols then fought 
a stubborn two-day engagement at Pothus (41) before making 
yet another withdrawal - along the Saltfjord to the Bod0 
peninsula, where the South Wales Borderers had now arrived 
to strengthen the defence. But at this juncture the campaign 
petered out, as the British troops were to be re-embarked 
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forthwith at Bod~ because of the impending evacuation of 
North Norway by the Allies. For security reasons the change 
of plan was not explained to the Norwegians, who had 
recently sent reinforcements which were left in a very difficult 
position. 
In a confidential section of General Auchinleck's Report on 
his command in North Norway, which was circulated to the 
War Cabinet in !942, he criticised his British troops as 
seeming "distressingly young, not so much in years as in self-
reliance and manliness generally. They give an impression of 
being callow and undeveloped."(42) His standards would be 
those of training in the Indian Army, where he had been 
Deputy Chief of the General Staff. But he himself remarked 
in regard to the Independent Companies, which were not 
organised for warfare in such thinly populated territory, that a 
guerrilla was more likely to succeed in his own country. (43) 
As for the Guardsmen trained on barrack squares, their 
traditional discipline did not fit them well for fighting on 
barren hillsides and along narrow, boulder-strewn valleys 
against men of a purpose-equipped mountain division, brought 
to Norway by HiUer's orders for the express purpose of 
rescuing their comrades, hard pressed at Narvik. 
The withdrawal, which was probably in the long run in-
evitable, was turned into a continuous retreat by the domi-
nance of the German air force. This had indeed affected every 
side of the Norwegian campaign, from the shock to the Home 
Fleet, when the A.A. armament of its much prized battleships 
was found to give insufficient protection against land-based 
bombers on the afternoon of April 9th, (44) to the havoc 
wrought by the same enemy weapon at every one of our bases 
in Norway, from Aandalsnes to Harstad. (45) The reinforce-
ment of the holding-operation south of Bod~ was disrupted 
twice - by an air attack on the C!zrobry, which killed the four 
senior officers of the Irish Guards and ravaged the entire 
transport; ( 46) and by the wrecking of the cruiser Ejfingham, 
which was taking an unusual alternative course for Bod~ with 
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the S.W.B. on board, partly to avoid the fate of the Chrobry. 
Thus the South Wales Borderers as well as the Guardsmen 
had to return to Harstad to refit. Meanwhile the enemy, 
besides receiving some of their supplies by air, could watch 
every Allied movement and harass troops in action or on the 
march. The War Diary of the Scots Guards states that, after 
six days of withdrawals, "The men were utterly exhausted and 
a certain demoralisation had set in," (48) which suggests that 
the menace from the air bears a greater share of responsibility 
than the casualty list might indicate. 
Conversely, the troops engaged at Pothus took heart when the 
two fighters flew over from Bodf<l (where they had landed 
from a carrier) and shot down two enemy planes over the 
battlefield. Both of these, however, were destroyed on the 
ground next day, and German bonbers eventually laid the 
whole town in ashes. Nine years later a traveller over the road 
route of about 215 miles, from the scene of the initial ambush 
south of Mosj~en to that of the re-embarkation at Bod!<l, found 
the surroundings of that port to be the only recognisably urban 
district on the whole journey; and the sites of individual 
British war graves were still to be seen in the solitude of the 
Arctic Circle. 
* * * 
Certainly, the failure of the Allied campaign in Norway was 
due much less to shortcomings in the men who fought there 
than to the glaring mistakes made by the men who sent them 
out to fight, the most conspicuous of whom was Winston 
Churchill. Indeed, in a postwar letter to his most trusted 
military adviser he himself admitted that "The brief and 
disastrous Norwegian campaign, if campaign it can be called," 
was one for which he "certainly bore an exceptional measure 
of responsibility". (49) And yet it was the resulting political 
crisis at Westminster which carried him in the nick of time to 
the premiership, as being, from an overall viewpoint, less 
responsible than Mr Chamberlain for the recent past and in 
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any case, more resolute for facing a perilous future. Is it too 
farfetched for me to close with the paradoxical but prophetic 
reply which the Norwegian Resistance leader, Gunnar Jahn, 
gave in 1942 to a fellow countryman who feared that the 
Germans might be the winning side? "Oh no, the Germans lost 
the war when they invaded Norway ... It had this effect, that 
Winston Churchill took over the leadership of Great Britain." 
(50) 
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The Battle for Narvik 
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The Allied Attack on Narvik-Bj~rnefjel/ 
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Chapter 6 
From Mountain Waifare in Winter 
Conditions to the Allied 
Recapture of Narvik 
K. Rommetveit 
Introduction (1) 
"Only idiots say that they learn 
from experience. Personally I 
prefer learning from other peoples' 
experience." (Bismarck) 
50 years ago, nearly two generations ago, the longest and 
hardest fighting during the Norwegian Campaign took place 
in the Narvik area. As a military geographic concept the 
Narvik area includes the northern part of the county of 
Nordland and the southern part of the county of Trams, 
limited by the sea to the west and the Swedish-Norwegian 
border to the east. 
In my article I will consider some aspects of the campaign in 
North Norway, and attempt a preliminary evaluation of the 
importance of the so-called human factor, including questions 
of command, materiel and organisation, especially German and 
Norwegian. This assessment can be seen more clearly if we 
consider it under two main themes: mountain war in winter 
conditions and the Allied recapture of Narvik. Narvik was 
taken twice by the Germans in 1940, and once 
by Allied and Norwegian armed forces. 
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Survey. Conditions before the battle 
On 9 April 1940 Norway was drawn into the Second World 
War without prior mobilisation. A rather weak defence had 
been set up, in case Norway's neutrality should not be 
respected. 
This defence was stronger in the north due to the Pinna-
Soviet Winter War 1939-40. In 1940 the Treaty of Friendship 
between Germany and the Soviet Union still existed. The 
partition of Poland made by the two powers was not forgotten 
by Norwegian civilian and military authorities. The danger 
from the East (the Soviet Union) led to a strengthening of the 
garrison company in Spr-V a ranger by a security force of two 
infantry battalions and a field artillery battery in East Firm-
mark during the whole campaign. (2) This had considerable 
consequences for the battle of Narvik since the lack of first-
line Norwegian infantry battalions there had poweiful reper-
cussions. 
The few available battalions were in the front line the whole 
time, with little rest or relief under extremely hard weather 
conditions, in the high mountains, throughout the campaign. 
The result of this lack of infantry was that the fighting power 
of the Norwegian force was considerably reduced. The transfer 
of, for instance, the Varanger battalion would have increased 
the manpower strength of the infantry battalions by approxi-
mately 20 per cent, in real fighting power perhaps even more, 
taking into account the probable fighting power of this 
battalion as being equivalent to the Alta battalion. 
Narvik was quite clearly the central operational focus for all 
involved in the war for reasons my colleagues have made 
abundantly clear. The German occupation of Trondheim and 
Trpndelag cut North Norway off from the rest of the country, 
and so the region became a separate theatre of opcrdlions 
where the hostilities in the first phase developed fairly 
independently and were unaffected by the war in South 
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Norway. A notable exception was Vaemes airport at Trond-
heim as base and harbour for German air, sea and ground 
operations heading north. Unfortunately Vaemes was repaired 
and enlarged with the assistance of several thousand Nor-
wegian civilians. This proved to be a distinct help to the 
German operation at Narvik. 
In 1940 there was no continuous road link north-south through 
North Norway, and the railway was not open for regular 
traffic north of TJV)ndelag. Therefore the sea alone linked the 
northernmost counties. No airfield that could be used by 
contemporary fighters and bombers existed. At Bardufoss, the 
army's main airfield was under construction, but no coastal 
defences existed in North Norway. A planned "fortress" at 
Ramsund at the estuary of the Ofotfjord had not at that time 
been built, a point that the German mountain troops only 
realised after some action; this Jack together with the defective 
German submarine torpedoes, made the Royal Navy's domi-
nance of the Ofotfjord possible. German-manned batteries on 
both sides of the Ofotfjord's mouth and intact German 
submarines, would have changed the situation dramatically. 
Apart from the rail link to Sweden, N arvik in 1940 was 
effectively an island in communication terms. No bridge 
existed over Rombaken or Beisfjord. 
Militarily, North Norway constituted the 3rd Naval District and 
the army's 6th Command District. The Commander of the 6th 
Division, Major General C G Fleischer, was appointed 
Supreme Commander in North Norway, and he also assumed 
command when the German attack started, over the naval 
forces. 
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Norwegian armed forces in the Narvik area 
on 8 April 
The only Norwegian naval forces partly deployed for combat, 
were the navy's Ofoten detachment which consisted of two 
forty-year-old annoured ships, the Eidsvold and the Norge, 
two outmoded submarines and three guard vessels. The rest of 
the ships of the navy were spread along Norway's long coast. 
The Naval District also included the 3rd Air Detachment with 
3 torpedo/bombers (Heinkel I 15) and 2 reconnaissance planes 
(MF Ill). 
In the Narvik area the anny could field one reduced infantry 
battalion (1st/13th) on Elvegaardsmoen and one reinforced rifle 
company of the 1st/13th, one antiaircraft battery (40 mm) and 
one reduced pioneer company of local troops from Narvik. 
The majority of the soldiers called up for frontier guard duty 
in North Norway in April 1940 had 72-84 days of basic 
training. No refresher training had taken place since 1922. The 
units therefore needed training and exercises in order to 
become tight-knit units usable under field conditions. It was 
not enough to have good and sufficient equipment; the soldiers 
that were to use it needed individual training, and then, 
combined anns training preferably including inter-service 
exercises. Even the first stage, i.e. leaming how to handle new 
weapons, is a long process in an anny of mobilisation. With 
20,000 being retrained every year, it would take 4-5 years 
before all soldiers were trained to handle a new weapon. (3) 
During the call-up in the winter of 1939/40 there was some 
time and room for manoeuvres. During this period all the line 
units of the 6th Division - except Ilnd/!6th which lacked unit 
training - did their 3 month stint of neutrality defence. The 
hardening, exercise and welding together that they received 
here, were of great importance in the battle for Narvik. 
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Another factor which also greatly influenced the fighting, was 
the army's general lack of officers. It was especially difficult 
in the 6th Division, because the majority of reserve officers 
lived in South Norway. Generally speaking, the battalions of 
the 6th Division could not match the German and Allied 
battalions in firepower, weapons or equipment.(4) However, 
one must add that General Dietl's mountain troops had ortly 
a small degree of the heavy fire support they were supposed 
to have, owing to problems of supply and transport. Their 
stock of artillery and heavy mortars was severely reduced, 
leaving only one mountain battery and no heavy mortars. In 
addition, the Germans lacked naval fire support. To some 
extent, this situation was partly offset by German air support 
from Vaemes, but the Luftwaffe was hampered by the 
distances involved, the poor availability of airplanes, those 
aircrafts' range, and periodically, bad weather. The Norwegian 
forces lacked hand grenades, submachine-guns, effective air 
defence, mines, antitank defence, tanks and armoured vehicles. 
The Germans did not have the last three equipment categories 
in North Norway either. Therefore this state of affairs had 
only an indirect influence on events because these deficiencies 
accelerated the collapse in South Norway. Thus Dietl's forces 
got air support, reinforcements and supplies sooner than they 
otherwise would have done. However, the Norwegian forces 
and about 2,000 of Dietl's mountain troops were the only ones 
that had had training for winter and mountain warfare. The 
Norwegians were the only force that were fully equipped on 
skis and had a comparatively high mobility under winter 
conditions. (5) The lack of close range weapons like hand 
grenades and submachine-guns, made the Norwegian units best 
suited to fighting in open terrain with long fields of fire. Even 
if the Norwegian army lacked equipment, and deficiencies 
stretched from uniform to Colt heavy machine-gun and 81 
mm mortar, on the whole it was well suited to winter war in 
mountain terrain, at least compared to the Allied battalions. 
Haalogaland Air Detachment had 6 field planes (Fokker, model 
1929) and 14 unarmed trainers (Tiger Moth). None of the 
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Norwegian planes was, in performance and armament, a match 
for the German fighter planes. 
9 April in Narvik 
These events have been described many times in several 
languages. But seen from this article's perspective, I will stress 
the human and psychological factors that made the German 
occupation of Narvik and Elvegaardsmoen possible in the first 
hours of the first day of attack. A key phrase in this con-
nection is mental preparedness. Norway had had peace for 126 
years. The transition from peace to war is always difficult. It 
was especially so because Norway had not mobilised in 
advance, and the Germans took the major cities, airfields, ports 
and depots during the first hours. "It was no political aim that 
Norway was to be prepared to fight a war alone." (6) Thus 
neither people nor soldiers were prepared for the ruthlessness, 
brutality, sufferings and strains of war. The Germans were also 
aided by the weather. Northwesterly gales and drifting snow 
at dawn made visibility poor. Dietl's 3rd Mountain Division 
was the only one of the 6-7 invading German divisions with 
combat experience (from the Polish campaign). The Germans 
knew what they wanted and used surprise, audacity and speed 
with great sldll and luck. 
They also used the uncertainty and confusion of the opponents 
when they conquered Narvik and Elvegaardsmoen. 
Here a more general problem emerges: Haw can one, in 
peacetime, prepare for the unexpected, even for what seems 
"impossible"? It is particularly difficult in long periods of 
peace with reduced defence budgets, no obvious external threat 
and a seemingly unavoidable tendency towards increasing 
military ineffectiveness! This question is relevant for politi-
cians and the military today as it was in the 1930s. It is of 
course impossible to address this complex question within the 
scope of this article. Now I can suggest only a few possible, 
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relevant factors. Geography, past experience (history), tradition, 
culture, the ideology and perceptions of a nation's top 
decision-makers, all come into play in various ways. Just as 
important is the internal character of an army or a military 
organisation. If we treat an army as a living, complex organ-
ism, I can use the analogy "military disease" to illustrate the 
idea that a number of internal factors determine the combat 
effectiveness of an army to a high degree. 
Military history provides many examples - besides the initial 
phase of the German attack on Norway - of larger military 
forces being defeated by smaller ones, such as the collapse of 
the French army in 1940, the British defeats in Malaya in 
1941 and of Gazala in 1942, and the Arab-Israeli Wars of 
1967 and 1973. An examination suggests that cenain diseases, 
active in the defeated armies, were of more imponance than 
the health of the victorious ones. These diseases are charac-
teristic of most social organisms. Yet military personnel and 
many military historians have paid little attention to "pathol-
ogies" such as conformity, faulty feedback, excess trust, 
careerism, poor selection and promotion values, and unrealistic 
training. 
In N arvik in the morning of 9 April, the Germans were 
numerically superior. Very soon this changed, but still the 
small, isolated German force fought on and avoided defeat by 
a larger Allied and Norwegian force. This was possible 
because the above-mentioned "pathologies" were less active in 
the German army than in its opponent's organism, especially 
the Allied one. 
The undecided situation in Narvik during the first hours of the 
German occupation of the town, could have gone either way. 
About 200 men of the Ist/13th managed to bluff their way 
through the German positions and marched eastward along the 
Ofoten railway. Thus, this force, under Major Omdal, blocked 
the important railway link to Sweden until the Norwegians 
were surprised and overwhelmed on 16 April. 
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Sea war 
The sea war at N atvik finished after three days on 13 April -
four days after the invasion staned. After this date, there was 
no question about who dominated at sea. 
Again we can point out a difference from conditions in the 
south where the Germans shipped their supplies over Kattegat 
and Skagerak protected by aircraft. (7) As a result of the 
battles at sea, Dietl's land force more than doubled. It is an 
open question, historically, whether the Germans could have 
held on so long without the 2,600 naval personnel from the 
sunk German destroyers. These were equipped from Elve-
gaardsmoen. The loss of Elvegaardsmoen was a major one: 
here the Germans gained a well-equipped operational base 
(e.g. provisions for 2-3 weeks) close to the nonhbound main 
road. 
Air war 
For some time the Luftwaffe was somewhat stronger than its 
opponent in the Nonh. As I mentioned earlier, the Gennans 
were severely limited in the use of air power. Among other 
things, the distance fron the airfield to the zone of operations 
in conjunction with the range of the aircraft, made only one 
hour of operation in the N atvik area possible. After South 
Norway fell in late April -early May, the Luftwaffe's activity 
increased in the N atvik area of operations. In panicular, 
offensive missions by nearly 200 bombers, increased enor-
mously. Most Gennan bombing missions were directed against 
British naval ships and the maritime traffic in general. Harstad 
harbour and the British naval base of Skaanland suffered 140 
air attacks in 8 weeks. 
The cold, objective result of this was that the Norwegian 
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forces that operated chiefly to the east of the main roads, had 
fewer air attacks than they otherwise would have had. Those 
that took place were bad enough, but, as often happened 
during the Second World War and during more recent wars, 
morale increased rather than the opposite, as seems to be the 
case when one is bombed from the air and cannot hit back 
effectively. 
Another lesson we learn from the air war in the mountainous 
terrain in the Narvik region, was that initially the psycholog-
ical effect of being bombed was more important rather than 
the actual. But this effect decreased later by improved 
Norwegian air warning, and better use of the terrain for 
protection, while naturally, the soldiers got more accustomed 
to being bombed and found that the snow had a moderating 
effect. 
During the campaign, the German air transports to Hartvigvann 
and Bjpmefjell became more frequent. In the last phase of the 
battle about 1050 men (mountain troops and parachute troops) 
in addition to vital supplies, were dropped. 
The British used for a long time only carrier-based aircraft 
because of the lack of adequate airlields in North Norway. 
The aircraft carriers had to cruise at a safe distance out of 
reach of the German aircraft, and the distance to the coast 
being frequently so great, these carrier-based aircraft seldom 
could give effective support to friendly troops. Another 
contributing factor was that the British had not developed 
modem, fast, long-range dive-bombers and torpedo-carrying 
aircraft that could operate from carriers. 
From 26 April to 6 May no aircraft carrier operated outside 
North Norway. Apart from the few Norwegian airplanes, only 
one squadron of amphibious planes operated from the region. 
This fact of course affected the operations on the ground. 
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Bardufoss airfield was ready around 20 May and from 21 May 
one Gladiator fighter squadron, and from 26 May - 7 June one 
Hurricane squadron, operated from this base. (8) 
The Norwegian army made reconnaissance and photo missions, 
while naval aircraft flew bombing missions to cover them. For 
instance: east of Laeigastind on 12-14 April when 6th Brigade 
attacked, the Norwegian aircraft gave tactical air support to 
their own ground troops. Another example showing that the 
campaign in South and North Norway was very different. In 
the south there was no air support. The arrival of the British 
fighters ended the German supremacy in the air and saved 
bases like Harstad and Tromsp from suffering the same fate 
as Aandalsnes, Namsos and Molde in South Norway. 
Ground war 
Given the above-mentioned air and naval strength relationship, 
the final outcome was destined to be decided, as so often 
before and since the Narvik campaign, on the ground. Whereas 
more Norwegians fought on more fronts in South Norway, the 
Allied land forces were in the majority from mid-May onwards 
around Narvik. In the period from 14 April to 9 May, 12 
Allied infantry battalions and some divisional and base units 
reached North Norway. 
In the first phase, until mid-May, the 6th Division was 
virtually alone in driving the Germans back in the Narvik 
region. Only 3 of the 12 Allied infantry battalions were 
involved during this time in any actual fighting with Dietl's 
forces. This says much about the Allied command and the 
limited usefulness of the Allied units, due to insufficient 
training and deficient materiel for such extreme weather 
conditions and difficult terrain. 
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Dietl consolidates 
To achieve freedom of movement in order to have some 
defence in reserve against the expected Norwegian attacks 
from the north, and to reach his main objective, Major General 
Dietl deemed it necessary to establish rapidly sufficient room 
for defensive manoeuvres. On 10 April, therefore, a mountain 
troops battalion advanced northwards from Bjerkvik and 
reached Elvenes in Gratangen the next day. 
On 13 April a reinforced company of this battalion established 
itself on Lapphaugen after having thrown a Norwegian 
protective detachment back. On 16 April, as mentioned above, 
the railway link to Sweden was established. Again Diet! and 
his men showed vigour and initiative. The space and the time 
he thus provided for himself, was later to prove sufficient to 
enable Diet! and his men to be saved by events on the 
Continent. 
The Norwegian forces and leadership 
After the fall of Narvik the 6th Division, (excepting the above-
mentioned force on B j(<lmefjell which commanded by Omdal 
was broken on 16 April,) had only one infantry battalion plus 
a few minor support units that was immediately available to 
be thrown against the Germans. The Division, therefore, had 
to prevent Dietl's bridgehead from becoming reinforced, and 
at the same time secure its own mobilisation and concentration 
of forces. This task was ably executed. Major General 
Fleischer' s independent and quick reaction, from the evening 
of 8 April to the first Norwegian attack on the night of 24 
April showed good leadership qualities, resourcefulness and a 
will to do what the siutuation demanded. He achieved this 
without waiting for the Government's mobilisation order or his 
own formal appointtnent as Commander in Chief North 
Norway by the same Government. 
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Further, it was Aeischer's plan to prepare thoroughly in order 
that the baptism by fire of his green, inexperienced troops 
might be as favourable as possible. He knew that this was 
essential for their further usefulness in combat. His reasoning 
was correct, and he could justifiably claim, in his posthu-
mously published work: 
"The units suffered much, but they became tough and ... 
learnt how to take care of themselves. They became units 
that could be used in war." 
Operations in South and North Norway clearly illustrate the 
difference between timely, orderly mobilisation and its 
converse. 
Still, for some Norwegian units the first engagement with the 
enemy was a catastrophe. Three times Norwegian forces were 
surprised and overwhelmed by the Germans. The first time 
was in Narvik on 9 April when the Germans occupied the 
town without the army firing a single shot and the second the 
incident with Major Omdal's force on 16 April at Bjpmefjell. 
The third time was the Trpnder battalion (1st/12th) on 25 April 
during the fighting in Gratangen. This battalion was also 
attacked early in the morning when everybody except a small 
close security force was sleeping. During the remainder of the 
campaign the Ist/12th operated as a half-battalion. Several 
military historians maintain that the battalion never fully 
recovered from the psychological shock of the attack and of 
its result. 
In the cosy light of hindsight the question can be asked 
whether Fleischer should have cancelled the attack. Storm and 
blizzard had totally exhausted the units. The plan for the 
attack was sound, but it presupposed possible skiing conditions 
and observation visibility in the direction of proposed fire. 
Operationally speaking, the 6th Division had lost a first-line 
infantry ballalion. The lack of Norwegian infantry became 
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even more acute. But there were no further surprise attacks. 
The Norwegians had learnt the hard way. 
The Germans soon withdrew their forward positions from 
Lapphaugcn and the valley of Gratangen south of Gratangen. 
They found their positions too exposed against the numerically 
superior Norwegian forces in this area. On 23 April five 
Norwegian infantry battalions had converged in the area north 
of the German bridgehead. 
After the tragedy of the Trpnder battalion, the 6th Division 
continued its offensive regardless. At the end of April the 
snow had begun to melt and hampered the movement of all 
units enormously, especially those that used skis and sledges. 
Around the end of April - early May the units of the 6th 
Division in the Salangen-Gratangen area were organised as a 
combat division that consisted of two weak brigades - 6th and 
7th Brigades - plus some divisional troops directly under the 
division. According to a report given to the Norwegian central 
staff in 1947, with Colonel 0stby as chairman and among 
others Colonel Hyldmo (Commander Ilnd/15th in 1940) as 
commission member, 7th Brigade was never a brigade in the 
real organisational sense. "It lacked, for instance, all facilities 
for service in the rear areas. No brigade command existed, 
only a strongly reduced, small brigade staff. It was rather a 
combat group". 
At the same time, early May, the Germans held a defensive 
perimeter over Labergdalen · Gratangseidet - Gressdalen. They 
had here two mountain troops battalions and two naval 
companies. One mountain troops battalion was stationed in 
Narvik with one company at Ankenes. The other naval 
battalions were along the north and east sides of the Herjang-
fjord, in Narvik and along the iron ore railway. 
On 29 April Fleischer started his combined operation with the 
French General Bethouart, commander of the five French and 
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four Polish battalions which had arrived. The relationship 
between the two gentlemen was excellent and much better than 
Fleischer's relationship with General Mackesy. 
On I May the pressure against Dietl's forces was resumed. 
The Norwegian offensive lasted more or less until the fighting 
was over. In the operations, the participants were 6th and 7th 
Brigade, the French 27th Demi-Brigade with two mountain 
battalions (Chasseurs Alpins) and one 75 mm field battery. 
Simultaneously a British battalion was in combat with a 
German mountain troop company in the area Haakvik-Andenes 
southwest of Narvik. 
Apart from the actual amphibious operations in Bjerkvik and 
Narvik and the French-British battalion thrust along the main 
road at Haakvik, the operations on the ground in the Narvik 
area must be characterised as mountain warfare under winter 
conditions. 
Operations to a great extent took place above the timberline 
where the possibilities for shelter from the harsh weather and 
concealment from aerial observation were very sparse. 
9 April had nine hours between sunrise and sunset. Six weeks 
later it was daylight day and night. In 1939-40 the winter was 
unusually severe. The snow along the coast was more than 
one meter deep and inland double that. On 9 April it was still 
full winter, but three weeks later the spring had begun in the 
lower coastal area, and gradually spread upwards to the 
valleys. During the final phase of the campaign, the ice in the 
rivers melted and formed formidable obstacles. In the high 
mountains the snow and nightfrost remained until the end of 
the campaign on 9 June 1940. 
During the fighting there was often a strong wind, and periods 
with snow falling, and in the final stage of the campaign, 
many days with dense fog. (10) 
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Main development in the following operations 
In the first phase the main axis of attack was to a great extent 
directly south. From mid-May onwards the direction of the 
thrust changed towards the southeast, towards the eastern pan 
of the iron ore railway and the Bjs;!mefjell area - the Swedish 
border. The objective was to gain control over these areas and 
eliminate Dietl's forces or drive them into internment across 
the Swedish border. (11) Gradually the north side of the 
Ofotfjord, north Rombaken, became the main area of French 
operations, while the Polish troops had the southern sector as 
their fighting area. 
The British 24th (Guards) Brigade was transferred to Bads;!, to 
Mo i Rana, from 30 April to 25 May. Fleischer deeply 
regretted that the best British unit, 24th Brigade, was for all 
practical purposes inactive from 14 April to 17 May. They 
were waiting for the snow to disappear! 24th Brigade was 
pursued by accidents and tragedies as two of the three 
battalions experienced shipwreck resulting in heavy losses in 
personnel and equipment. 
The operations from the Vefsn valley to Bads;! fall beyond the 
scope of this article, but since the Allied forces in the Narvik 
sector were reduced due to the fighting there, it should be 
mentioned as influencing on the outcome at N arvik. 
The British suggestion to send the Polish brigade to East 
Finnmark was brusquely rejected by Fleischer! 
The Allied landing 1n Herjangsfjord/Bjerkvik 
The French General Bethouart, who commanded the five 
French and the four Polish battalions, had quite correctly 
found out that it was easier to advance by sea than on snow-
covered mountains. The Allies dominated the sea from 13 
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April onwards. An amphibious assault was planned by 
Bethouart and executed on the night of 13 May - after having 
been postponed. F1eischer pledged Norwegian cooperation on 
8 May. Due to faulty timing, lack of good cooperation and 
strong German resistance, the German defenders managed to 
escape the pincer movements. The sources give different 
accounts of the operations of 6th and 7th Brigade in connec-
tion with the landing. (12) Only a detailed study could, if it 
were still possible, provide answers about what happened when 
and why up there in the mountains. 
Munthe-Kaas, then commander IInd/!6th, calls 13 May "the 
biggest day of fighting in the Narvik area". Five nations 
participated. Tanks were used fot the first time in the battle 
for Narvik! 
The result of the fighting in the mountains was that the 
German positions on the northern sector of the mountain 
plateau were outflanked and deserted on 22 May. The Nor-
wegians lacked fresh, rested troops for effective pursuit and 
possible defeat of the exhausted Germans, because the 
Varanger battalion was still deployed in East Finnmark ... 
After four weeks of combat and hardship day and night, the 
Norwegians had reached their limit. The supply lines of 6th 
Brigade were stretched to the utmost. 
After these successful operations, the Allies now held the 
necessary jumping-off ground for a direct attack on N arvik by 
the reconquest of the Bjerkvik-0yjord area. 25 years after the 
Gallipoli landings, the Allies began the Second World War's 
amphibious operations at Narvik. 
The pause in the 6th Brigade's operations 
until early June 
Munthe-Kaas, Commander of 1Ind/16th, criticises in his book 
from 1968 6th Division's (F1eischer's) directive of 22 May 
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that led to the long break in the fighting and evacuation from 
the mountain of !Ind/16th, minus one rifle company and one 
heavy machine gun platoon. (13) 
The Alta battalion, Ilnd/16th, and Ist/16th, needed a rest, but 
the offensive-minded Munthe-Kaas estimates that a 48 hour 
pause would have been sufficient. IInd/I6th was out of action 
for one week! The skis of the battalion were sent to Seter-
moen, a grave mistake, because the skis were later needed 
again when the battalion again had to operate in the snow-
covered mountain plateau. Lindback-Larsen, in 1940 Major and 
Chief-of-staff 6th Division, mentions several times in his book 
of 1946 about the 6th Division that the Division's command 
underestimated the capacity and endurance of the Norwegian 
soldiers. On page 83 he says: "We were to learn that the 
troops could endure much more than we thought." On page 
90: "Without any doubt the troops endured the mountain 
conditions better than we had expected." 
Ist/I6th under Commander Major Hunstad, had on 7 and 14 
May shown a remarkable marching capacity in difficult terrain. 
This was the battalion that IInd/16th were to operate with ... 
A contributing reason for Fleischer's possible miscalculation 
could be the fact that the direct attack on Narvik was impend-
ing, an attack that took most of the attention of Fleischer and 
Lindback-Larsen. Moreover, they both panicipated with 
Hyldmo's battalion in the landing as observers. However, 6th 
Division had underestimated the substantial problems that the 
Nygaard basin created further to the west after the ice had 
melted. 
Not until 3 June was the group Ilnd/16th (Ilnd/16th, Mountain 
Artillery Battalion Ill, one heavy machine gun platoon from 
Ist/16th and a mortar section from Ist/12th) allowed to move 
up into the mountains. By then, 12 days had elapsed smce 
Diet! 's retreat on 22 May! 
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Loss of time haunted the Allied and Norwegian operations at 
Narvik. "The long pause in operations ... brought the Germans 
great advantages and the Norwegians considerable loss of time 
and terrain. The shifting of weight was decisive ... " According 
to the former Commander Ilnd/16th Munthe-Kaas. 
The direct attack on NaNik 27-28 May 
The attack had to be postponed several times because of the 
necessity of having the airport at Bardufoss ready to receive 
British fighters. From 21 May one Gladiator squadron and 
from 26 May one Hurricane squadron operated from Bardu-
foss. Could the Gladiator squadron have provided sufficient air 
power? Could the attack have started immediately after the 
squadron was operative from the Norwegian air base? The 
possibility was a real one; but it must be stored in the 
collection of tempting hypothetical questions. 
The attack was prepared and led by Bethouart in cooperation 
with the British and the Norwegians. The attacking force 
consisted of two battalions of the Foreign Legion, the Narvik 
battalion Ilnd/15th and two light tanks. The French artillery 
battalion and the Norwegian battery were there to support the 
attack from positions above 0yjord. Artillery support was also 
supplied by the Royal Navy, which provided landing crafts as 
well. 
Coordinated with the time of the attack over Rombaken, the 
Poles advanced over the mountain from the Haakvik area 
towards Ankenes and the bottom of the Beisfjord. 
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Comments on some important aspects 
of the Narvik operation 
A prepared amphibious assault against a defended area needs 
detailed planning, reconnaissance, coordination and detailed 
orders down to each individual soldier. All this takes time. For 
this operation enough time was available; indeed the long 
waiting period produced nervous strain on the attackers. 
Bethouart was waiting for the British fighters to arrive or for 
dense, low cloud cover ... 
The plan's weak point was the lack of suitable landing crafts. 
Only half a battalion could be transported across at a time. 
Surprise was therefore essential. Secrecy and camouflage of all 
movements were imposed. 
The operational plan was simple and good. But the choice of 
embarkation points was unfortunate, excepting the first echelon 
of the bridgehead-battalion and the two tanks which embarked 
at Seines. Seines was hidden from Gennan observations and 
the first echelon achieved initial surprise in the landing area. 
But the rest of the attack force embarked at 0yjord which 
could be clearly observed from the opposite, Gennan side. 
When the second echelon of the bridgehead-battalion were due 
to embark, the quay and the surrounding area came under 
heavy artillery fire. The Legionnaires suffered some losses: 
amongst others a French company commander was killed. 
Therefore the embarkation area had to be moved 200-300 
metres west of the quay. From there the Legionnaires were 
ferried across without further loss of life. (16) 
But precious time had been lost - perhaps 45 minutes. It was 
impossible for the later echelons to close this time gap. The 
next battalion to cross the fjord was Major Hyldmo's Narvik 
battalion. It crossed without casualities, but because of the 
above-mentioned lapse of time, the bridgehead-front had not 
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been pushed as far forward as planned. The French battalion 
commander assured Hyldmo that there was no danger and that 
he could simply advance. At that time, the second critical 
phase occurred: before Hyldmo's two forward companies had 
time to move on, while they were marching through the 
French lines, the Germans launched a strong counterattack 
against the left company and the central sector of the battal-
ion's front. Suddenly the French and Norwegians had a crisis 
on their hands and panic broke out. (17) 
Simultaneously, Allied ships were attacked by German aircraft 
over a period of two hours. Several ships took direct hits and 
suffered heavy casualties, among them the flagship Cairo. 
During the German air attacks the naval ships could not give 
fire support to the ground operations. It was a great disap-
pointment for the attackers that British air support did not 
materialise during this critical period due to fog coming in 
from the sea near Bardufoss. The whole operation was in 
danger. But through excellent leadership, the officers managed 
to contain the situation and regain control. The reserve 
company and the mortar platoon were thrown in as reinforce-
ments. Cooperating with the Norwegian battery on the 
0yjordside of the fjord, Ilnd/15th made an envelopment that 
enabled the Hyldmo battalion to gain a foothold on the 
mountain plateau. Unfortunately, the tanks got stuck in the 
mud and therefore played no further role in the operation. 
In the afternoon the llnd/15th advanced as the first battalion, 
courtesy of the French, into Narvik through the French 
battalion that waited north of the railway station. 
The reconquest of Narvik - the Allied goal from the first day 
of the Norwegian campaign - caused 150 casualties. About 60 
of these were Norwegians. 
How could Norwegian soldiers with their "peaceful" attitude 
and short training period before 9 April, become real combat 
soldiers? (19) 
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Some points may be considered: 
I. Officers, non-commissioned officers and private soldiers 
knew each other well and could trust each other. During 
the neutrality defence period and the winter exercises, the 
units achieved a high degree of unit cohesion. Com-
radeship with strong leadership was the rule. The will 
and ability to help and support each other was well 
developed. Recent research confirms that the above-
mentioned factors are decisive in determining unit 
cohesion in battle and fighting power. (20) 
2. The soldiers had learnt how to use their weapons even 
those which needed a great deal of practice and main-
tenance like the Madsen machinegun. 
3. The soldiers knew how to exploit the terrain. (21) 
4. The Norwegian soldiers knew why they fought. They 
knew that their war effort could be decisive. 
5. II/IR 15 had rather simple tasks to begin with. The 
gradual introduction to battle led to heightened self-
confidence and high morale. 
What has been said here about Hyldmo's battalion, could just 
as well be said of the majority of the Norwegian forces in the 
Narvik battles. 
The final battles 
After the reconquest of Narvik, the Norwegian offensive in the 
north which began again around early June, the French 
advance in the West along the iron ore railway, and the taking 
of Beisfjord by the Poles in the southwest and their subse-
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quent advance towards Si!dvik, it seemed as if it was only a 
question of time before Dietl's forces had to give up the fight. 
But events on the continent were to influence the outcome of 
the operations in North Norway in a decisive way. The 
decision to withdraw the Allied forces was conveyed to 
Admiral Corlc and Orrery on the night of 25 May. Owing to 
security measures the evaluation order was first passed on to 
representatives of the Norwegian government late on June 1 -
one week later. 
The Chief of Defence, General Ruge, who had assumed 
command on 29 May, was told on 2 June. The decision was 
received with bitterness. The fact that the evacuation order was 
conveyed so late, caused the Norwegian military command to 
act in the light of a false sense of the vital time factor. A case 
in point is that of the disposition of General Fleischer's men 
in the mountains from 22 June onwards. The temporary lack 
of Nowegian pressure on the Germans, gave Dietl's hard-
pressed and exhausted forces a breathing space that probably 
saved them. Actually, it was possible to resume the Norwegian 
mountain offensive earlier. Diet! told Ruge after the campaign 
had ended that they (the Germans) could have held out for 
only 24 more hours - at the most 48. 
Tentative conclusions 
Why did the numerically superior Norwegian-Allied force fail 
to defeat the German bridgehead at Narvik? 
The German attacks of 9 April on Narvik and Elvegaardsmoen 
were, as with the simultaneous attacks in South Norway, 
primarily based on surprise, audacity and speed. These factors 
combined with the unreadiness and indecision on the part of 
the defenders enabled the Germans to take both objectives in 
North Norway without a fight. 
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These factors were to be decisive. "We (the Norwegians) built 
on peace in sheer defiance" to try to quote the Norwegian 
poet Nordahl Grieg. 
During the following operations in the Narvik area, the 
German mountain troops fought with great skill under inspiring 
leadership, periodically supported by the Luftwaffe. In this 
connection it is relevant and remarkable to refer to General 
Jodl 's OKW report about the Norwegian campaign, signed 12 
June 1940. (22) It was written just after the events when the 
impressions and incoming reports were fresh. The decisive 
influence of the Luftwaffe forms a thread through the whole 
document. The report becomes even more interesting when we 
consider the author's position as an army officer who knew 
only too well of the disagreements and the lack of cooperation 
between the three services. 
We know that in peacetime it is extremely difficult to evaluate 
and compare the military strength of different countries or 
blocks. Such an evaluation consists of much more than 
counting materiel and soldiers, ("bean counting"). When 
evaluating the operative status (stridsdyktighet) of a force, 
many critical, but non-quantifiable factors like leadership, 
organisational ability, strategy, operations, morale and unit 
cohesion in combat come into the sterile, quantifiable data. 
Further, local factors like climate and terrain enter the picture 
as well. 
It must be remembered that the fighting men are much more 
than a mere physical presence on the battle ground! It is a 
very advanced organisation of human beings whose ability to 
fight is ultimately dependent on a delicate psychological, social 
and moral cohesion. This cohesion can be ruined in other 
ways than by regular annihilation or decimation. It will be 
wise to remember the German military, philosophical and 
strategic thinker Clausewitz' words that war is a "clash of 
opposing wills". And the will of the enemy can be influenced 
by other means than defeating his first line troops ... 
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Today we know that the Gennan anny in the winter 1939-
40 went through a tough training period based on the expe-
rience from the Polish campaign. Soldiers and officers were 
encouraged to he critical, to take the initiative, to improvise. 
How could they otherwise be prepared to deal with the 
unexpected, or learn to exploit the opportunities in combat that 
often only exist for a passing moment? Something of the 
essence of the Gennan philosophy was expressed by the elder 
Count Moltke although this advice was not always followed: 
"A favourable situation will never be exploited if commanders 
wait for orders. The highest commander and the youngest 
soldier must always he conscious of the fact that omission and 
inactivity are worse than resorting to the wrong expedient." 
(23) 
This attitude helps us to hegin to understand something of the 
"secret" that lay behind the Gennan anny and Wehnnacht's 
successes. Certainly it is more plausible than explanations just 
listing revolutionary tactics or superior weapons and numbers. 
On the three-year course at the Gennan Military Academy, for 
many years the highest Gennan military educational institution, 
half the time was spent learning tactics. The second most 
important subject was military history. The result of this was 
that in the art of waging war up to a certain level, they were 
second to none. Unfortunately for the Allies the Gennan 
Wehnnacht in the spring of 1940 was far superior to the 
Allied forces in combat effectiveness. 
According to the late Major General A.D. Dahl, Lieutenant 
Colonel and battalion commander of the Alta battalion in 
1940, tactical defence was strongly emphasised in the Nor-
wegian anny in the 1930s. He maintains that tactical defence 
has always been a negative undertaking. It invites "waiting, 
leaves the initiative to the enemy, and leads to disaster if 
considered the only right doctrine ... Our terrain is well suited 
to tactical surprise attacks ... The offensive spirit must be kept 
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alive. It has nothing to do with sabre rattling or "ein frischer 
and frohlicher Krieg"; it is simply the essence of all war 
experience. But if an attack is to be executed by a rather large 
unit, it must be practised in peacetime". (24) 
The Norwegian army's directives and doctrines on the conduct 
of the officer when in combat point in the same general 
direction. He was supposed to be where he can best lead and 
control his unit, i.e. behind the unit, and the bigger the unit 
the farther behind he must be! Even if there were many 
exceptions, the above-mentioned 0stbye report stated: "There 
is no doubt that the officers ... on the whole were located too 
far back. This is no reproach: they were where they were 
supposed to be. It is the system that was wrong." (25) 
Considering the emphasis on defence in the prewar army, the 
offensive operations in the Narvik area become even more 
impressive. 
There is another sensitive question which is difficult,· even 
impossible, to evaluate with any degree of accuracy today: 
how did the activities of certain civilians as saboteurs and 
intelligence agents for the Germans affect the war? Had the 
sympathy that certain officers undoubtedly had for the 
Germans any influence on their performance? It is quite 
obvious that the suspicion of security leaks on the Norwegian 
side affected the cooperation with the Allies in a negative 
way. A.D. Dahl mentions "cases" and events in his book about 
the Alta battalion. Two people that he suspected were one of 
his company commanders and the chief-of-staff of his brigade! 
(26) 
Concerning the Norwegian-Allied numerical superiority based 
on the number of active combatants at Narvik, the literature 
is often misleading. One forgets, for instance, that the 6th 
Division had personnel in Nordland and East Finnmark! The 
6th and 7th Brigade had only 4,800 men - not 8-10,000. 
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Some authors also count British forces that were based far 
away from the actual fighting zones. Finally, numbers vary 
from this distance in time on both sides. My preliminary 
research indicates, reservedly, an Allied superiority around 
mid-May of slightly less than 3-1, decreasing to 2.3-1 by the 
end of the month. 
Still, these factors are not sufficient to answer our question. 
Additional causes can be found in the Norwegian-Allied camp. 
Here we can identify at least four serious deficiencies that 
probably played just as decisive a role as the Germans' own 
skill and air support. (27) Before I list these problems, I will 
refer to Clausewitz's words: ··Everything in war is very simple, 
but in war the simplest thing is difficult". (28) General Ruge 
has, in his Felttoget, a personal narrative of the campaign 
pointed out: " ... He who makes the least mistakes, wins". (29) 
The first fault in North Norway in I940 was that we lacked 
the necessary infrastructure to receive those components which 
compose balanced military help e.g. airfields. 
Secondly, the organisation, agreements and mutual trust were 
lacking which could have provided functional use and unity of 
command of the Allied and Norwegian armed forces in North 
Norway. 
In Felttoget General Ruge criticises himself for not assuming 
earlier active command over the Norwegian warfare in North 
Norway in order to influence the Allies to wage war more 
aggressively; he wished to avoid stepping on General Fleis-
cher's toes. 
Thirdly, the campaign exposed the lack of a British command 
structure for combined operations which included all services. 
Finally, the operation revealed the fact that the majority of the 
Allied ground units lacked adequate training and equipment for 
winter and mountain warfare. This fact strongly reduced their 
usefulness. (30) 
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In my opmwn, the internal factors that decide the combat 
efficiency of an anny, among them the human factor, must be 
accentuated much more strongly than is commonly suggested. 
The theory that the Allies had to confront a foe superior in 
anns and materiel in North Norway is simply not acceptable. 
In addition, the Norwegian-Allied loss of momentum and 
subsequent loss of time played an important role in explaining 
the outcome. Time is always a critical factor in military 
operations. 
Some questions that need further research 
I. Why did the Varanger battalion remain in East Finnmark 
during the whole campaign? Was the Red danger, the 
threat from the Soviet Union perceived to be so immi-
nent? What did really happen with the 6th and 7th 
Brigades from 11-14 May? 
2. What happened to the innocent third party, the civilian 
population, during the battle for Narvik. We have some 
knowledge, and it is pleasant to find that more personal 
accounts are emerging. But we need to know more. As 
the saying goes: "Until the lions get their own historians, 
hunting stories will always glorify the hunter." 
3. Why did Norway not receive the same amount of help 
from Sweden that Finland did during the Winter War? 
The Finns received large quantities of weapons and 
ammunition that were partly substituted by Gennany. In 
addition, about one and a half times more Swedish troop 
volunteered to Finland than the number of men in the 6th 
Division on the Narvik front. We know that the Swedish 
Government were under heavy pressure from the Ger-
mans and that, to a certain degree, they gave in to the 
pressure. 
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Finland showed more will to help her neighbour, but they 
had to give priority to the very real threat from the 
Soviet Union. They had no military materiel to spare. 
Still, courtesy of the Finns, a Norwegian "supply line", 
Tomeaa-Rovanicmi-Svanvik-Kirkenes, was established. 
Personnel, notably badly needed reserve officers from 
South Norway, came via this route. 
But despite the fact that the Norwegians in the Narvik area 
advanced modestly but steadily, the battle was lost due to 
events on the Continent beyond their control. North Norway 
too lost its sovereignty. Five years of foreign rule were at 
hand ... 
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Chapter 7 
The Fateful Decisions: Intelligence, 
Command and Technical Failure 
J. Rohwer 
The battle for Narvik - the fateful decisions *) 
To avoid a repetition of well known facts and of details 
presented by my colleagues I shall cover the questions of how 
intelligence reports influenced decision-making on both sides, 
of how the perceptions of the leaders and commanders were 
formed by the information they received from different 
sources, and of how the command set-up and techoical failures 
on both sides influenced the outcome of the campaign. 
The way to Narvik 
As Michael Salewski pointed out, one of the main aims of the 
German operation was to take Narvik to prevent a capture of 
this ore-exporting harbour, which was vitally important to the 
German war economy, by the Allies. (1) 
To achieve this, it was necessary to use most of the available 
big destroyers, (10), the only fast seagoing vessels which 
could reach Narvik in time without losing the indispensable 
surprise element until the last moment. Because this type of 
ship was not constructed as a transport, it was only possible 
to load the minimum of necessary troops with their personal 
weapons and light equipment, while the heavy weapons and 
vehicles had to be sent by two apparently innocent merchant 
ships in advance. To cover the destroyer force to the entrance 
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of the Vestfjord from British heavy forces, the only two fast 
battleships had to go with this group. (2) 
Because these two battleships and ten destroyers were so 
important to future naval operations, it was thought necessary 
to bring them back to home ports as early as possible. This 
was only possible if the destroyers found in Narvik the 
necessary fuel for the return voyage which had had to be sent 
in advance by two disguised merchant tanlkers. (3) 
Early intelligence and the first decisions 
In early April 1940 the Gennan xB-Dienst, the radio intel-
ligence unit, was more successful in deciphering the British 
naval ciphers than Bletchlcy Park was with their own Gcnnan 
ciphers at that time. So the German Seekriegsleitung or SKL 
could infonn the commanders at sea promptly and fairly 
accurately about the strength and dispositions of the British 
forces off North Norway. (4) 
The British intelligence agencies in early 1940 were not 
working in close coordination. (5) There were many conflict-
ing reports about Gennan intentions towards Scandinavia in 
early April, but there was no central evaluation. So the 
decision-makers acted mainly on their own preconceptions. 
Even when on April 7th an aircraft reported part of the 
German force in the North Sea and, later on, west of the 
Skagerrak, the Admiralty and the Commander in Chief Home 
Fleet considered a Gennan break-out into the Atlantic the most 
probable and dangerous possibility and acted accordingly, 
disregarding the available reports from diplomatic sources 
about Gennan troop transports moving north in the Belts and 
the Kattegat. (6) 
At this time Operation Wilfred, the mining of some places on 
the Norwegian coast in order to force German ore transports 
out to the open sea, was aleady under way, and in British 
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ports troops were loaded aboard cruisers to be ready to 
counter German moves. (7) Now these ships had to unload the 
troops and to sail with the main body of the Home Fleet to 
cover positions in case of a break-out. So they were too far 
west to intercept the German force running for the Lofoten 
area. The air reconnaissance was greatly hampered by the 
wind's rising to a gale and by low visibility. 
Such weather conditions might have been advantageous for a 
getaway into the Atlantic by the German heavy ships, but the 
destroyers, heavily loaded with troops and equipment, had 
great difficulty in reaching the Vestfjord in time and they lost 
almost all the materials which were lashed to the decks. (8) 
Also the merchant ships which had sailed from Germany on 
April 3rd, were delayed, and only the whale factory ship Jan 
Wellem, which was used as a tanker, reached Narvik in time, 
coming from the Basis Nord near Murmansk. (9) 
Why was the entrance to the Vestfjord not blocked? 
While four British mine-laying destroyers laid their minefield 
near the southern shore of the Vestfjord, according to plan, on 
the morning of April 8th, Vice Admiral Whitworth, whose 
battlecruiser the Renown was covering the operation off the 
Lofotens, had no clear idea about the German intentions and, 
when he got a garbled signal from the isolated destroyer 
Glowworm, he raced south with his only remaining destroyer. 
(10) 
In the late forenoon of the 8th Whitworth intercepted the 
Admiralty signal to the minelayers and their escorting 2nd 
Destroyer Flotilla to join the Renown off the Vestfjord and so 
he then turned north. But after meeting the 8 destroyers, 
having no new information on the German ships' position, he 
presumed their escape into either the Arctic or the Atlantic, 
either way most dangerous possibilities, and decided to 
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position his force northwest of the Lofoten islands. (11) 
The weather also played a part in Admiral Whitworth's 
decision not to go back immediately to the entrance of the 
Vestfjord as ordered by the Admiralty on the evening of the 
8th, when the intelligence pointed more directly to a probable 
Gennan attack on Narvik. The gale and the heavy seas forced 
the destroyers to heave to, and then trail at low speed behind 
the battlecruiser on a northwesterly course. 
Whitworth could not imagine that the German ships would try 
to enter the narrows of the Vestfjord in such conditions at 
night without being able to fix their positions exactly. (12) 
So the way for Commodore Bonte and his destroyers was 
opened only about two or three hours before they arrived at 
the entrance of the Vestfjord. There Vice Admiral Liitjens 
detached them from his two battleships for their final run in 
to Narvik, while he himself turned for a covering position 
west of the Lofotens, so innocently following Whitworth's 
force. (13) 
Both were surprised when they sighted each other through 
gaps in the snow showers, Whitworth without identifying the 
Gennan ships correctly and Liitjens without recognising the 
destroyers clearly but guessing there would be a second 
battlecruiser (the Repulse) from his intelligence reports. An 
indecisive action followed with some success for both sides 
before the slower Renown lost sight of the Gneisenau and 
Scharnhorst but managed to follow them for some time while 
the destroyers were sent on to the Vestfjord. (14) 
Bonte's situation estimate and his decisions 
Meanwhile, Bonte and his destroyers arrived off Narvik on 
time according to plan. The low visibility and insufficient 
communication between the Norwegian outposts and Narvik 
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prevented a clear warning to the two Norwegian coa~t defence 
ships Eidsvo/d and Norge, which only now had the warning 
to prepare to resist a German attack. They had just manned 
their battle stations, but their captains were reluctant to open 
fire immediately. Bonte had the order and wanted to avoid a 
battle but he had to sink both ships when the captain of the 
Eidsvold refused to surrender and the Norge finally opened 
fire. (15) The unfortunate loss of life from those unpre-
meditated actions must have weighed heavily on Bonte's mind, 
probably adding to his indecisiveness during the day; the 
mental exhaustion from the strain of responsibility in bringing 
General Dietl's mountain troops to Narvik in such terrible 
weather conditions was already troubling him. (16) 
While Diet!, informed beforehand of the probability of a 
surrender by the Norwegian commander at Narvik (as a 
follower of Quisling) (I 7), was able to occupy all the impor-
tant standpoints of the town and established defensive positions 
around with his 2,000 mountain troops, Bonte is not reported 
to have been very efficient in preparing his ships for the 
return voyage, although ordered by the SKL to do so as soon 
as possible. (18) 
His problem was the fuel situation. He waited for the tanker 
Kattegat, which had been detailed to refuel him but which, 
unknown to him, was intercepted by the Norwegian auxiliary 
Nordkapp and had scuttled herself. (I 9) His only available 
tanker was the Jan Wel/em, which was not very well suited as 
a supply vessel. She could fuel only two destroyers at a time 
and this took from six to eight hours. Bonte' s intention seems 
to have been to take as many of his ships as possible, but it 
could have taken at least one and a half days to top them up 
with fuel. A getaway could only be tried, therefore, at night 
on the I I th if he did not wish to divide his forces. So he 
dispersed half his ships to outlying fjords while the others 
waited their turn to use the Jan Wel/em. (20) 
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The British reactions and Bonte's preparations 
Meanwhile the British in London and at sea off the Vestfjord 
had no clear information whether the Germans were already in 
Narvik and, if so, in what strength. A series of counter-
manding signals went out from the Admiralty, the Commander 
in Chief Home Fleet, and Admiral Whitworth, to Captain 
Warburton-Lee, commander of the 2nd Destroyer Flotilla on 
patrol off the Vestfjord. He chose the most militant order and 
decided to attack the Germans at N arvik in the early morning 
hours of the lOth using his 5 destroyers. (21) 
Bonte probably counted on timely reports of the three U-boats 
in the Vestfjord and Ofotfjord. But only U 51 sighted the 
destroyers on the evening of the 9th, just when they were on 
course southwest, trying to win some time to be at sunrise off 
Narvik. (22) And the orders Bonte gave for the patrol 
destroyers in the Ofotfjord were not vehement enough to 
prevent the Diether von Roeder from leaving its post before 
the relieving destroyer took over. So Warburton-Lee achieved 
complete surprise in the very bad visibility of the morning. 
(23) 
The outcome of the battle is well known and I will not repeat 
the story here. (24) 
The deaths, first of Bonte and then of Warburton-Lee, had 
grave consequences. On the German side the SKL ordered an 
escape of the prepared and fuelled ships, but by the evening 
of the lOth Captain Bey, who had taken over command of the 
destroyers, had only two ships ready. Knowing from the 
German xB-reports of the heavy forces off the Lofoten, when 
he sighted two destroyers and a cruiser in the Vestfjord, he 
returned to Narvik. The destroyers must have been the Eskimo 
and Punjabi, which U 25 had just attacked and assumed they 
had sunk, the first two instances of the many torpedo failures 
in Norway. (25) 
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The British preparations for a final attack 
On the British side Admiral Whitworth could not get a clear 
picture of the German position from the reports from the three 
destroyers which returned damaged (and which had also, 
incidentally, been attacked twice by U 51 without their 
knowing it because the torpedoes failed). (26) When the 
Admiralty signalled the captain of the cruiser Pene/ope to take 
the available destroyers and attack Narvik again, there was 
some uncertainty as to whether there were one or two German 
cruisers, and Whitworth, probably piqued because he had again 
been overridden by the Admiralty, did not act at all. (27) 
Only when on the 12th air reconnaissance reported the heavy 
German ships in the southern North Sea goig southward did 
the Commander in Chief, Admiral Forbes, send his forces 
northward, to attack the German ships by carrier aircraft from 
the Furious, but without success. However, with a report of 
five German destroyers at Narvik, a plan was made now on 
the 13th to attack with 9 destroyers, supported by the battle-
ship Warspite flying the flag of Admiral Whitworth. (28) 
The order to form the "Force B" was intercepted and deci-
phered by the German xB-Dienst and so Bey was warned of 
the forthcoming attack, without being able to attempt a further 
escape. Only three of his destroyers were fully operational, 
two had to repair battle damage, two were damaged by 
grounding, one was wrecked from the battle of the 1Oth and 
two were sunk. (29) 
The events of the battle on April 13th are also well known 
and need no re-examination here. (30) More interesting are the 
decisions taken during the following days on both sides. 
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The crisis in leadership 
at the German supreme command 
To the German side the loss of all the ten destroyers was a 
great shock. General Diet! 's 2,000 mountain troops had 
established a wide defensive ring around the north as far as 
Elvenes and were trying to push the Norwegian forces back 
away from the ore railway to the Swedish border. But they 
were without heavy weapons. There was no possibility of 
supplying them by sea and only very limited means for air 
supply. (31) 
In the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) a crisis erupted 
on the 14th when a nervous Hitler wanted to evacuate the 
Narvik troops to Sweden to avoid further losses which might 
undermine his prestige. Only by strong opposition from 
General Jodl were the orders redrafted, and Diet! was told 
that, if he could not hold Narvik, he should take up a 
defensive position in the mountains along the ore railway and 
remain there supported by airdrops of supplies. Only on the 
18th when the expected strong Allied action did not take 
place, was the crisis in leadership overcome. (32) 
British indecisiveness: 
direct attack or methodical approach? 
On the Allied side the rea~on for the inaction was a clash of 
opposing ideas on further operations by the Admiralty, the 
Home Fleet and the commanders on the spot. (33) Because the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, recalled a 
former First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet the Earl of Cork 
and Orrery, to be supreme commander for the operation in the 
field, there arose problems of seniority, of coordination with 
the army, and of conflicting orders. 
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The anny itself had problems with the assignment of troops. 
Major-General Mackesy, commander of the 49th Division, had 
only a part of his troops when he anived at Harstad on the 
14th, because the remainder was diverted to land at Namsos. 
(34) Lord Cork, sent out without clear orders, anived on the 
14th at the Vestfjord and proposed to Mackesy early on the 
15th to attack with the available ships and to land the troops 
directly at Narvik in order to overwhelm the enemy by the 
weight of naval power. But Mackesy held to his orders to 
establish a base at Harstad first; he had not at that time 
combat-loaded his transports. In addition he still had no clear 
picture of the enemy situation. (35) 
So it was decided first to set up camp at Harstad, and, after 
preparing to cross the Vaagsfjord towards Skaanland and 
Gratangen, to attack the Gennan positions systematically in 
cooperation with the Norwegian Brigades 7 and 6 which were 
east of them.(36) 
The German torpedo crisis 
This decision might have led to heavy Allied losses if the 
Gennan torpedoes had worked well. Already during the two 
destroyer battles the Gennan destroyers and the U-boats had 
experienced many frustrating torpedo failures. Some exploded 
prematurely, others became surface runners, many were 
running much deeper than set and neither the magnetic fuses 
nor the impact detonators functioned reliably. (37) Most of the 
British destroyers in the battles of April lOth and 13th 
reported torpedoes running far beneath their ships. (38) 
And now the U-boats ordered to the Vaagsfjord, on an xB-
Dienst report of enemy concentrations there, failed in their 
attacks. On the 14th, U 38 missed the cruiser Southampton, 
carrying General Mackesy. and on the 25th the same U 38 
missed the covering battleship Valiant, while U 65 failed to 
hit the Polish transport Batory. Meanwhile U 49 was sunk by 
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British destroyers, which captured a chart showing the German 
U-boat dispositions at the beginning of the Operation Hartmut. 
U 47 (under Lt.Cdr. Prien) twice fired salvoes of four 
torpedoes each against the anchored transports and cruisers, but 
all failed. This list could easily be expanded using other areas 
off Norway. (39) 
Unsupported, off the northern coast of Norway the battleship 
Warspite was attacked three times; the cruisers Effingham 
(then flagship of Lord Cork), Enterprise and the French Emile 
Bertin were also attacked; and there were many destroyers, not 
least among them the Polish Blyskawica, which were attacked 
but not hit: all these failures were in spite of close range shots 
and good intelligence (40). What might have happened if all 
the torpedoes had worked as expected? 
The Allied buildup and the German defences 
Meanwhile General Mackesy awaited the arrival of the convoy 
with the 5th Demi-Brigade Chasseurs Alpins which arrived on 
the 19th. (41) Lord Cork sent destroyers regularly to bombard 
Narvik and the German positions along the ore railway. Also 
British troops were transferred from the northern shore of the 
Bogenfjord to the southern side of the Ballangenfjord in 
preparation for the land attack. (42) 
During this time General Dietl tried to equip approximately 
2,500 survivors of the destroyers with Norwegian weapons 
captured at Elvegaardsmoen and to strengthen his positions 
after driving the Norwegians off the railway and up to the 
Swedish border. Supplies were airdropped on a limited scale, 
and Do-26 flying boats were used to bring in some heavier 
loads and to evacuate important technicians. (43) 
The heavy snowfalls made movements very difficult for both 
sides and the Germans found it almost impossible to bring 
supplies from Narvik to the northern Group Windisch because 
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of the British destroyers in the Rombaksfjord. (44) 
Lord Cork still hoped to take Narvik by direct assault; he 
made one last attempt to compel the Germans to surrender by 
a massive naval bombardment, intending to land his British 
troops without opposition. On April 24th, after some delay 
caused by snowstorms, he came in with his flagship the 
Effingham, the battleship Warspite, the cruisers Aurora and 
Enterprise, and the destroyer Zulu, and engaged in a three-
hour bombardment, but because no positive results were 
observed, the troops already embarked on the training cruiser 
Vindictive had to be disembarked again. (45) 
On the 26th the German Group Windisch destroyed the 
Norwegian battalion 1/12 and took 144 prisoners in a counter-
attack near Elvenes. They were evacuated to Sweden during 
the next few days. (46) General Mackesy gained additional 
strength by the arrival on the 27th of a convoy with the 
French 27th Demi-Brigade Chasseurs A! pins, and of another 
convoy on May 5th with the French 13th Demi-Brigade 
Foreign Legion and a Polish Brigade "Chasseurs de Nord". 
(47) 
The German xB-Dienst successfully identified these transports, 
but the Luftflotte 5 was seldom able to send attacking aircraft 
up to the Lofotens partly because of the weather conditions 
but more because the planes were needed to attack the Allied 
evacuation convoys from Andalsnes and Namsos in Central 
Norway. (48) 
Notwithstanding their failure to crack the German position in 
Central Norway around Trondheim by this two-pronged attack, 
the British Government decided, during the first days of May, 
to take Narvik as soon as possible intending to hold North 
Norway as a foothold for the Norwegian Government in its 
own territory. (49) To coordinate the troops from Great 
Britain, Norway, France and Poland in the inevitable land 
operation, it was deemed necessary to have a more senior 
124 
commander, and Lieutenant-General Auchinleck was sent out. 
However, as he could anive no earlier than May 12th, further 
direct attacks were postponed. (50) 
German deliberations for a relief attack 
On the German side during these days deliberations took place 
on how to help General Diet!, who on 3rd May reported his 
intention of holding N arvik, and asked for more air support. 
(51) With the area around Trondheim now secure, the 2nd 
Mountain Division (known at this time as Group Feurstein) 
began their very difficult journey from the area north of 
Namsos along the coastal road to Mosj('len and Mo in the 
hopes of eventually reaching Narvik by land. (52) On May 8th 
the OKW ordered Diet! to hold out if possible in Narvik but, 
if not, at least in the mountains on the Norwegian side of the 
Swedish border. (53) 
The German advance along the coastal road forced the British 
eventually to transfer the British 24th (Guards) Brigade south 
to block the area around Bod0, while the exercises against 
Narvik had to be taken on by the French, the Norwegians and 
the Polish battalions. (54) 
Their pressure was felt by the Germans especially on the front 
in the north with the Group Windisch. So discussions started 
whether there was a possibility of easing the situation by 
calling on the heavy German ships off the Lofoten Islands or, 
as Hitler proposed, of sending troops with the big liners 
Bremen and Europa, in the protection of the big ships, into 
the Lyngenfjord north of Troms0 to reach the important 
airfield Bardufoss which would first be taken by a drop of 
parachutists. (55) The discussions dragged on: the liners would 
first have had to be reconstructed accordingly, and the 
banleships and cruisers as well as the few available destroyers 
for escorting the ships would have had to be made fully 
operational again, and so nothing came of this idea in the end. 
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On May 1Oth the main interest of the Allied Governments was 
turned on the new German offensive against the Netherlands, 
Belgium and France. In North Norway the snow began to 
melt, making movement for some time even more difficult. 
(56) 
The Allied amphibious attack into the Herjangsfjord 
Lord Cork, who had already on May 3rd planned to attack 
across the Rombaksfjord on May 8th, again had to back down 
in the face of General Mackesy's doubts, and only when the 
French General Bethouart supported him by offering the two 
battalions of the Foreign Legion for an amphibious operation, 
was he able to organise an assault against Bjerkvik at the end 
of the Heijangsfjord for the night of 12th-13th May, supported 
by the battleship Resolution, and again the cruisers Effingham 
and Aurora and four destroyers. (57) 
This attack, which incidentally led to the capture of the former 
Norwegian depot at Elvegaard, made the situation of the 
Group Windisch, which was attacked at the eastern part of 
their line by the Norwegian Brigade 6, even more difficult and 
led to its retreat to a shorter line. (58) Local attacks by the 
Norwegians and the French pushed the German line back until, 
on May 22nd, it withdrew from the Straumen narrows of the 
Rombaksfjord, north of the Haugfjell, to the Swedish border. 
Strengthened by some groups of parachutists General Diet! 
could now think of evacuating most of the destroyer crews, 
after the Swedish Government had agreed to their transfer by 
Swedish railway as "survivors of sunken ships"; this evacu-
ation really began on May 30th. (59) 
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The preparation for the final attack 
After General Auchinleck's arrival, new planning began for the 
final capture of Narvik on May 13th. (60) When he took 
command of the land and air forces under Lord Cork's overall 
direction, he sent all British army forces to the south to cover 
the Bod~ area and stand against the oncoming German attack 
of Group Feurstein. The troops off Narvik were put under the 
command of General Bethouart, who had to lead the French 
and Norwegian battalions against the northern front, and the 
Polish troops against the southern front over the heights above 
Beisfjord. (61) 
But the preparations for the final attack needed time, and 
especially the transfer of the British banalions to the south 
gave time and opportunity for some successes to the German 
Luftwaffe. Already on May 4th the Polish destroyer Grom had 
been sunk by a He-Ill bomber. On May 14th a Ju 87 dive-
bomber sank the Polish transport Chrobry on the way to Bodl') 
and on the 17th the cruiser Effingham struck a rock while 
transporting troops to Bod~ and was lost. On May 18th the 
battleship Resolution was hit by a 1,000 kilo bomb from a Ju 
88. So the planned attack had to be postponed from May 21st 
to May 27th. (62) 
The decision to take Narvik 
and to evacuate North Norway 
Meanwhile the developments in Belgium and France and the 
increasing danger from the German Luftwaffe, which could not 
be countered by the few fighter aircraft that the carriers 
Glorious and Ark Royal could bring in to North Norway, led 
to a decision by the Allied Governments, on May 24th, to 
evacuate North Norway after capturing Narvik and destroying 
the harbour and the ore-loading installations. (63) 
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The German air superiority was again shown, when on May 
26th the antiaircraft cruiser Curlew, the intended flagship of 
Lord Cork for the final assault, was sunk by German Ju 88 
bombers while defending the construction of a new airfield at 
Skaanland for the fighter planes from the carriers. By changing 
to the sister ship Cairo Lord Cork came in with the anti-
aircraft ships Coventry and Stork and five destroyers to support 
the crossing of the Rombaksfjord by one Norwegian and two 
French battalions for the direct attack on Narvik, while the 
cruiser Southampton supported the Polish attacks along the 
Beisfjord. (64) During the afternoon of May 28th the Cairo 
was damaged by a bomb hit. but the Norwegians entered 
Narvik, sent in first by courtesy of General Bethouart. (65) 
The Germans retreated along the ore railway to the innermost 
part of the Rombaksfjord beyond Sildvik, but the Allied 
attempt to close their escape to Sweden by ski patrols of 
French and Polish detachments failed. (66) 
At that time, reports in the media of the "victory" were used 
to black out to some extent the bad news from France 
including imminent evacuation of Dunkirk, but the evacuation 
of North Norway was beginning in great secrecy. (67) First 
the British brigade at Bod0 was taken off while a Norwegian 
battalion, ignorant of the whole intention, tried to cover this 
operation from the advance of the Group Feurstein. (68) 
Now the Allied troops , as they no longer needed to continue 
the pressure against the much shorter defence lines of the 
Group Diet!, had concentrated again at Harstad. Very bad 
weather with snow showers and low visibility prevented the 
observation of these movements by the German air reconnais-
sance. And the exhaustion of the German troops hampered 
their patrols so that the Germans did not realise what was 
going on. (69) In the four consecutive nights from 4th/5th to 
7th/8th May, 4,700, 4,900, 5,100, 5,200 and finally the last 
4,600 British, French, Polish and some Norwegian soldiers 
were concentrated and embarked on the troop transports 
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assembled at Harstad and left in several convoys for Great 
Britain. (70) 
The evacuation and Operation Juno 
This operation was also successfully disguised from the 
German intelligence. Even when the xB-Dienst recognised 
heavy shipping movements, they first thought it might be 
reinforcements coming in. (71) This led to additional pressure 
on the German side for a relief operation of the two battle-
ships Gneisenau and Schamhorst, the heavy cruiser Admiral 
Hipper and four destroyers against the Allied concentrations at 
Harstad. (72) 
On June 4th the Commander of the Fleet, Admiral Marschall, 
left with his force for the Operation Juno. The enemy situation 
was not very clear. While ordered to attack the concentration 
of transports at Harstad he, travelling north, gained the 
impression of an Allied evacuation already in operation. When 
aircraft reported ships to the south with westerly courses, 
Marschall changed his target in contravention of his received 
orders from the SKL and the Naval Group Command, causing 
the second crisis in the leadership of the fleet and finally his 
relievement. (73) 
The details of the operation, which led to the sinking of the 
carrier Glorious and some other ships, but failed to intercept 
the real evacuation convoys with the troops, are well known. 
(74) 
Not so well known is the reason why the German ships could 
attack so freely in the Norwegian Sea. The British intelligence 
got no early indication of the German operation, and the air 
reconnaissance did not report the German force until they 
reached Trondheim. (75) The Home Fleet at the time was 
distracted by a false report from the Q-ship Prune/la about 
two unidentified ships proceeding towards the Iceland-Faroes 
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passage, leading the Commander in Chief Home Fleet to fear 
a German sortie into the Atlantic, always the most dangerous 
possibility for his command, and he sent his fast battle cruisers 
into this area, away from the evacuation convoys and the 
German ships. Because there were no radio signals about the 
German ships, no countermeasures were taken in time. (76) 
So the Norwegian campaign ended with intelligence failures on 
both sides, which prevented the Germans from achieving 
greater successes with their heavy ships, and hampered the 
possibilities for the British of bringing the dangerous German 
ships into battle. 
Summary 
Generally speaking the German commanders in Norway and 
at sea were supplied with more exact intelligence, mostly 
because of the success of the German naval xB-Dienst in 
cracking the British Naval Cypher No. I with the result that 
about 30 to 50 per cent of the intercepted signals were 
available with short delays. Also, after the establishment of air 
bases in Norway, the German air reconnaissance could furnish 
much better information than the British. 
On the British side there was a great amount of information 
available from many different sources, but the collation and 
evaluation of this material, and its presentation to the decision-
makers and to the commanders in and off Norway was 
ineffectual. Even the success of Bletchley Park in reading the 
new "Enigma"-cypher "Yellow", introduced on April lOth for 
the intercommunication between the German army and air 
force , could not usefully be used because of the absence of 
an evaluation and distribution system. (77) For the same 
reason the capture of intelligence materials during the cam-
paign produced relatively unimportant results until June 1940. 
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On April 14th the destroyers Fearless and Brazen captured 
from the sinking U 49 off Harstad maps and orders for the U-
boat operations, but when they arrived in London the German 
U-boat operations had practically come to an end because of 
the torpedo failures. (78) 
And on April 26th British search operations against some 
German special service trawlers, sent out to cut cables from 
Norway to Great Britain, led to the sinking of the Schiff 37 by 
the destroyer Arrow and the capture of the Schiff 26 by the 
destroyer Griffin off the Romsdalfjord. Looting of the second 
ship by the boarding party prevented Bletchley Park from 
making use of the captured cypher materials and documents as 
expected. Only in May was it possible to solve the cypher 
settings for six days of April. (79) 
So the experience of this failure was only of use for the 
future. 
In the decision-making processes the Germans had the great 
advantage of having the initiative, and of having the possibility 
of planning beforehand and arranging the command relations 
for a combined operation before its outset. These arrangements 
generally worked well. But there were on the German side two 
crises, first with Hitler's nervousness from April 14th to 18th 
which was overcome by the strong recommendations of 
General Jodl, and secondly with the problems between the 
SKL, the Group Command West and the Fleet Commander 
during Operation Juno, which have just been described. 
On the Allied side problems arose because there were several 
decision-making bodies which had to react to surprising events 
which no one in command had imagined. It took time and 
disappointments before controversial orders to army and navy 
commanders and problems of seniority could be overcome, and 
when the arrangements for joint leadership of the different 
services of four nations were started, it was too late. There 
was also the interference of the authorities in London, 
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especially that of the First Lord of the Admirally, with direct 
orders on tactical operations, when it should have been 
sufficient to send all available infonnation concerning the 
enemy and then let the commander on the spot make decisions 
according to the situation of his forces, the geographical and 
meteorological conditions, and his own observations about the 
enemy. (80) 
Finally we must remind ourselves of what could have hap-
pened if the Gennan torpedoes had functioned as one would 
have expected after such a long development of this weapon. 
The failure of lhe Gennan technicians to test this weapon 
under realistic conditions probably saved lhe Allied Navies 
great losses which might have had grave consequences for the 
future operations of the war. (81) 
When I look back at my own experience in preparing the two 
papers for the conferences at Canakkale and Narvik, it is 
interesting to note that there were many critical analyses about 
the Dardanelles campaign available when, almost exactly 25 
years later, the operations around North Norway were planned. 
There were even people who had participated in the battle of 
1915 in positions such as deciding politicians, soldiers or 
sailors, who now had to take new decisions. (82) But had they 
re-evaluated their own memories using lhe analyses available 
from all participating nations? It seems that most of the 
lessons were disregarded. I think we historians must not only 
work together regardless of borders between us, but must 
invite lhe politicians and decision-makers to join us as our 
Norwegian hosts did. We must be grateful for their effort. 
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French Participation in the Battle 
for Narvik 
P. Masson 
Both the timing and the extent of the German invasion of 
Norway came as a great surprise for the Allied Command. On 
the French side, no preparations had been made. The French 
Prime Minister, Paul Reynaud, was astonished to find that the 
French force set up at Brest at the beginning of March had 
been disbanded, and that one had to start again from scratch. 
This made him consider the possible dismissal of the Com-
mander in Chief of the French forces, General Gamelin. 
In the meantime, a new expeditionary force was being set up 
at Brest. It was made up of three echelons: first the 5th and 
then the 27th Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs Alpins under 
General Audet, and General Bethouart's 13th Demi-Brigade 
Foreign Legion together with the Polish brigade. In addition 
to these three echelons, there was the 2nd Light Division made 
up mainly of the 2nd Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs Alpins. In 
fact, this last unit had barely reached Scotland when it was 
called back home on 10 May to face the German onslaught in 
the West. 
Troops and stores and equipment were carried in 10 convoys, 
the departures of which, from Brest, were staggered between 
12 April and 5 May. Convoys were mustered from 14 April 
to 10 May at Greenock, on the west coast of Scotland, where 
the French navy kept several supply ships, such as the tankers 
Mekong, Lot and Tarn, the ammunition carrier Margaux, and 
the patrol boat Leoville which was used as a seaborne base. 
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Altogether, the French navy mustered the 1st Division of 
armed merchant ships under Rear-Admiral Cadart (the liners 
El Djezair, El Mans our, El Kantara, and Ville d' Oran), as 
well as 15 passenger ships and 14 cargo ships which had been 
commandeered. Cover was provided by French torpedo boats 
and destroyers. 
The French expeditionary force was given the Narvik operation 
as an assignment by an Allied decision made on 9 April. But 
as early as 14 April, it was decided, on politial and military 
grounds, to move the joint Anglo-French contingent to Central 
Norway. It was expected that a pincer movement starting from 
Namsos and Aandalsnes would drive the Germans out of 
Trondheim. The first French echelon, together with the 5th 
Dcmi-Brigade de Chasseurs Alpins under General Audet were 
sent to Namsos which was already occupied by a few British 
battalions. The landings of the troops and supplies were 
staggered between 19 April and 27 April and proved difficult 
to carry out. 
The very next day, however, the British Commander ordered 
the evacuation of Aandalsnes and N amsos despite the objec-
tions of the French. Several facts led to this decision: mount-
ing pressure exerted by the German forces, the power of the 
Luftwafle, the high exposure of ground forces, onshore 
supplies and ships due to the lack of air cover and AA guns, 
and lastly, the makeshift harbour facilities including wooden 
piers and no lifting gear. 
Moreover, another mistake was made in having the troops and 
their supplies conveyed by separate convoys travelling at 
different speeds. The troops ran short of heavy weapons and 
even ammunition within several days of their landing. One 
ship, the Ville d' Alger, had to pull back because of the 
dreadful weather after having put on the shore only some of 
the troops on board. Skis were unloaded on shore but without 
their bindings ... To crown it all, the loading of the cargo 
ships at Brest had been a complete mess, ships were loaded 
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as the railway waggons came in, without any schedule, 
ignoring both where the units belonged in the overall military 
structure and their requirements in the field. And then most 
supplies were destroyed by aerial bombings in Namsos harbour 
on 28 April. 
The troops were evacuated during the night of 2 and 3 May 
by Allied ships under Vice-Admiral Cunningham; the ships 
included the Montcalm, the destroyer Bison and the liners of 
the lst Division of armed merchant ships. They managed to 
sail down the fjord without trouble, but once out on the high 
seas, air attacks sank the Bison and the British destroyer 
Afridi. The 5th Demi-Brigade de Chasseurs Alpins under 
General de Division Audet was taken back to Scotland and 
was then no longer involved in the Norwegian campaign. Once 
back in France, it was eventually surrounded and forced to 
surrender at Saint Valery-en-Caux after the collapse of the 
Somme. 
While the Allied gambit in Central Norway wa~ a total failure, 
the British Command, after endless waverings, decided to 
revive the Narvik operation. Conditions seemed right. All the 
German destroyers had been sunk or gutted by the Warspite 
group. From 15 to l7 April, three British battalions managed 
to gain a foothold at Harstad in the Lofoten islands. The 
second echelon of the French expeditionary force joined them 
from 27 April to 30 April. The 27th Demi-Brigade landed at 
Skaanland and Salangen. Supplies were unloaded later at 
Harstad and Skaanland. The 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign 
Legion and the Polish brigade landed at Harstad, Skaanland 
and Salangen from 7 to 9 May. Supplies carried on board five 
cargo ships were unloaded at Harstad and Skaanland from 9 
to 12 May. 
Landings had to be staggered because the Anglo-French base 
at Harstad had many faults: moorings were inadequate, there 
were no facilities to carry out repairs on motor vehicles, there 
were not enough buildings to provide shelter for equipment 
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and other supplies. Since loadings at Brest had not been 
planned properly and there were no lists, the French alpine 
troops never retrieved their jackboots or their sunglasses. The 
lack of that part of their equipment led to many cases of 
frostbite and of snowblindness. All the ammunition of the 27th 
Demi-Brigade travelled on board a single cargo ship. Had the 
laner been sunk, the firing capability of the troops on land 
would have been reduced to six hours. 
To quote an officer in the French navy, the base at Harstad 
was a "real bear-house". Each unit ordered that its equipment 
be unloaded and took it away without any checking. And he 
added: "We were getting conflicting orders from British and 
French officers, each one with his own order of priority. They 
went round the ships looking for their supplies and the crews 
of the cargo ships did not know what they had on board". 
What made things even worse was that the ships were being 
unloaded under heavy aerial bombings, particularly after 15 
May. There were not enough AA gun batteries to protect all 
the exposed areas. It was only from 21 May that two fighter 
squadrons, one of Gladiators and the other of Hurricanes, were 
able to operate out of Bardufoss. Many ships, such as the 
cruiser Curlew and the destroyer Grom, the liner Chrobey, and 
the tankers Pembroke, Castle and Balteako were sunk or set 
on fire by the Luftwaffe. 
Worse was still to come, since there were also disputes among 
the leadership. General de Brigade Bcthouart, the French 
commander of the French troops, was an expert at mountain 
warfare. His earlier assignment as French military attache in 
Finland had given him a sound knowledge of the Scandinavian 
theatre of operations. In the beginning he reported to Admiral 
of the Fleet the Earl of Cork and Orrery, Supreme Commander 
of the whole expeditionary force, and to Major-General P.J. 
Mackesy, Commander Land Forces. The two British command-
ing officers had a disagreement. 
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Admiral the Earl of Cork and Orrery advocated a stmight 
landing close to Narvik, so as to take advantage of the 
protection of the ships. Mackesy, however, was cautious and 
even fearful, and wanted the troops to make a circular move 
forward in a carefully planned fashion, up the fjord from 
Bogen and Ballangen at the same time, while the French and 
the Norwegian units moved up from Salangen. 
General Bethouart, who fully shared the views of Admiral 
Cork and Orrery, managed to make his own compromise 
proposal prevail after having done some reconnaissance work 
off the coast of Narvik. Without giving up the idea of a 
circular move forward, he advocated a landing by lhe 13th 
Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion at Bjerkvik, so as to secure the 
German-held 0yjord peninsula and Elvegaard camp where 
large Norwegian supplies were kept. This first operation was 
to be followed by a second landing close to Narvik itself. The 
operation had every chance of being successful given the 
Allied superior force of 25,000 troops against 3,000 German 
troops. 
It began on 12 May. The battleship Resolution, the cruisers 
Ejfingham and Vindictive, and five destroyers opened fire 
under General Belhouart's command against the German lines 
of defence. According to an eyewitness, Captain P.O. Lapie of 
the French Foreign Legion: "The scene was at once striking 
and weird, as though from a very ornate theatre show with a 
weallh of sets and on a film strip at lhe same time ... Houses 
were ablaze ... After an hour's steady artillery fire it was 
suddenly dead still, and the sea beyond the beach was 
swarming wilh little black boats full of troops bobbing up and 
down. It was lhe first battalion on its way to storm Bjerkvik." 
The little town was taken after overcoming stiff enemy 
resistance which had to be driven out of every street and 
house. The civilians were sorely tried because they were not 
evacuated before lhe fighting began. A legionnaire retains lhe 
memory of "an appalling crossroads strewn wilh torn corpses, 
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with dead babies lying under their overturned cots, the 
wounded moaning in pools of their own blood". The landing 
of a second battalion led to the securing of Maby and the 
Elvegaard army camp. Next day, the troops that made the sea-
landings were able to join up with the Polish troops that had 
come up the road along the shore and with the Chasseurs 
Alpins and the Norwegian troops that had come down from 
Stratangen. The success of the landing at Narvik brought about 
the dismissal of General Mackesy who was replaced by 
Lieutenant-General Auchinleck. The latter appointed General 
Bethouart commander for the whole area of Narvik and all the 
Allied forces there. 
While the British tried to check the advance of the Gennan 
relief force moving up from Trondheim towards Mo and Bod(j, 
General Bethouart planned the final move which began on 28 
May. The Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion and a Norwegian 
battalion landed at Omeset, east of Narvik, with the support 
of the ships' guns which had been brought to bear for the 
second time. 
The fighting at Omeset was very tough for the Poles con-
cerned. The Germans launched a counterattack with the air 
cover supplied by the Luftwaffe. the latter hitting the cruiser 
Cairo very badly and driving the Allied ships away. Dietl's 
forces, for fear of being trapped, began to give way and to 
fall back along the railway line towards Sweden. The Nor-
wegians thereupon marched into Narvik. 
It turned out to be a short-lived victory. As early as on 24 
May, the impending disastrous outcome of the battle of France 
with the British Expeditionary Force trapped at Dunkirk 
prompted Winston Churchill's decision to evacuate Narvik. 
The troops that had carried out the orders in the field, at any 
rate the British and the French, were informed on 26 May. 
The evacuation was carried out throughout five consecutive 
nights beginning 3 June, and involved the destruction of the 
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railway line, the harbour facilities and the power station. This 
was done without any major interference by the Luftwaffe 
because of low cloud. But the success of the move was 
marred by the loss of the aircraft carrier Glorious sunk by the 
guns of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau despite the gallant 
sacrifice of its two destroyers. The RAF pilots who had 
supported the ground forces during the battle of Narvik all 
went down with the carrier. 
At a particularly gloomy juncture for the Allied cause the 
Narvik success may seem a mere hollow one. Did it not spell 
the end of the Norwegian campaign and did it not happen at 
a time when the final outcome of the Battle of France was no 
longer in doubt? Narvik will nevertheless continue to have an 
enormous and lasting effect in France. This single victory 
during a tragic spring shows that French army units under a 
good commander and integrated into a close-knit force can 
win. Let us also add that the Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion 
was still in Britain when the truce was signed by France, and 
that it was the first unit of the French forces that joined 




Polish Forces in the High North 
M. Borkowski 
After the defeat of Poland by Nazi Germany, following the 
sudden and ruthless aggression of September I 939, not all 
soldiers of the defeated Polish army dispersed or were taken 
prisoners of war. Tens of thousands, in concentrated groups, 
crossed the Romanian and Hungarian frontiers in an attempt 
to reach France or England. In the belief that the war could 
only result in good, they were making their way to join the 
Allies and to take their part in the final crushing of Germany. 
In May !940, Polish units on Allied tenitory numbered 82,000 
officers and men, 45,000 of whom took an active part in the 
defence of Norway and France. 
The Battle for Narvik was the first real battle fought by Polish 
soldiers after the September defeat, and it proved that t11e 
Poles had not laid down their arms, but rather that they had 
joined the Allies boldly, under the war cry so deeply rooted 
in the Polish national consciousness: "For your freedom and 
ourslt. 
1. Participation of the Independent Podhale 
(Highland) Rifle Brigade in the battle for Narvik 
During the night of April 8 1940, Nazi Germany made a 
surprise attack on Norway. German troops landed at a number 
of points on the Norwegian coast: Oslo, Arendal, Stavanger, 
Kristiansand, Bergen, Trondheim and Narvik. The Norwegian 
government mobilised their forces and asked the Allies for 
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help. In the afternoon on April 9, following an agreement 
between the governments of Great Britain and France, a 
decision was taken to send Allied troops named "Nonh-
Westem Expeditionary Force" to aid the Norwegian army 
fighting in the region of Narvik. The corps, with the consent 
of the Polish government in France, incorporated the Indepen-
dent Podhale Rifle Brigade. 
The order to create the Independent Podhale Rifle Brigade (1) 
was issued on February 9, 1940. The brigade was set up 
promptly from battalions separated from the 1st and 2nd 
infantry divisions in Brittany and and elsewhere in France. 
Initially it was intended to be transferred to the Finnish front. 
The composition of the brigade was diverse: some officers, 
mostly career ones, were greatly experienced after the fighting 
in Poland, but nearly 90 per cent of the privates were volun-
teers from Polish emigre families in France, Belgium and 
Holland, none of whom had had front line experience. 
By the end of the formation process, the brigade was com-
posed of staff, communications, motorised section and two 
demi-brigades. Each dcmi-brigade was composed of staff 
company, auxiliary weapons company and two rifle battalions. 
Colonel Zugmunt Bohusz-Szyszko. promoted to the rank of 
Brigadier General before setting off for Norway, was nomi-
nated commander of the brigade. He was an experienced 
officer; among other things, he had been in command of the 
!6th infantry division during the 1939 September campaign in 
Poland. An important characteristic of the brigade's organisa-
tional set-up was its inability to conduct independent opera-
tions for want of organic artillery, armoured weapons and 
antiaircraft defences. At the time that the brigade was em-
barked, (on French transport vessels, the Mexique, Chenon-
ceaux and Co/umbie, which occurred during the night of April 
23) the numerical strength of the brigade was 4,778 officers 
and men. It had twenty-five 25 mm armour-piercing guns, 
fifteen 8 J mm mortars, fifteen 60 mm mortars and 68 heavy 
machine guns. 
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After several days of lying in the roadstead off the port of 
Greenock, the convoy, together with the Polish brigade and 
detachments of the French 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion, 
accompanied by destroyers, set off for Nonh Norway. It 
crossed the Polar Circle on the night of May 3. The 13th 
Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion and the Polish brigade together 
formed the 1st Light Rifle Division under the command of a 
French general Marie Emile Bethouan (2). Poles constituted 
one-third of Allied armed forces operating in the region of 
Narvik and nearly 50 per cent (3) in the actual battle for 
Narvik, after the Britsh troops were moved to the region of 
Bodiil and Mosj0en. 
Initially the Polish brigade was to disembark at Troms0. 
However, the King, the Government and the Norwegian 
Parliament stayed in the town. It was feared that the presence 
of military troops could attract German aircraft, and so two 
days later the Polish brigade was disembarked at the port of 
Harstad on the isle of Hinn!ily. The I st and 2nd Battalions of 
the 1st Demi-Brigade were immediately directed to patrolling 
the nonhem part of the island while the 3rd was moved to 
Ballangen where it replaced the detachments of the Foreign 
Legion; the 4th was sent to Salangen. 
After the ships departed, it took fourteen days to apportion the 
supplies. (This was because the troops had been loaded in 
France without keeping to the organisational scheme.) Nearly 
the whole rolling stock of the 4th battalion was lost: 21 
trucks, 2 passenger cars, and 10 motorcycles. The 1st Battalion 
moved to the front without grenade detonators and without 
ammunition belts for heavy machine guns which were not 
found in time from among the piles of luggage. (4) 
At that time the Allied Command drew up a plan to crush the 
enemy's right flank, i.e. the Windisch Group, and to clear the 
0yjord peninsula in order to make a starting point for the 
attack on Narvik. General de Brigade Bethouart was entrusted 
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with carrying out the plan. Plans were made for simultaneous 
attacks; by the 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion from the 
direction of the sea, and from the north, through Grassdalen 
valley towards Hartvig Lake. 
An auxiliary role in the Bjervik landing operation was played 
by the 2nd Battalion of the Podhale Brigade under the 
command of Lieutenant-Colonel Wladyslaw Dec who attacked 
the enemy's right flank from the direction of Bogen. The 
Poles were transported by fishing boats from Harstad to Bogen 
on May I I and at 9 p.m. on the following day the companies, 
covered by Norwegian skiers, moved eastwards working their 
way through heaps of melting snow. Despite the extremely 
difficult conditions of their advance, (the Gennans had pulled 
down all the bridges over deep ravines and streams) the 
Podhale Brigade soldiers, carrying all their equipment on their 
backs, covered the distance of more than 25 kilometres in less 
than sixteen hours, and their appearance behind the defences 
accelerated the enemy's withdrawal. The battalion's advance 
through such rough country was recognised by the Allied staff 
as an extraordinary achievement. 
A participant in the Bjerkvik operation, the then Private 
Wojciech Lipinski, who is present here in the delegation of 
Polish war veterans, recalls that exhausting combat march: " ... 
The route that our platoon had to cover was the most difficult. 
We had to move along the very shores of the Ofotfjord. After 
many hours of working our way through the heaps of melting 
snow (some soldiers even crawled on their knees putting snow 
rackets on their hands) we were deeply exhausted and many 
soldiers fell asleep while marching. We owed a lot to the 
protection of the Norwegian skiers. At one moment, seeing our 
utter exhaustion they made walls out of snow to let us rest for 
several hours and took the watchman's duty. We joined the 
battalion 24 hours later." (5) 
During the night of May 13 the Poles and the Legionnaires 
worked together to draw away the Gennan patrols covering the 
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section of the road between Berkvik and 0yjord. During the 
evening of May 15, the 2nd Battalion was relieved of duty by 
the 14th Battalion Chasseurs Alpins and, according to General 
Bethouart's order, set off for Bjerkvik to embark for the 
Ankenes peninsula. 
As a result of the three-day Allied operation, the situation of 
Major-General Dietl's troops deteriorated considerably. The 
loss of the 0yjord peninsula meant Allied mastery of the 
Narvik garrison from the north. Only the waters of the 
Rombaksfjord lay between the Allies and Narvik, which was 
no major obstacle as the British navy had supremacy at sea. 
On May 17 the Narvik operational area was divided into two 
regions: the region of Ankenes - from the north bordering on 
Ofotfjord and from the west on Aefjord; under the orders of 
the commander of the Independent Podhale Rifle Brigade; and 
the region of B jerkvik - under the orders of the commander 
of the 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion. On May 16 and 17 
battalions of the I st Podhale Demi-Brigade released the British 
and French troops on the Ankenes peninsula. This arrangement 
was strengthened by the arrival of the 4th reserve Battalion on 
May 19. Only the 3rd Battalion remained in the region of 
Ballangen to secure the supply bases. Detachments of the I st 
Podhale Demi-Brigade defended the ridge of the Ankenes 
peninsula from the vi!lage of Baetberget to Hi!ls 295, 405, 677 
and 734 until May 27 inclusive. The demi-brigade occupied 
two battalion defence regions. The 1st Battalion was on its 
right flank and the 2nd on its left. The commander of the 
demi-brigade, Colonel Benedykt Chlusewicz, held the 4th 
Battalion in reserve and on May 22-24 it was transported from 
the region of Tjelbotn (the headquarters of the 2nd Demi-
Brigade) to the Ankenes peninsula. 
Initially, the German numerical strength in Ankenes was 
composed of two companies of mountain troops (Gebirgsjager) 
and later, under the threat of Allied invasion of Narvik, it was 
increased to two battalions. 
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General Bethouart's operational order issued on May 22 
stipulated that the 1st Light Rifle Division, using pan of its 
force, would attack the Narvik peninsula from the 0yjord 
peninsula The attack was to take place at midnight on May 
27 in order to make counteraction by the German Luftwaffe 
more difficult. 
The Independent Podhale Rifle Brigade (1st, 2nd and 4th 
Battalions) suppcrted by a detachment of Chasseurs Alpins, 
two tanks of the 342nd Company, a battery of French 75 mm 
guns, two English field howitzers and artillery of the British 
cruiser Southampton, was to seize control of the rest of the 
Ankenes peninsula at the same time stopping the attacked 
Germans from escaping along the shores of the Beisl]ord. East 
of Bcisl]ord, the Poles were to join forces with the Foreign 
Legion approaching from the north, and close the ring around 
General Dietl's troops on the Narvik peninsula. 
The 3rd Battalion of the Podhale Brigade, located in the 
region of Ballangen, and two Chasseurs Alpins rifle battalions 
made up General Bethouart's reserve, which was to move into 
action in the final stage of the battle to contain any Gennans 
that would manage to escape from Ankenes and Narvik or to 
drive them out to Sweden. 
Having studied the division commander's order, the com-
mander of the Podhale Brigade, General Bohusz-Szyszko, 
decided to launch an attack in two different directions: Colonel 
Benedykt Chlusewicz's forces (1st Battalion and a detachment 
of the 4th Battalion) were to attack east to capture the village 
of Beisfjord, and Colonel Wladyslaw Dec's 2nd Battalion, was 
to make itself independent of the dcmi-btigade, and launch an 
attack northward towards Ankenes and Nyborg. Such an 
operational solution was not exactly what General Bethouart 
had in mind when he insisted on the necessity of seizing 
Beisl]ord, but the occupation of that village would prevent the 
escape of the Germans from Ankenes and lead the Podhale 
Brigade round to the rear of the Narvik corps. 
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The right flank attack of Colonel Chlusewicz's troops was 
preceded by a reconnaissance canied out by the 4th Battalion 
which, on May 27 at 2 p.m. secretly left Mattisjorden to 
encircle the enemy from the south. After a twelve hour march 
it reached the region of Iverdalryggen hill on the following 
day. From here, after a prearranged light signal, it was to 
attack the enemy's rear positions on Hill 606. At 6 p.m., 
without waiting for the signal, and remarking a German 
withdrawal, the commander decided to launch an attack. Hill 
606 was captured, but the attack did not coincide with the 
operation of the 1st Battalion from Chlusewicz's demi-brigade 
which started its attack at 00.01 hours on May 28 and after a 
heavy battle, captured Hill 773 at 9.30 p.m. The 1st Company 
supported by a heavy machine gun platoon set off for the 
village of Beisfjord but it reached only as far a~ Lakselven 
valley. Because the soldiers were exhausted with climbing, it 
proved impossible to take advantage of the success of the 
advance troops, and the idea of making the 2nd Reserve 
Company give hot pursuit to cut off Haussel's troops' escape 
route through the village of Beisf]ord towards Kvanta pass and 
on to Sildvik, was abandoned. The march was resumed on the 
following day, and at 5 a.m. patrols of the 1st Battalion 
entered a Beisf]ord cleared of Gennans, where the rest of the 
battalion joined them at 3 p.m. Later they all moved towards 
the Kvanta pass without meeting any significant enemy forces. 
Colonel Dec's troops launched an attack on May 28. The 
attack by the 2nd Battalion's left flank started at 00.01 hours 
after a 20 minute artillery barrage. The 3rd Company sup-
ported by a heavy machine gun and a mortar platoon, attacked 
on both sides of the highway leading to Ankenes. However, 
the tanks which were to support it ground to a halt the 
moment they entered the struggle. Despite that misfortune, the 
company continued to attack with great vigour and eventually 
reached the southwestern outskirts of Ankenes. Here, however, 
it encountered heavy machine gun and mortar fire and, after 
heavy losses, had to withdraw at about 3 a.m. 
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The Gennans launched an immediate counterattack taking 
advantage of the gap which occurred between the 1st and the 
3rd Company. Their capture, at about 5 a.m., of Hill 295 
disorganised the command and communications systems of 
Colonel Dec' s detachments. The danger was averted by the 
3rd Company of the 4th Battalion which moved into battle 
from the brigade's rear echelon and took its positions on the 
southern and western slopes of Hill 295. Unfortunately, despite 
three successive attempts, the recapture of the hill proved to 
be impossible. The Gennans left it voluntarily at midnight 
after the loss of N arvik, there being no point in remnaining on 
the Ankenes peninsula longer. In U1e moming of May 29, the 
3rd Company of the 4th Battalion entered Ankenes and took 
it without struggle. 
Colonel Dec's 1st Company, supported by the fire of the 
heavy machine-gun platoon, began an attack at 02.00 hours 
from Hill 295 towards Haugen. Slowly but systematically, it 
moved forward until its left flank came under fire from the 
Gennans who, in the meantime, had seized Hill 295. The 
company then lay low until the morning of May 29. 
The only real success was scored by the right-wing 2nd 
Company, supported by fire from the 2nd Demi-Brigade 's 
heavy machine gun and mortar platoons and a British howitzer 
half-battery. During the seven-hour battle they forced their way 
through the Gennan defences and reached the rock crest at the 
village of Nyborg. From that position, they kept the Gennans' 
main Nyborg-Fagernes escape route under machine-gun fire 
and, together with the 2nd Company of the 4th Battalion, 
inflicted heavy losses on the escaping enemy. The occupation 
by the two companies of the village of Beisfjord clarified the 
situation in the Ankcnes section and improved the position of 
the Foreign Legion, because the Gennan resistance on Hill 457 
subsided and this accelerated the Gennan defeat on the Narvik 
peninsula and the eventual seizure of Narvik. (6) 
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Seizing control of the Nyborg and Lyngenes region on the 
southern side of Beisfjord and of the southern side of Laks-
elven valley finally deprived Dietl's group of support on the 
Ankenes peninsula. 
Driving the Germans away fron the Ankenes peninsula was an 
unquestionable combat success on the part of the Polish 
brigade, but it was also a source of joy and pride for all the 
soldiers. For most of them, participation in the Battle for 
Narvik was their "baptism of fire", and they had demonstrated 
their endurance and determination to fight and given numerous 
proofs of their personal courage. Many of them did not live 
until the end of the battle: Polish army losses in the Battle for 
N arvik amounted to 97 killed, 189 wounded, 7 taken prisoner 
and 21 missing. The German losses along the Polish section 
of the front are estimated at 190 officers and men, including 
60 POWs. 
Driving the Germans away from the Ankenes peninsula did 
not mean an end to the combat activity of Polish troops. On 
May 30, the staff of the Polish Podhale Brigade received 
another order to remain in combat readiness for the attack on 
Hundalen via Sildvik. The entire 1st Demi-Brigade, for this 
purpose concentrated at Beisfjord, was to take part in the 
attack. However, the 2nd Battalion was too exhausted and, for 
the time being, the men were incapable of fighting. the 3rd 
Battalion, transported to Salangen, received the order to cover 
the region of the airfield at Bardufoss. 
In the meantime the 1st Battalion, knowing nothing about the 
evacuation due to error in the command system, managed 
(with the help of the 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign Legion) to 
move the line of its own defence further east. When the 1st 
Battalion joined detachments of the 13th Demi-Brigade Foreign 
Legion along the Klubnes line and on Hills 675 and 660, a 
new order came ordering them to cover the evacuation of the 
whole brigade. All bases in the region of Narvik and the 
0yjord peninsula were covered until June 8. 
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The evacuation was carried out smoothly and in secrecy, but 
the brigade's heavy equipment and rolling stock was mostly 
destroyed. Fishing boats were used as a means of transporting 
the soldiers to the British destroyers which later set off for 
Troms0 where the soldiers boarded transport vessels. The 
brigade set off for Scotland on June 9. Partial reloading took 
place at Greenock and on June 13 the brigade left for Brest 
in France. 
The operation of the Independent Podhale Rifle Brigade -
despite its final success in fulfilling the tasks set by the 
commanders of the 1st Light Rifle Division - has been 
criticised by military historians. They draw particular attention 
to command errors; characteristic was the breaking of the 
principle of concentrating on the main object of attack. The 
tendency to troop dispersal was noticeable in General Bethou-
art's operational plan, in General Bohusz-Szyszko's orders and 
also in the operation of individual units. From the operational 
point of view, the Ankenes direction was of secondary 
importance and it should only have received protection. 
A decisive solution, not only for the fighting on the Ankenes 
peninsula but also for the whole Narvik operation, could only 
be brought about by t11e Beisfjord-Sildvik operation, i.e. attack 
on the rear positions of Haussels' section where the main 
attack would be concentrated. 
The failure of the attack carried out by Colonel Dec' s troops 
was due to shallow, linear grouping and a poor choice in the 
direction of the strength of the action. Colonel Dec launched 
three companies in one line along the five kilometre long 
front, distributing among them all the battalion's howitzers, 
without leaving reserves and without focusing on the seizure 
of the enemy's main defence point. General Bohusz-Szyszko 
accepted this tactical solution which eventually led to the crisis 
after the defeat of the 3rd Company. 
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In turn, Colonel Chlusewicz's group, because of excessive 
caution and lack of practice in mountain operations, advanced 
too slowly (3-4 km a day); the reconnaissance of the enemy's 
rear was also a failure. The commander of the brigade had a 
groundless fear of a Gennan attack from the direction of 
Ankenes on Chlusewicz's rear positions and this also slowed 
down the already not too swift speed of attack. (8) 
Independently of the aforementioned criticisms it should be 
stressed that the lack of adequate progress in operations on the 
Ankenes peninsula, and the considerable losses suffered there, 
had their sources primarily in the brigade's inadequate supply 
of annoured and artillery equipment, lack of air support and 
in the Jack of combat experience of the majority of soldiers 
and their inability to carry out operations in the mountainous 
and climatic conditions of North Norway. Apart from that, the 
plan and the course of the Battle for Narvik were undoubtedly 
under pressure from the decision to evacuate the Allied 
Expeditionary Corps from Norway which had already been 
taken on May 24, 1940 but whose implementation (owing to 
the finn position of General Bethouart) was postponed until 
the seizure of Narvik. An unusual situation arose in which the 
commander had his attack order in one pocket and his 
evacuation order in another. The actual capture of Narvik 
became just a matter of military honour though, in fact, it 
served to achieve an orderly departure. 
It should be emphasised that the operation of the Independent 
Podhale Rifle Brigade and the combat worthiness and moral 
values of its soldiers on the Narvik battlefield won high 
recognition from Allied command. "I am using this oppor-
tunity", says a special message of May 26 addressed to the 
commander of the brigade by Colonel Finne, representative of 
the Norwegian anny in the Allied command, "to tell you, Mr. 
General, that of what I have seen and heard, the troops 
fighting under your command are among the best and the most 
disciplined it has ever been my pleasure to see. I know that 
156 
General Ruge's and General Fleischer's opinion is the same." 
(9) 
In addressing the troops which took part in the battle, General 
Bcthouart specifically congratulated the French and the Polish 
soldiers " ... who in extremely strenuous conditions showed the 
enemy and the whole world the combat readiness of the Allied 
infantry and artillery". (10) 
2. Participation of Polish warships 
and merchant ships in the Norwegian campaign 
Expecting the German attack on Norway, the Allied Corn-
mand, in early April, prepared in the Scapa Flow base a 
special multipurpose team, separate from the Home Fleet, 
especially for operations in this region. It was composed of 
mostly Polish warships and merchant vessels which, after the 
loss of Polish ports in September 1939 went undet the 
command of the British Admiralty. The team of destroyers 
which was to cover the landing operations included, among 
other warships, Polish destroyers: the B/yskawica, Grom and 
Burza whilst the transport fleet included Polish motor ships: 
the Chrobry, Batory and Sobieski. These were large, modem 
passenger ships which could accommodate more than I ,000 
men at a time. Apart from that, two Polish submarines: the 
Orze/ and Wilk, as well as a number of smaller boats also 
served under the British Admiralty Command. 
The operation of the Polish navy in the Norwegian campaign 
was begun by the Orze/ submarine (Commander: Captain Jan 
Grudzinski) which on April 8, that is on the eve of the 
German aggression on Norway, sank the German vessel the 
Rio de Janeiro which was carrying several hundred Gennan 
troops towards the southern Norwegian coast. Those who were 
picked up after the wreck said U1at U1ey were heading towards 
the port of Bergcn. This infonnation could have eliminated the 
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possibility of a surprise attack, but it was completely dis-
regarded by the Norwegian command. 
The division of Polish destroyers went into action for the first 
time during the evening of April 7 as part of the main force 
of the Home Fleet under Admiral Forbes' command. The 
group was looking for German warships in a region many 
miles off the Norwegian coast while the numerous groups of 
German warships at sea at that time were much closer to the 
coast. Because of this, the attempt to counteract the Nazi 
landing operation in Norway was abortive. At midday on April 
9 Admiral Forbes directed the main forces of the Home Fleet 
to the north to lead them out of range of the German planes 
which were using several airfields already captured in South 
Norway. The Polish destroyers did not join the big ships in 
their voyage to the north because, together with the British 
destroyer Tartar, they received the order to escort the convoy 
of ships from the Norwegian coast to the British ports. The 
Polish warships and the Tartar reached the convoy safely; it 
was composed of 31 vessels fleeing from Norway and, 
incidentally, transporting gold from the Norwegian bank. The 
whole convoy reached the British ports without loss. On April 
12 the Polish vessels docked at Rosyth whence, after refuel-
ling, they moved on to Scapa Flow. 
It was there that they were given a new task connected with 
the decision of the Supreme Military Allied Command to 
disembark French and British troops in central and northern 
Norway. Ships with landing troops including Polish military 
transport vessels the Batory and Chrobry started to leave 
Scapa Flow and Rosyth on April 11. The transport vessels had 
an escort of their own and their safety was further guaranteed 
by numerous protective and patrol units. One of the patrol 
units was composed of the ORP Blyskawica and the Gram and 
the British destroyer HMS Tartar. On April 14 and 15 the 
team carried out a patrol operation off the Norwegian coast. 
On April 17, it was despatched to the aid of the heavy cruiser 
Suffolk which had been damaged by a German aircraft, and 
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under the protection of the destroyers, the cruiser was safely 
escorted to Scapa Flow. 
Meanwhile the transport vessels Chrobry and Batory fonned 
part of teams engaged in transporting the first groups of Allied 
landing troops. The Batory (Captain Edward Pacewicz) and 
two British transport vessels under the protection of the liner 
Valiant and nine destroyers brought the landing troops to 
Harstad and the Chrobry (Captain Zygmunt Deyczakowski) -
to Namsos. 
The unit of Polish destroyers under the command of Com-
modore Stanislaw Hryniewiecki was sent to the northern coast 
of Norway on April 19. In the evening of April 21 only the 
ORP Blyskawica (Commodore Stanislaw Nahorski) and the 
ORP Grom (Commodore Aleksander Hulewicz) reached the 
waters of Vestfjord. The ORP Burza (Commodore Wojciech 
Francki) had to return to port as she was damaged during a 
stonn. The Grom and Blyskawica spent their first week 
patrolling the waters of V estfjord and many other small fjords 
along the coast of Norway. At that lime they accounted for 
one-fifth of the overall strength of the Allied navy in North 
Norway because, in addition to them, there were only ten 
destroyers in the area. By the end of April, fresh Allied 
warships started to arrive in the region of Narvik, mainly 
cruisers and destroyers, the ORP Burza, among them. At that 
time, the commander of the Allied troops in Norway, Admiral 
of the Fleet, William Henry Boyle Lord Cork and Orrery, 
using the warships' artillery fire, was trying to force the 
Gennan garrison at Narvik to surrender. On April 28 the ORP 
Grom was sent to Rombaksfjord and the ORP Blyskawica 
penetrated fjords south of Narvik. The Polish warships were 
to destroy enemy positions, roads and railway lines as well as 
other objects of military importance. Both destroyers coped 
with the task rather effectively, pressing the enemy hard with 
120 mm artillery gun fire day and night. 
159 
The tasks of the British warships were similar. But Admiral 
Lord Cork expected more than just shelling of the German 
positions. Although, because of the deep waters in the fjords, 
the ships could come close to the rocky coast, and managed 
to destroy a number of enemy positions, they, however, did 
not manage to force the Gennans to surrender. 
The Gennan anny's offensive in central Norway was accom-
panied by increased activity of the Luftwaffe in the region of 
Narvik. The Allied ships often had to fight with the planes 
defending not only themselves but also the Allied troops. All 
the three Polish destroyers took part in the fighting. 
The ORP Blyskawica which was patrolling the fjords in the 
vicinity of Narvik was shelling the Gennan positions. In the 
evening of May 2 she entered Rombaksfjord when~ she was 
attacked and damaged. 
On May 3, the Blyskawica was replaced in Rombaksfjord by 
the ORP Grom which kept shelling the Gennan positions day 
and night destroying three guns of a exposed battery and 
several other objecL~. On the following day the Grom was 
attacked by the Luftwaffe. The bombs dropped by one of the 
three high-flying aircraft hit the midship. The ship broke in 
two and sank in less than three minutes. 
The Gennan soldiers opened fire on U1e shipwrecks with 
machine-guns. British cruisers and destroyers rushed to the 
scene. The rescue operation lasted 40 minutes. 17 officers 
including the captain and 137 noncommissioned officers and 
seamen, 26 of them wounded, were rescued. Fifty-nine crew 
members were killed. 
The ORP Blyskawica returned to her position in Rombaksfjord 
on May 5. During the day the ship was attacked several times 
with aerial bombs and in the evening she shelled a Gennan 88 
mm AA battery and managed to silence it Hit by 11 shells, 
the Polish warship escaped practically undamaged. On ti1e 
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following day the Luftwaffe attacked the B/yskawica from 
morning till dusk. Commodore Nahorski directed his ship to 
the larger fjord - Heljangsfjord - where, using the engine and 
the rudder it was easier to avoid the bombs. The ship was not 
hit. The 8/yskawica artillery men downed one enemy plane 
and damaged two others. 
From May I, the ORP Burza stayed in Harstad taking part in 
rejection of aerial attacks on the base. On May 2 the ship 
patrolled the fjords west of Harstad and on the following day 
it transported a detachment of French Chasseurs Alpins 
riflemen and towed several landing craft from Skaanland to 
Gratangen. From May 4 it operated near Skaanland where her 
captain acted as commander of a naval region. The ship's 
main task was the antiaircraft defence of personnel and 
materiel unloaded in Skaanland. The Luftwaffe attacked the 
ships with particular ferocity: for example, on May 5, eleven 
bomb airraids were made but, owing to the strong antiaircraft 
defence, no major losses were inflicted. On May 7, the ORP 
Burza covered the landing of Polish Podhale riflemen. This 
unexpected meeting in combat conditions had an especially 
friendly character. 
On that day in the evening the ORP Burza, with the com-
mander of the 1st Light Rifle Division, General Bethouart and 
officers of his staff on board, went out on a reconnaissance 
mission in the region of B jerkvik. After the return and 
unloading of the staff at Skaanland the ship went to Harstad 
where it met the ORP Blyskawica. 
Then a decision was taken to send Polish warships to British 
ports. (I I) 
The Polish destroyers left the Norwegian waters but the white 
and red flag remained there until the end of the hostilities. On 
May I I. the military transport vessel Chrobry, arrived at 
Harstad bringing reinforcements of Allied troops and a new 
commander of the Allied army in North Norway, Lieutenant-
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General Claude Auchinleck and his staff. 
On May 14, the Chrobry with 1,200 British soldiers on board 
left Harstad and assisted by the British destroyer Wolverine 
and the gun boat Stork set off for Bodiil. Oose to its objective 
the unit was attacked by Gennan aircraft 
The attack was concentrated on the Chrobry the biggest and 
the least anned vessel in the group. Despite the antiaircraft 
gun fire the Polish ship was hit by several bombs. The fire 
spread so quickly that there was no hope of saving the vessel. 
Abandonning ship was a smooth operation. The HMS Wol-
verine which approached the sinking vessel from the stem 
picked up 695 shipwrecked, and the Stork, several hundred 
others. However, many soldiers went down with the ship, and 
12 members of the Chrobry crew died. 
The sinking of the Chrobry was a considerable loss for the 
Polish navy. The Allied forces in North Norway also suffered 
in its wake because after the loss of equipment and materiel, 
the rescued soldiers and seamen were transported back to 
Harstad and on to Britain. 
The second attempt to reinforce the Allied troops in the region 
of Bodiil was undertaken as late as May 17 when reinforce-
ments from Great Britain arrived in Harstad brought in there, 
by, among others, the Polish military transport vessels: the 
Batory and Sobieski. Both ships took part in the evacuation of 
the entire Allied Expeditionary Corps from Norway early in 
June 1940. 
The last two patrols of the ORP Orzel submarine are to a 
certain extent connected with the operation in Norwegian 
waters. The first was carried out from April 28 to May 17, 
1940 in the North Sea. The second started on the evening of 
May 23 and the ship was never seen again. No explanation of 
the ship's disappearance has ever been discovered. Sixty 
seamen and six officers perished on board the ship. 
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The disappearance of the Orzel, the sinking of the ORP Grom 
and the bombardment of the Chrobry were considerable Polish 
losses in the Norwegian campaign. These losses could not be 
cushioned by the sinking by the ORP Orzel of the German 
transport vessel Rio de Janeiro and another unidentified ship 
as well as the shooting down of two German planes by the 
Blyskawica. 
These losses were the price of the typical effective daily 
activity of Polish warships and vessels during the Norwegian 
campaign - they are impossible to express in numerical terms. 
* * * 
The capture of Narvik was one of the brighter spots against a 
background of continued Allied failures in the years 1939-
1940. "Our soldiers", wrote General Bethouart in one of his 
despatches, "wrote in N arvik a history whose name is as hard 
as iron, as bright as glory and as mysterious as the Great 
North; Narvik was to shine with joy and trust in the dark days 
of May 1940 and to leave priceless memories in the hearts of 
the 10,000 boys who survived it." (12) 
The Poles contributed a great deal to the Allied victory. On 
July 17 1940, in Scotland after the reading of the roll of the 
dead, the Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile 
and Commander in Chief of the Polish Army, General 
Wladyslaw Sikorski decorated the banner of the Independent 
Podhale Rifle Brigade and many of its soldiers with the 
highest Polish combat decoration - the Virtuti Military Order. 
On December 9, the Commander in Chief of the Norwegian 
armed forces, Major-General Fleischer, on behalf of King 
Haakon VII bestowed on all Podhale Brigade soldiers the 
privilege to wear a cord in Norwegian national colours with 
a golden lion on the left ann. After the war, the people of 
163 
Narvik erected a monument to Polish seamen at Ofotfjord. 
Polish war veterans, participants in the Battle for Narvik, were 
honoured by King Haakon with medals and diplomas bearing 
the inscription: "Norway warmly thanks you for all that you 
have given her in the struggle for Freedom". 
Notes 
1. The name of the brigade comes from the tradition of the 
Podhale regiments in the prewar Polish army. Reminiscent of 
the tradition were long, green cloaks provided by the French 
commissariaL 
2. The 1st Light Rifle Division together with the 24th (Guards) 
Brigade and support units made up the North Western 
Expeditionary Force; the name was adopted on May 12 after 
the forces previously operating in the region of Trondheim. By 
the same token, the combat force of the corps equalled that of 
12 battalions: three - of British Guards, three of Chasseurs 
Alpins riflemen, two - of the Foreign Legion, and, four - of 
Podhale riflemen. On May 12 General Claude Auchinleck took 
over command of the Allied army in North Norway from 
General Mackesy. At the same time, he also assumed control 
of the local air force. 
3. Cf. Witold Bieganski, Narvik, Warsaw 1979, p. 15. 
4. Janusz Odziemkowski, Narvik 1940, Warsaw 1988, p. 95. 
5. Delivered orally to the author on Feb. 21, 1990. 
6. Cf. Felicjan Majorkiewicz, Narvik, Warsaw 1957, p. 123. Alex 
Buchner, Narvik - die Kampfe der Gruppe Diet/ im Fruhjahr 
1940, Heidelberg 1958, p. 139. 
7. Polish and German losses are quoted from "Polski czyn zbrojny 
w I! wojnie swiatowej" (Polish Armed Effort in World War I!), 
vol. /l, Walki formacji polskich na Zachokzie 1939 - 1945 
(Struggles of Polish Formations in the West 1939 - 1945, 
Warsaw 1981, p. 112. 
8. Cf. F. Majorkiewicz, op. cit., pp. 128-131; W. Bieganski, op. 
cit., p. 31; J. Odziemkowski, op. cit., p. 178. 
9. Quolation from F. Majorkiewicz, op. cit., p. 154. 
10. Ibid. 
11. In all probability, the decision came in effect of intervention 
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of the Polish Navy Delachment in the Admiralty or of the 
Division Commander, Commodore Hryniewiecki with Admiral 
Lord Cork and Orrery. It could have been evoked by the 
anxiety about the fate of Polish ships caused by the loss of the 
ORP Grom and the intensification of the activity of the 
German Luftwa!Te in the region of Narvik. It could also be the 
physical and psychical exhaustion of sailors who have had no 
rest for a long period of time and who were depressed by the 
fate of the ORP Grom. (Polish Armed Effort in World War ll), 
op. cit., p. 97 
12. Quolation from F. Majorkiewicz, op. cit., p. 154. 
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Chapter 1. 0 
The Narvik Campaign 1940: A Summary 
O.Kr. Grimnes 
The battle for Narvik was decisively shaped by conditions 
prevailing from the very outset of the operations. The Germans 
conquered a town which was situated so far to the north that 
they were perforce isolated there. This isolation became a 
permanent feature of the campaign even if the Germans 
received some reinforcements from the air and some specialists 
and a certain amount of civilian goods in transit through 
Sweden. Furthermore they were given the opportunity to 
evacuate some wounded men by Swedish railways. In addition, 
the German invasion force was fairly small, a prerequisite of 
the invasion project being that the troops must be transported 
on board warships which could only carry a limited number 
of men. An isolated and small German force was thus a 
characteristic throughout the campaign. It had only light 
weapons at its disposal as the heavy equipment did not arrive 
according to plan. 
On the other hand, German preparations for the attack on 
Narvik had been thorough. The landings were canicd out as 
planned. The troops were well trained and highly motivated. 
Through surprise the Germans not only established their 
bridgehead but were also able to consolidate it before the 
Norwegians and the Allies were able to counterattack by land 
on any significant scale. This at the same time provides an 
explanation of why it took so long to drive back the almost 
completely isolated, small-sized, and lightly armed German 
force. It was given the time to dig in. 
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The Allies and the Norwegians were detennined to throw out 
the enemy, but they had been taken by smprise: confusion 
reigned, and they were hampered by lack of preparations even 
though Norwegian troops were better prepared in North 
Norway than in the south, there having been extensive call-
ups for the neutrality defence force in North Norway during 
the Winter War. What further distinguished the Narvik 
campaign from operations in South Norway was that in the 
north the Norwegians and the Allies had more time to mount 
a counterattack, and gradually were able to do so with superior 
forces because the Allies, unlike in South Norway, controlled 
all sea lines. 
Topography and natural conditions always play a part in 
military operations but at Narvik they made for a particularly 
complex situation, the war frequently being more of a combat 
with geography and meteorology than with the enemy. A great 
number of fjords cut into the mainland and made it difficult 
to carry out coherent operations. At one moment the troops 
had to be transported by boat, the next they were marching on 
foot in rugged terrain. There were so many bare mountains 
and such a lack of roads that mountain warfare above the 
timber line became typical of the campaign. Winter receded 
only slowly, cold and snow, later spring thaw and slush 
bearing heavily on the campaign. 
This was a campaign where war at sea, in the air, and on land 
all played their part, but in proportions different from what 
was prevalent during the operations in South Norway. Sea 
warfare was important and there were battles at sea of a kind 
that never took place in South Norway. On the other hand, the 
war at sea was largely decided within a matter of days. It was 
clear after the battles in the Ofotfjord on 10 and 13 April that 
the British controlled the sea, having inflicted on the Gennan 
navy a defeat from which it was never wholly to recover 
during the remainder of the war. This British victory meant 
that the Gennan troops never received any help from the sea, 
that they were shelled continually by the British navy, and that 
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the Allied attacks readily assumed the fonn of landings from 
the sea. It also meant that the Allies by and large could 
transfer their troops by boat when they so wished. it was 
mostly farther south, in the Helgeland campaign, and during 
the evacuation after the operations at Narvik had come to an 
end that the British suffered casualties at sea. 
In the air the parties were more of a match than in South 
Norway where the Gennans were always superior. At Narvik 
the latter had for a long time only a slight advantage because 
Gennan planes had to operate from distant airfields in South 
Norway. However, the British established hegemony in the air 
at the end of May when British fighter planes could finally 
operate from a freshly completed airfield north of Narvik and 
not from aircraft carriers which had to stay far off the coast 
for fear of Gennan bombers. This hegemony was to become 
an important factor in the Allied reconquest of Narvik. 
Land warfare was decisive in the sense that the chief objec-
tive, control of Narvik, could ultimately be obtained only by 
operations on land. Here the main pattern of development was 
as follows: a well established and consolidated Gennan 
bridgehead was gradually brought on the defensive, its forces 
being forced to relinquish its very core, the town of Narvik, 
but finally when they were at the point of surrender, the 
whole campaign was called off because the Allies had to 
withdraw due to disasters on other fronts. The gradualness of 
this development and the fact that the Norwegians and Allies 
were forced to rely on superior force to reconqucr Narvik are 
conspicuous facts about the campaign. To explain them the 
historian is thrown back on those basic conditions prevailing 
from the very out~et of the campaign which have been 
mentioned. 
Two aspects of the campaign are particularly characteristic: 
mountain warfare and landing operations. The fanner has 
already been touched upon. Much of the war was fought in 
open and roadless mountainous terrain. As for landing 
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operations the Gennan forces anived at Narvik by means of 
a landing operation and two of the most important Allied 
operations were landing enterprises, the first when B jerkvik 
was taken 12-13 May, and the second when Narvik was 
reconquered on 28 May. Landing operations required the 
cooperation of navy and anny, and at the reconquest of Narvik 
the air force was involved too. These operations were a 
distinct feature of the Narvik campaign both in the sense that 
they had no parallel in South Norway on the Allied side and 
that landing operations had not yet become a regular occur-
rence in war generally. 
The relationship between the long-drawn-out and stubborn 
mountain warfare on one hand and the swift landing opera-
tions on the other is interesting but can also turn into a 
controversial subject. Here we find the well known difference 
between the two Allied commanders, Lord Cork who wanted 
to wager the whole campaign on a dashing landing operation, 
and Mackesy who wished to proceed slowly and systemat-
ically, advancing towards Narvik step by step on either side 
of the Ofotfjord. The upshot was a mixture of both, advance-
ment on land and two landing operations. But which was more 
effective to the final outcome, the warfare on land or the swift 
landing operations? And who were most important for the 
landing operations, the navy which made the crossing at sea 
possible, or the anny which put into the field the men who 
actually vanquished the enemy? Such questions are relevant 
not only to the different branches of service, but also to 
different nations because there was an international division of 
labour during the operations. The Norwegians would dearly 
like to consider the mountain warfare their particular domain 
although Polish and French forces participated in them to 
some extent. The French made up the majority of the landing 
forces though Norwegian units participated in the reconquest 
of Narvik. The British exercised control of the sea which was 
necessary for the landing operations. 
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The NaiVik campaign was a European multinational undertak-
ing in which altogether five nations participated. In a sense 
there was a multinational campaign in South Norway, too, but 
at NaiVik there were Poles who did not take part in events 
further south, and at NaiVik the relative strength of the various 
anti-German forces were more evenly balanced than in South 
Norway where the Norwegians constituted the bulk of resist-
ance against the Germans. At the same time, multinationality 
was distributed in such a way that there was only one nation, 
the Germans, on one side. This made for homogenity and 
clarity on this side, strengthened by the uniform German chain 
of command. There was no doubt as to who was the Com-
mander in Chief; it was General Dietl, and as the German 
navy was of little importance after 13 April there were few 
problems of coordination between army and navy. Coordina-
tion between air force and ground forces was also smooth on 
the German side. 
Relations between the Allies were much more complicated, 
and the NaiVik campaign provides an illustrating example of 
the difficulties encountered when several nations are to 
conduct a campaign jointly. The differences were aggravated 
by the fact that the Allies had to improvise so much from the 
outset and that opposing views of land warfare and landing 
operations were coloured by interstate controversy. 
In consequence, the Allied and Norwegian campaign as a 
whole is marked by little integration. This applies particularly 
to the Norwegian side of the campaign. The Norwegian 
warfare in the mountains started before the Allies were able 
to mount their operations on land and generally was conducted 
without much linkup with Allied operations. The British use 
of their forces provides another example, in this case of troops 
that were at hand but for a long time hardly participated in 
any operations. The British ground forces were the first to 
arrive of all the Allied ground forces but were engaged in 
combat on a larger scale only from around the middle of May 
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when they were dispatched southwards to participate in the 
Helgeland operations. 
There are campaigns that end in victory for one side, defeat 
for the other. There are campaigns which end inconclusively 
and there are campaigns which end in disintegration and 
chaos. The distinguishing mark of the Narvik campaign is that 
it has no clear loser, but several winners, each in his own 
way. The Allies did not lose but withdrew at a time when 
they were advancing victoriously and the Norwegians were 
triumphant just as the campaign was called off. The Germans 
did not lose either though they were on the point of surrender-
ing when the campaign ended and they were the ones who 
could move into Narvik as the ultimate conquerors of the 
town. There is something agreeable about a war that has no 
losers, only victors ... 
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